c. Protection and Rehabilitation of Collaborators after the Israel PLO Accord
B'Tselem estimates that there are still thousands of open or exposed collaborators in the territories who want to move to Israel. Our assessment is that the number of collaborators and their families in the territories totals between 30,000 and 50,000 people. Following the signing of the Israel PLO Declaration of Principles, the defense establishment launched intensive discussions about their rehabilitation, and the issue was also one of the major subjects in the negotiations with the Palestinians. According to various reports, Israel insisted that the PLO grant general amnesty to the collaborators in the territories, and made this a condition for gestures such as the release of Palestinian prisoners. In the final days of October 1993, the Israeli delegation pressured its Palestinian interlocutors to publicly declare a general amnesty. The Palestinians refused. Their delegation head, Nabil Sh'ath, explained that only 'Arafat could make that decision and that he would do so only after receiving powers of self government.75
In September October 1993, staff work was carried out within the framework of a committee which is seeking a solution for collaborators whose lives are at risk. The committee is chaired by Maj. Gen. (Res.) Rafael Vardi and its members are from the IDF, the GSS, and other institutions. Press reports indicate that it intends to recommend the creation of a liaison committee to deal with all the collaborators and that many of them will remain under Israeli protection and be issued Israeli ID cards.76 A meeting held in the defense establishment on October 5, 1993, decided to establish a special directorate with the participation of the IDF, the GSS, and the Civil Administration to assist collaborators in the new situation.77 In October November 1993 the security authorities distributed forms to all Palestinians defined as collaborators on which they were asked to indicate whether they wished to move to Israel before the implementation of Palestinian self rule. The Vardi committee recommended that all recognized collaborators be granted a permit to reside in Israel and financial aid for their rehabilitation.
In December 1993, shortly before the agreed date for the start of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, many of the open collaborators and their families from the two regions were moved to Israel. Collaborators who remained in the territories did so out of choice, or because they were suspected of criminal activity or were double agents, like R.Z., a veteran collaborator from Rafah whose weapon was confiscated by the GSS and who was prevented from entering Israel. The authorities say that they have information that R.Z. was in contact with the Fatah Hawks in Rafah including their commander, Yasser Abu Samhadanah, and even supplied them with arms. R.Z. himself confirmed to B'Tselem that he had been in contact with the cell, but said he had done this to protect his life.
During the Intifada hundreds of Palestinians who were suspected of collaboration, together with their families, were expelled from their villages and their homes were ransacked and torched. The question of compensation for the serious damage sustained by collaborators who were attacked remains open: no decision has been made on whether they will receive compensation, or how much, despite oral promises. In November December 1993 collaborators who were expelled from their places of residence were asked to present assessors' estimates of property damage or loss. Ahmad Hamarshah, the only Palestinian who took part in the deliberations of the Vardi committee, told B'Tselem on December 16, 1993, that the committee had decided to defer discussion of the compensation question to a later stage. In the meantime, he said, the authorities had instructed the victims to try to sell their homes and property, promising that the difference between the payment they would receive and the assessor's estimate of the value of their property would be covered by the Israeli government. Thirty-eight of the collaborators who had been ejected from their villages tried to sell their houses, but the local strike forces threatened potential buyers and possible deals fell through.
Conclusion
The Israeli authorities are responsible for the safety and security of all the residents in the territories. The authorities take various measures to ensure the well-being of the Palestinians whom they employ as collaborators or others whom they define as threatened, such as arming them, issuing them wireless radios, evacuating them to protected villages, or moving them to Israel. However, the fact that hundreds of Palestinian collaborators have been killed, as confirmed by the Defense Ministry, and continue to be killed, demonstrates that the authorities have failed in their protective efforts. For example, the security forces were late in coming to the rescue of collaborators under attack, refused to supply collaborators with permits to reside in Israel, or were negligent in safeguarding a protected village. The authorities sometimes display apathy to collaborators who have been exposed and have ceased to be of use to them. They are in no hurry to solve their problems, even when such delays can endanger the collaborators' lives. The authorities provide financial assistance to those who are evacuated to the protected villages or to Israel. But that assistance is usually meager in relation to the losses they have suffered as a result of losing their land, their home, and their property, and in some cases is not enough even for basic subsistence needs.
Summary and Conclusions
This report presents an inclusive survey of collaboration in the occupied territories, and the human rights abuses and violations associated with the phenomenon. Human rights violations around the world are often justified by the pretext of a national state of emergency, existential danger, enemies from within or without, and other pressures. The Israeli authorities also invoke the special situation in the territories, and pressing security considerations to explain the need to recruit collaborators by illegal methods, to employ them in violent interrogations of suspected security offenders, and in some cases to turn a blind eye at the non-work related criminal offenses they commit. Similar reasoning is used by the Palestinian organizations in their activities against those they define as suspected collaborators, even though they use “collaborator” as a catch phrase that includes not only government agents, but also perpetrators of crimes or other types of deviant behavior, as elaborated in the report.
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