Global Development Cooperation after Monterrey

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Global Development Cooperation after Monterrey

Results and Perspectives from the Financing for Development Process

by Jens Martens (WEED)1

The UN Conference on Financing for Development (FfD), that took place from 18-22 March 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico, revived the debate about the future of North-South cooperation. Despite the publicly proclaimed Monterrey Consensus here are different standpoints in this debate. Both the forms and contents of cooperation are a matter of controversy. This also applies to the assessment of the Monterrey Conference itself. Some see it as a further example of unsuccessful UN diplomacy and ineffectual, symbolic global politics. Others emphasise its innovative multi-stakeholder approach, that for the first time brought together the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) plus business and NGOs in order to find common solutions for the problems of development financing. For them the FfD Conference is a showcase example of a global public policy network, that may form the core of future global governance structures.

There are likewise mixed views on the results of the FfD conference. Some think the Monterrey Consensus was nothing but a neoliberal "Washington consensus under a sombrero" (John Foster, North-South Institute). Others see in it a "comprehensive political agenda for the financing of sustainable development" (Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, German minister for economic cooperation).
In the preparatory process the EU and the USA vigorously resisted attempts to turn Monterrey into a globalisation summit. The leitmotif of the first draft of the final document was still: "Towards a fully inclusive and equitable globalisation"2. It was deleted from the Monterrey Consensus following pressure from the US and the EU. Nevertheless, the argument about the negative consequences of gobalisation and possible alternatives to the predominant neoliberal approaches ran through the whole of the FfD process. It will be crucial for the final assessment of the FfD conference whether the impetus and assignments emerging from it in this regard are used to achieve more just governance structures and a fair balance of interests between North and South – transcending the rhetoric of partnership.

The FfD Process: Example of a New Multilateralism?

For many participants at the Monterrey Conference, for example the Dutch Development Minister Eveline Herfkens, the FfD process was "unique" because not only the governments and NGOs but also the International Financial and Trade Institutions and the private sector were fully involved in preparations. Besides traditional aid issues, the conference agenda included the topics of trade and investment, establishing domestic financial markets, foreign debt and reforms in the international financial system. These have all been dominated in the last two decades by the IMF, World Bank and the WTO, along with their national counterparts, the finance and economics ministries. It is only consistent that the United Nations had attempted from the start to integrate these actors in the process. They expected greater political status for the conference and a higher degree of legitimisation for its results. While the World Bank had early on indicated its interest in being involved, the IMF and the WTO were more hesitant. During the preparatory stage the IMF continually warned against any intervention in its jurisdiction and successfully prevented any practical proposal for its reform from being included in the Monterrey Consensus.

The large-scale involvement of private enterprise was a further innovation in the FfD process. For the first time in the history of the United Nations not just business associations but also individual companies received the same accreditation rights as NGOs. Besides civil society organisations like the Third World Network or terre des hommes, groups like Cisco Systems or the Deutsche Bank were able to participate in the negotiations. This decision established a precedent that de facto undermines the previous rules for participation of Non-Governmental Organisations as defined last in 1996 in an ECOSOC resolution.3 The consequences in terms of international law are not yet foreseeable. At any rate, governments here took a further step towards the integration of business interests into the work of the United Nations.
Big Business in Monterrey
The following Corporations and Business Associations were represented at the official Roundtables at the Monterrey Conference:
AB Volvo, Sweden

African Business Round Table

Allied Zurich, United Kingdom

AMBAC Financial Group Inc., United States

Barra Mexicana Colegio de Abogados ,Von Wobeser y Sierra, SC, Mexico

BRED Banque Populaire, France

Business Coordinator Council

Business Council for Sustainable Development - Mexico, Mexico

Business Council for the United Nations, United States

Business Council on Sustainable Development - Argentina, Argentina

Calvert Funds, United States

Capital Markets Credit Society, United States

CEMEX, Mexico

China Online, China

Cisco Systems, United States

Cisneros Group of Companies, Venezuela


Daimler Chrysler Mexico, Mexico

Deutsche Bank Research, Germany

Dogan Sirketler Grubu A.S., Turkey

EFG Private Bank S.A., Switzerland

Electolux, Sweden

ESKOM, South Africa

Eurorient, United States

Evian Group, Switzerland

Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Israel

Financial Services Volunteer Corps (FSVC), United States

FireXchange, United States

Frank Russell Company, United States

GF Securities, China

Grameen Phone, Bangladesh

Grupo Empresarial Olmeca, Mexico

Grupo Emyco Mexico


Grupo IMSA, Mexico

GTFI Fund Management, Poland

Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services, India

Institute of Liberty and Democracy, Peru

International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), France

KfW, Germany

Miranda Guimaraes Associados Advocados S/C, Brazil

Money Matters Institute

Moody's Investors Service, United States

ONDEO Suez, France

Potomac Associate, United States

Samuels Associates, United States

Securitas, Sweden

Securities Industries Association (SIA), United States

Societe du Louvre, France

Soros Fund Management, United States

Spring Investment Corporation, United States

Standard and Poor's, United States

State Street Global Investor Services Group, United States

Suez, France

Total Fina Elf, France

Uganda Small Business Enterprise, Uganda

Ultraquimia Group, Mexico

United Bank of the Philippines, Philippines

Upstart Business Strategies, South Africa

Violy, Byorum & Partners Holdings, United States

Vistech Corporation, United States

World Economic Forum, Switzerland

Zurich Group, Switzerland
That means that a concept of global governance is increasingly gaining ground in the United Nations that in view of the global problems sees the governments as having reached the limit of their room for manoeuvre. It therefore supports new forms of multilateral cooperation of state and private actors.4 Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Director of the UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks, and his colleagues stated on this question:
Governments and international organizations alone are nor longer able to address ever more complex global policy issues. The corporate sector and civil society are significant players in almost all global policy domains. Their active engagement is a critical if not imperative component in delivering policy outcomes that are timely, effective and legitimate”5
The report of this project sees global policy networks of public and private actors as constituting the future of international cooperation beyond traditional multilateralism of nation states.6 Kofi Annan's initiative for a Global Compact between the UN and business ( and the resolutions of the General Assembly entitled "Towards Global Partnerships" are based on this same approach.7
Yet the Monterrey process also shows the limits of the global policy networks. In many areas the opposing interests of NGOs and business representatives allow of no compromise and their interventions practically neutralize each other (e.g. on the Currency Transaction Tax). In addition, many of the developing countries of the Group of 77 were sceptical about any further opening up of the UN towards NGOs and private enterprise, fearing the loss of their intergovernmental sovereignty. In the whole preparatory process and increasingly after 11 September the US demonstrated its lack of interest in any multilateral agreement under the auspices of the UN. It would have sufficed for the US if the conference had produced a joint declaration highlighting what it saw as the three most important "commitments and ideals": peace, freedom and capitalism.8 In view of the American dominance and the "arrogance of power" demonstrated by the US president in Monterrey many saw the FfD conference less as an example of a new multilateralism than as the expression of its acute crisis. The process of seeking new forms of international cooperation will therefore continue after Monterrey.

The Leitmotif: Washington Consensus under a Sombrero

The decision to conduct an autonomous UN conference on Financing for Development was taken at the end of 1997 under the impact of the Asian financial crisis. This shed a glaring light on the shortcomings of a development model primarily geared to opening up markets, liberalisation and deregulation. These issues were also to be raised in the run-up to the Monterrey conference.

So the conference was about far more than "just" money. Ultimately the question was to discover the outlines of what had been rather overbearingly called a "new development paradigm", in view of the failure of the development policies of the last few decades with their fixation on the state and the market. The neoliberal development policy encapsulated in the Washington Consensus was up for discussion (see box). It was no accident that the result of the FfD conference received the title of Monterrey Consensus. That was to demonstrate the final departure from the Washington Consensus and present an alternative. But those whose death is forecast tend to live longer. Some of the motifs of its Washington predecessor run through the Monterrey Consensus. A central role in development financing is attributed to private capital flows. The conditions for promoting and protecting foreign direct investments are therefore to be improved. Trade is seen as a "engine for development" and trade liberalisation as an important element of the sustainability strategy (sic!) of a country.
This basic orientation is watered down rather half-heartedly at other places in the final document. For example, the liberalisation of capital flows are supposed to take place "in an orderly and well sequenced process consistent with the development goals"9. Elsewhere the governments stress: ”We recognize that the appropriate role of government in marked-oriented economies will vary from country to country”10
The blind belief in the market of earlier years is undoubtedly passé, while the Monterrey Consensus presents as an alternative to a resolute "one as well as the other". This becomes apparent in its diplomatically balanced judgement of globalisation:
Globalization offers opportunities and challenges. The developing countries and countries with economies in transition face special difficulties in responding to those challenges and opportunities. Globalization should be fully inclusive and equitable, and there is a strong need for policies and measures at the national and international levels, formulated and implemented with the full and effective participation of developing countries and countries with economies in transition to help them respond effectively to those challenges and opportunities.”11
In response to the economic globalisation of past decades many NGOs and academics call for economics to be reintegrated into politics. While Monterrey came one step nearer to this goal we may well expect the Washington Consensus to die hard.

The Washington Consensus
In 1989 US economist John Williamson12 listed measures he thought essential to bail out developing countries with solvency problems. Under the name of Washington Consensus the list became the basis of the structural adjustment programmes of the IMF and World Bank. In its original form the consensus comprises 10 elements:

  • Fiscal discipline (i.e. generally cutting public spending)

  • Public expenditure priorities including primary health and education

  • Tax reform, including cutting marginal tax rates, broadening tax base, improving administration, tax capital flight

  • Financial deregulation

  • Unified competitive exchange rate (for trade)

  • Unilateral trade liberalization

  • Replace quantitative trade restrictions with (progressively lower) tariffs

  • Liberalize Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) rules

  • Privatization and deregulation

  • Property rights

The Official Outcome: the (Minimal) Consensus of Monterrey

The official outcome of the FfD conference played hardly any part at Monterrey itself. It was finalised at the last PrepCom in January 2002. This happened not least due to the enormous pressure applied by the US, which made the participation of its president dependent on the conference not being overshadowed by unresolved conflicts about the final document.

What came out of the almost two years of negotiations was a compromise paper of 16 pages and 73 paragraphs, reflecting the minimal consensus of the governments that is apparently the only one possible at the moment13. In its main part this Monterrey Consensus is concerned with the six great thematic areas around which the FfD negotiations had focused:

  1. Mobilisation of domestic resources

  2. Foreign investments and other private capital flows

  3. Trade

  4. International financial and technical cooperation

  5. External debt

  6. Systemic issues: enhancing the coherence and consistency of international monetary, financial and trade systems.

Governments were largely in agreement about the central role to be played in the development process by domestic resources and internal conditions. The final document of the Monterrey Conference therefore stresses the importance of good governance, of democracy and human rights, an efficient tax system and a functioning financial sector. The demand of the US for enshrining its three basic principles of "peace, freedom and capitalism" in the final document was largely met. Only the notion "capitalism" was replaced by "market orientated policies".

There was also agreement between industrialised and developing countries on the enhanced promotion of foreign direct investments. Demands from the business sector, primarily to improve the investment climate in developing countries so that companies could operate "efficiently and profitably" were also included. The text no longer contains the proposal propagated by the EU within the WTO on a "multilateral framework on FDI". Nor does it contain any reference to the OECD Guidelines for multinational companies and the Global Compact, deleted after pressure from the G77. Companies are merely called upon to "consider" social, gender-specific and development-related consequences of their activities, besides the economic and financial side. The NGOs had called for greater entrenchment of duties and standards for foreign investors but this was rejected by almost all governments.
The passages on trade confine themselves basically to affirming the positions and results of the fourth WTO ministerial conference of Doha. They refer particularly to the need for "special and differential treatment" of developing countries. The appropriate provisions in trade agreements should be made more "precise, effective and operational". In order to compensate for falling export income the Monterrey Consensus asks for an increase in multilateral aid. It particularly refers to the IMF's Compensatory Financing Facility.
The Monterrey consensus is quite categoric that a substantial rise in official development assistance (ODA) is necessary in order to achieve the internationally agreed development goals. Yet numerous proposals from the preparatory process fell victim to the self-imposed pressure to reach a consensus, and under pressure from the US: this also concerned the initiative to immediately double ODA by 50 billion dollars. Instead, as originally discussed, of agreeing on a fixed phased plan to raise ODA, the consensus paper merely refers to "examine the means and time frames". All passages about the financing of global public goods were also deleted – despite the active support of this issue e.g. by the French and Swedish governments. New finance instruments, primarily the Currency Transaction Tax (”Tobin Tax”), were not even included in the draft text out of deference to US opposition. There was merely agreement on examining the study commissioned by the UN Secretary General in the "appropriate forums".
In the area of external debt the Monterrey Consensus was not very productive either. It demands the immediate implementation of the extended HIPC initiative and consideration of worsened growth prospects in the assessment of debt sustainability. Further, the effect of debt relief on the realisation of the millennium goals (poverty reduction etc.) should only be considered in future study of debt sustainability. In the preparatory process to the Monterrey conference considerable progress had been made in the discussion about introducing a fair and transparent arbitration procedure (FTAP) for debt relief – by analogy with insolvency law. All that remains in the final document is the recommendation to examine an international "debt workout mechanism" in the appropriate forums.
The systemic issues on the agenda of the FfD conference remained the most controversial until the end. The US and EU opposed any demands for real institutional reforms in the international financial system. All that remained are appeals to involve developing countries more strongly in the decision-making processes of the international financial institutions and to reinforce the UN, particularly the General Assembly and ECOSOC. The follow up process to Monterrey is to feature the common spring meetings of ECOSOC and the Bretton Woods Institutions along with the biennial High-Level Development Dialogue of the General Assembly. The latter is given the power to deal with development policy coherence and consistency of the international monetary, financial and trade system. Representatives of the G77, in particular, consider this a substantial upgrading of the UN over against the IMF, World Bank and WTO.
The G77 also rate it a success for them that a FfD follow up conference is to be held. The details are to be decided at the latest in 2005. It is, at first sight, hard to comprehend what the developing countries expect from another conference in view of all the opposition and blocks encountered in the FfD process so far. Their main motive is apparently the hope of keeping the tough economic and financial topics on the UN agenda.

The Extras of Monterrey: More Money from the EU and US

Since the final document initially contained no specific commitments to raise ODA, many expected from the EU and US that they would go beyond the minimal consensus of Monterrey by unilateral promises. In fact George W. Bush and his European colleagues did not go to Mexico empty-handed. It was probably a mixture of public pressure, political calculation and the insight into real needs that prompted the EU and US to announce a rise in their aid budgets in a mutual "beauty contest".

The heads of state or government of the EU decided at their summit in Barcelona on 16 March to raise their average ODA level by 2006 to 0.39% of GNP. For Germany this means a rise from 0.27% (2001) to 0.33%. In all EU aid should rise this way from currently 25 to 32 billion dollars. This decision was blocked to the end by the German finance ministry and only accepted at the last minute with the intervention of the federal chancellor himself. The ministry immediately announced that the decision was by no means binding on it and was subject to the usual budgetary proviso. Nevertheless the EU decision did mark a political turnabout.
President Bush announced at the same time that he would progressively raise American ODA spending until 2006 from 10 to15 billion dollars (2004: +1.66 billion, 2005: +3,33 billion, 2006: +5 billion). The allocation of funds should however be tied to strict conditions to be laid down unilaterally by the US administration. Consequently it may be assumed that the money will be used more as a bonus for good behaviour for the most loyal allies of the US in combating terrorism. The fact that Bush proclaimed, almost in the same breath, that the military budget would be raised next year by 48 billion dollars indicates the real priorities of current US policy.
Precisely these additional 48 billion dollars would, according to World Bank figures, be necessary per year in order to achieve the development goals agreed at the Millennium Summit.14 Oxfam International has done further calculations and on the basis of figures from the World Bank and the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health come to the conclusion that the additional costs worldwide are even around 100 billion dollars per year (see table).

Additional financing requirements to realise the MDGs ($bn per year)

Halving extreme income poverty


15Source: Oxfam International

But the additional funds announced by the EU and US in Monterrey add up to just 12 billion dollars – and only as of the year 2006. Provided they were fully used for combating poverty they would still only cover a fraction of the financial requirement. In other words, with available funds it will not be possible to halve the share of people living in extreme poverty by 2015 nor to achieve the other international development goals by then. If there is no immediate correction the inadequate financial promises of Monterrey really mean goodbye to the millennium goals.

UN Millennium Development Goals
“We resolve further:

  1. To halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the world’s people whose income is less than one dollar a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger and, by the same date, to halve the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water.

  2. To ensure that, by the same date, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling and that girls and boys will have equal access to all levels of education.

  3. By the same date, to have reduced maternal mortality by three quarters, and under-five child mortality by two-thirds, of their current rates.

  4. To have, by then, halted, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS, the scourge of malaria and other major diseases that afflict humanity.

  5. To provide special assistance to children orphaned by HIV/AIDS.

  6. By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers as proposed in the ‘Cities Without Slums’ initiative.”16

The Unfinished Business of Monterrey
It would be wrong to measure the success or failure of the Monterrey conference solely by its official final document and the amount of additional ODA promised. Independently of the results on paper, global conferences play an important role in political discourse. Frequently they bring new topics into the international discussion and thereby make them amenable to political solution. New debates are sparked off in the course of preparations at the national and international levels, sharpening public perception of global problems. In the five-year preparatory phase a host of new ideas and initiatives arose of which only a fraction made it into the Monterrey consensus. Many proposals remain contested and many ideas need to be further developed in the follow-up process. The best example is the recommendations from the report of the Zedillo Panel of June 200117. The most important topics requiring further work include:

1. Corporate Accountability

The Monterrey Consensus stresses the positive effects of private business commitment and argues one-sidedly for the promotion and protection of foreign investments. There is no reference to the need for checking the impacts on development of these investments and to influence it through international regulation. The negative consequences of increasing privatisation and commercialisation are not dealt with, nor is the political influence of TNCs. In the follow-up process the balance must be reinstated. The World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg offers the next opportunity for this. In the run-up to the summit an international campaign was launched, calling for a convention on corporate accountability. Important elements of such an instrument would be: an internationally applicable liability law, far-reaching publicity obligations, an international competition law to prevent monopolistic market structures and cartel formation, plus the international harmonisation of corporate taxation in order to halt the world-wide race to the bottom.

2. Realisation of the Millennium Goals

The development goals agreed at the Millennium Summit of Heads of State or Government in the year 2000 continue to form an important normative basis for international development policy, even if their realisation was not financially guaranteed in Monterrey. They are to be publicised in a UN awareness campaign in the next few years and will therefore certainly attract more public attention. The debate about how to put them into practice will stress the question of how to raise the necessary funds. But the goals themselves and their political function should also be discussed. The reduction of development to only a few quantitative goals, particularly in the field of combating poverty and meeting basic needs, contains the danger of forgetting more comprehensive development approaches. The discussion could even be depoliticised.

3. The Concept of Global Public Goods

A new conceptual framework for global environmental and development policies has developed in the last three years -Global Public Goods (GPGs) 18. The topic was intensively discussed in the run-up to Monterrey. At the end it fell victim to the opposition of the USA and the negotiating tactics of the G77. However the topic is far from dead. Sweden and France have already stated that they will initiate an international Task Force to work on defining and financing GPGs. Starting from the observed market failure, a decisive question will be whether the idea can lead to higher legitimisation of intergovernmental action and multilateral cooperation. Further points for discussion will be redefining the public and private nature of goods and thereby indirectly also the areas of responsibility of the market and the state. Who ultimately has the power of definition?

4. Innovative Financing Instruments

in view of the lack of readiness of industrialised countries to raise their ODA in the necessary quantities, and the visible financial shortfall, the search for new financing instruments took off in Monterrey. International taxes and levies are central here, because they can also assume important steering functions besides the raising of funds.19 The best example is the proposal for a Currency Transaction Tax (CTT or ”Tobin Tax”). In the course of a global campaign by NGOs and trade unions it has gained considerably in political support. The German ministry for economic cooperation raised a lot of interest with an event at Monterrey presenting the study of Frankfurt economics professor Paul Bernd Spahn on the feasibility of such a tax. In her plenary presentation the minister emphasis the advantages of such a tax. She was supported by French president Jacques Chirac, to name but one. The debate will be continued at the international level in the framework of a study commissioned by Kofi Annan from the research institute of the UN University WIDER in Helsinki. The completion of the study has been repeatedly delayed. It is now due to be completed in early summer of 2002. Besides the CTT it will deal with other innovative financing instruments, including concepts for international environmental taxes. Important impetus was given just before the Monterrey conference by a special report of the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) entitled "Charging the Use of Global Commons". It is mainly concerned with international charges on the use of airspace and the oceans.

5. Reform of the International Debt Management

Coping with the international debt problems remains an urgent task after the Monterrey conference. The over-indebtedness of some HIPC countries is threatening again and makes the limitations of this initiative only too clear. The financial crisis of Argentina demonstrates, if this were necessary, that debt cancellation of heavily indebted poor countries with middle incomes can no longer be taboo. The proposals of NGOs and academics for a fundamentally new debt management in the framework of fair and transparent arbitration procedures (FTAP), patterned on national insolvency law, gained considerable support during the FfD process. Even the IMF is in favour of comparable approaches now. The debate on indicators for "sustainable debt" has also got moving. Demands of NGOs to consider the human development indicators when assessing the debt sustainability of a country were even reflected in outline in the Monterrey consensus. In order to achieve further progress it will be necessary to maintain the civil society pressure in the context of upcoming meetings of the IMF and World Bank and the G7/8 summit (first in June 2002 in Kananaskis).

6. Governance of the International Economic and Financial System

The FfD process brought a breath of fresh air into the arguments about regulatory shortfalls and institutional bias in the international economic and financial system. While little of that was reflected in the final document there is a consensus among the governments that the involvement of developing countries in decision-making organs of international financial institutions (World Bank, IMF etc) should be reinforced. The "democratisation" of the IMF and World Bank is therefore on the official agenda. The future role of the G7/8 is also under discussion. Through its demonstrative opening up to heads of state from other regions, particularly Africa, the group now seems to be trying to take the wind out of the sails of critics of its "exclusiveness", and to overcome problems of legitimisation. Nevertheless members of the G7/8 itself were among those calling for a new international decision-making body for global economic questions that is more representative than that body. Jacques Chirac in Monterrey called for the establishment of an Economic and Social Security Council with the task of sustainable management of global public goods. German Development Minister Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul reaffirmed her support for the founding of such a council: ”In my view the establishment of a high level Global Council is a worthwhile proposal to overcome the current inadequate representation of developing countries in international fora. Such a Global Council could discuss major economic and financial issues and chart out coherent political strategies”.20 France is expected to table a resolution on this topic at the autumn session of the UN General Assembly.

"Staying Engaged" - Multilateralism at the Crossroads

Monterrey reflects in its proceedings and results the dilemma of multilateralism. How effectively the international community can react together to global problems will depend on the readiness of all UN member states to achieve a consensus. Here the lack of readiness to compromise of the US will doubtless weigh more heavily than that of Santa Lucia. Under these conditions the blockade of one country can make any progress impossible. Blaming the UN for that and using weak results as an argument against multilateral policy approaches would be completely wrong, however, and would play into the hands of those nationalistic players who propagate going it alone. Instead it is above all the role of civil society to tackle those dragging their feet in this regard and to start by working for policy changes in their own countries. That especially applies to the US. The emergence of new social movements, last demonstrated in Porto Alegre, could be of key importance in this respect.

At the same time we should learn from the FfD process. We should examine to what extent it is possible in the context of world conferences to initiate coalitions of like-minded governments going beyond a global minimum consensus – practically "consensus minus x" solutions. This was practised to some extent in the climate negotiations around the Kyoto process. The Johannesburg Summit in summer 2002 will doubtless be the next occasion for experiment.
For further information: and


This report was initially written in German language. Responsible for the edition of the English version: Peter Eisenblätter (terre des hommes Germany).

2 UN Doc. A/AC.257/25 of 18 September 2001

3 ECOSOC Res 1996/31 of 25 July 1996.

4 See also Dirk Messner (2001): Weltkonferenzen und Global Governance: Anmerkungen zum radikalen Wandel vom Nationalstaatensystem zur Global Governance-Epoche. In: Thomas Fues/Brigitte I. Hamm: Die Weltkonferenzen der 90er Jahre: Baustellen für Global Governance. Bonn, p. 13ff.

5 Jan Martin Witte/Wolfgang H. Reinicke/Thorsten Brenner (2000): Beyond Multilateralism: Global Public Policy Networks. In: International Politics & Society 2/2000.

6 See Wolfgang H. Reinicke/Francis M. Deng (2000): Critical Choices. The United Nations, networks, and the future of global governance. Ottawa. See also the website of the project:

7 See A/RES/56/76 of 11 December 2001 and A/RES/55/215 of 21 December 2000.

8 Said by delegate Terry Miller in a speech at the PrepCom 3 in October 2001.

9 Draft Monterrey Consensus (UN Doc. A/AC.257/L.13 of 30 January 2002), para. 25.

10 Draft Monterrey Consensus (UN Doc. A/AC.257/L.13 of 30 January 2002), para. 12.

11 Draft Monterrey Consensus (UN Doc. A/AC.257/L.13 of 30 January 2002), para.7.

12 12 years later, as secretary of the Zedillo Panel, this same John Williamson drafted the Zedillo Report which, in July 2001, formed the basis of the Monterrey Consensus.

13 See Draft Monterrey Consensus (UN Doc. A/AC.257/L.13 of 30. January 2002).

14 The World Bank speaks of 40-60 billion dollars. See : World Bank (2002): The Costs of Attaining the Millennium Development Goals. Washington, D.C..

15 Oxfam International (2002): Last Chance in Monterrey. Meeting the Challenge of Poverty Reduction. Washington, D.C., p. 8.

16 Millennium Declaration of the United Nations (A/RES/55/2 of 8 September 2000), para. 19.

17 See UN Doc. A/55/1000 of 26 June 2001.

18 This was inspired by the book edited by Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern in 1999 entitled Global Public Goods. International Cooperation in the 21st Century.

19 See James A. Paul/Katarina Wahlberg (2002): Global Taxes for Global Priorities. Bonn (Working Paper by Heinrich-Boell-Foundation, Global Policy Forum and WEED).

20 Statement of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ms Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul (MP), Plenary session of the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, 21 March 2002.

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