Country of origin information report Turkey March 2009

Return to contents

Go to list of sources
Headscarves
18.14 The USSD 2008 report on International Religious Freedom – Turkey, published 19 September 2008, noted that:
“In February 2008 the Government enacted constitutional amendments intended to lift the ban on the wearing of headscarves in universities. Opposition parties immediately appealed the amendments to the Constitutional Court, arguing that the amendments undermine the secular state. Conflicting interpretations of whether the amendments were binding led to universities independently determining whether or not to apply a ban. In the past, university students who wore head coverings at public universities were officially not permitted to register for classes, although some faculty members permitted students to wear head coverings in class. The Constitutional Court annulled the amendment on June 5, reinstating the ban on wearing headscarves in universities.” [5e] (Restrictions on Religious Freedom)
18.15 The USSD 2007 report on Human Rights Practices further noted that:
“Authorities continued to enforce a long-term ban on the wearing of headscarves at universities and by civil servants in public buildings. Women who wore headscarves and persons who actively showed support for those who defied the ban were disciplined or lost their jobs in the public sector. Students who wore head coverings were not permitted to register for classes, although some faculty members permitted students to wear head coverings in class. Some wore wigs instead.
“In 2005 the ECHR Grand Chamber upheld a 2004 ECHR ruling that the ban on Islamic headscarves in the country's universities was lawful.” [5g]
18.16 The Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) in their 2007 (12) legal review publication on legal developments stated that:
“In the case Leyla Sahin vs Turkey,   the applicant alleged that a ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf in higher-education institutions in Turkey violated her rights and freedoms under Articles 8, 9, 10 and 14 ECHR, and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. ­The applicant spent four years studying medicine at the University of Bursa. She wore the Islamic headscarf during this time. On 23 February 1998 the Vice-Chancellor of Istanbul University issued a circular regulating students’ admission to the university campus. It said that students who wear the Islamic headscarf and students with beards must not be admitted to lectures, courses or tutorials and threatened disciplinary measures if students with headscarves refuse to leave the university premises… the applicant was denied access to a written examination, enrolment in a course and admission to a lecture because she was wearing the Islamic headscarf.” [6a] (p124-125)
18.17 The KHRP 2007 legal review further added that: “In its judgement on the merits the chamber of the ECtHR qualified the wearing of a headscarf as a manifestation of a religion. The court found that the impugned measure primarily pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and protecting public order. ­ The Court stated also that it does not lose sight of the fact that there are extremist political movements in Turkey which seek to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts. According to the Court, the regulations have to be viewed in that context and constitute a measure intended to reserve pluralism in the university. The ECtHR concluded that having regard in particular to the margin of appreciation left­ to the contracting States, there has been no breach of the European Convention of Human Rights.” [6a] (p125-126)
See also Section 22: Women
Return to contents

Go to list of sources
Alevis
18.18 The Minority Rights Group International (MRG) report on ‘A Quest for Equality: Minorities in Turkey’, published 10 December 2007, stated that:
“Alevi is the term used for a large number of heterodox Muslim Shi’a communities with different characteristics. Technically falling under the Shi’a denomination of Islam, yet following a fundamentally different interpretation than the Shi’a communities in other countries as well as the Caferis in Turkey, Alevis constitute the largest religious minority in Turkey. They differ considerably from the Sunni Muslim majority in their practice and interpretation of Islam. Linguistically, they consist of four groups: Azerbaijani Turkish, Arabic, Turkish and Kurdish (both Kurmanci and Zaza). The last two categories constitute the largest Alevi groups. The number of Alevis is a matter of contention. Estimates range from around 10 per cent to as much as 40 per cent of the total population. An academic study launched in November 2006 estimates that Alevis are around 11.4 per cent of the population.” [57c] (p12)
18.19 The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board noted in its reponse to information request (RIR) ’Situation of Alevis’, dated 27 May 2008, that:
“Turkey's largest religious minority, the Alevis, practise a form of Shia Islam that significantly distinguishes their form of worship from that of the Sunni Muslim majority. No official figures on Turkey's Alevi population exist. Estimates on the proportion of Turkey's population that belongs to the Alevi faith vary widely: estimates range between 10 and 40 percent of the population, but many sources put the total number of Turkey's Alevis at 15 to 20 million (ibid.). The majority of Alevis speak Turkish and live mainly in urban areas. Because cemevis cannot be listed as places of worship according to Turkish zoning laws, municipalities can refuse to grant building licences. Alevi organizations have reported that, due to the difficulty in registering their places of worship, there were approximately 100 cemevis across the country in 2007, which they deemed insufficient.
“The Cem Foundation, Turkey's most prominent Alevi organization is based in Istanbul and advocates for greater religious rights. In August 2005, the Foundation took the government to an administrative court over a package of requests that the state had rejected, including granting cemevis official status and paying the salaries of Alevi religious leaders who are known as dedes. However, the court ruled against the Foundation (ibid.).” [7m]
18.20 The USSD 2007 report stated that: “Academics estimated the Alevi population at 15 to 20 million… Alevi ‘cem houses’ (places of gathering) have no legal status as places of worship. In May 2006 authorities in the Sultanbeyli municipality of Istanbul reportedly banned the construction of a cem house on the grounds that the Pir Sultan Abdal Association, an Alevi group, had not acquired the necessary construction permits. Association officials said the local mayor and his staff had attended the groundbreaking ceremony and promised not to interfere with the project; however, the municipality reportedly filed a case against the association after it proceeded with construction following the ban. The case was ongoing at ’year’s end.” [5g] (Section 2c)
18.21 A map in the 2006 Eren Özalay report shows the Turkish provinces in blue with a higher concentration of Alevis (more than 10%) and provinces with low proportions of Alevis (less than 10%) in white.


[61] (p11)
18.22 The USSD 2008 report on Religious Freedom recorded that:
“In addition to the Sunni Muslim majority, academics estimate that there are between 10 million and 20 million Alevis, followers of a belief system that incorporates aspects of both Shi'a and Sunni Islam and draws on the traditions of other religious groups indigenous to Anatolia as well. Some Alevis practice rituals that include men and women worshipping together through oratory, poetry, and dance. The Government considers Alevism a heterodox Muslim sect; some Alevis and Sunnis maintain that Alevis are not Muslims.” [5e] (Section I)
Return to contents

Go to list of sources

Beliefs and practices
18.23 In a 2006 report written by Eren Özalay, ‘Minorities in Turkey: The identity of the Alevis in Accordance with the EU Legislation’, it was noted that: “Another wish of the Alevi authorities is the opening of the tomb of Haci Bektasi Veli in the town Hacibektas for Alevi practice. The tomb being the most sacred place in Anatolia for Alavis, serves as a museum open to all visitors and can not be used for particular Alevi worship. The Alevi authorities are against their kids learning the Sunni Islam tradition as Islam in public schools. The Turkish government has recently passed a regulation to teach the Alevi belief as an Islamic belief in the religion class.” [61] (p18)
18.24 The Middle East Review of International Affairs (MEDIA), in an article dated 1999 by David Zeidan on the beliefs and practices of ‘The Alevis of Anatolia’, stated that:
“Alevis belong to the extremist Shi’a branch and like all extreme Shi’a, their reverence for Ali (Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, and according to the Shi’a tradition, his rightful heir) verges on deification. Alevis accept Ali as the only legitimate successor to Muhammad. Alevis interpret the Quran in an esoteric, allegoric, and symbolic (rather than literal) manner and repudiate the external forms of Islam and its five pillars. In addition to the Quran, Alevis have their own holy books called ‘buyruk’ that contain doctrine and ritual and are claimed to have been written by important leaders. Alevis also have many liturgical hymns called nefes attributed to Shah Ismail and Pir Sultan Abdal.” [105]
18.25 The MEDIA article also noted that:
“Observers note that Alevi society is divided into two separate endogamous groups: the ocak are the spiritual and social elite who claim descent from Ali, Hussein, or religious warriors (ghazi) and constitute a priestly caste, and the talips (disciples), the majority lay members. Religious knowledge is passed down orally in the ocak families who were responsible for the religious and social leadership of the community. Alevi rituals (ibadet) are communal, with the aim of fostering unity (birlik) and love (muhabbet) within the community. Alevi rituals differ markedly from Sunni rituals. Alevis, for example fast in the month of Muharram for 12 days in memory of Hussein’s death at Karbala.” [105]
18.26 The MEDIA article further stated that:
“The central ritual of Alevi religious life is the ayn-i cem (cem for short) celebration, which includes a sacrificial meal (lokma), a ritual alcoholic drink, nefes hymns accompanied by music on the saz, dance (sema), and the ritual lighting and extinguishing of candles. In the villages of Anatolia the ayn-i cem takes place only in the absence of distrusted outsiders, and is held at night under great secrecy. The ceremony is held once a year under the leadership of a dede assisted by a rehber is held in a private house and women are included on an equal footing with men. Other Alevi holy days are Nevruz, the Persian New Year celebrated on the 9th March, the Khidirellez day on the 6th May in honour of Khidr (Elijah, St. George), and the twelve day Muharram fast culminating in Ashura.” [105]
18.27 The MEDIA article further commented that:
“Alevism does not possess a tradition of authoritative religious scholarship and official carriers of formal learning. Rather, it is more a flowing together of various related movements, doctrines, ideas and rituals. Other differences distinguishing Alevis from Sunnis: the use of wine for religious ceremonial functions; non-observance of the five daily prayers and prostrations (they only bow twice in the presence of their spiritual leader), Ramadan, and the Haj (they consider the pilgrimage to Mecca an external pretense, the real pilgrimage being internal in one’s heart); and non-attendance of mosques. Alevis were forbidden to proselytise, and to regenerate themselves internally by paternal descent. To prevent penetration by hostile outsiders, the Alevis insisted on strict endogamy.” [105]

Return to contents

Go to list of sources
Difficulties and problems for Alevis
18.28 In a 2006 report written by Eren Özalay ‘Minorities in Turkey: The identity of the Alevis in Accordance with the EU Legislation’, it was noted that:
“The problems that the Alevi community faces now are in the areas of political and religious representation and upward mobility in public sector… Under the heading of political representation, Alevis are not satisfied with the Religious Affairs responsible for representing the Muslim population in Turkey. Alevi claim is that the Religious Affairs represent only the Sunni-Orthodox Muslim population. Alevis expect the Cem Houses, the religious gathering places of the Alevis, in the same statue with the mosques, churches and synagogues… The recognition of the Alevi belief in the framework of Islam will also solve the religious representation problem of the Alevis.” [61] (p17-18)
18.29 The USSD 2008 report on Religious Freedom published 19, September 2008 noted that:
“Alevis freely practiced their beliefs and have built cem houses, although these have no legal status as places of worship and are often referred to as cultural centers. Representatives of Alevi organizations maintained that they often faced obstacles when attempting to establish cem houses. They said there were approximately 100 cem houses in the country, a number that they claimed was insufficient to meet their needs.
“In December 2007 a cem house in the Alevi Catalkaya district of Sivas was reportedly turned into a mosque. The 120 Alevi residents of Catalkaya submitted a petition to the Sivas Governor in protest. At the end of the reporting period, the building was no longer being used as a mosque, and the municipality had removed the imam.” [5e] (Section 2)
18.30 The USSD 2008 report on Religious Freedom published 19, September 2008 also noted that:
“In 2006 authorities in the Istanbul municipality of Sultanbeyli reportedly halted the construction of a cem house on the grounds that the Pir Sultan Abdal Association, an Alevi group, had not acquired the necessary construction permits. Association officials said the local mayor and his staff had attended the groundbreaking ceremony and had promised not to interfere with the project, but the municipality reportedly filed a case against the association after it proceeded with construction following the ordered cessation. The case continued at the end of the reporting period.” [5e] (Section 2)
18.31 The USSD 2008 report on Religious Freedom also noted that:
“Alevi children receive the same compulsory religious education as all Muslims, and many Alevis alleged discrimination in the Government's failure to include any of their doctrines or beliefs in religious instruction classes in public schools. During the reporting period, Alevis had more than 4,000 court cases against the Ministry of Education regarding this alleged discrimination. Materials for the proposed new religious course curriculum that includes instruction on Alevism are believed by many Alevis to be inadequate and, in some cases, false.” [5e] (Section 2)
18.32 The USSD 2008 Religious Freedom further stated that: “Alevis also charged there was bias in the Diyanet, which does not allocate specific funds for Alevi activities or religious leadership. In effect, the Diyanet budget is reserved for the Sunni community, covering the salary of imams and other costs. It does not pay for the cost of utilities of cem houses (places of worship) or facilities not recognized by the Government as places of worship.” [5e] (Section 2)
18.33 The USSD 2008 report on Religious Freedom published 19, September 2008 further reported that:
“In October 2007 the ECHR ruled in favor of an Alevi father who requested that his daughter be exempt from the religion courses at school; the Court argued that Alevism is distinct from the Sunni understanding of Islam and that the religious courses did not meet European Convention on Human Rights (Convention) criteria of objectivity and plurality. In January 2008 the Government incorporated ten pages of additional instruction on Alevi beliefs and practices in the final year of religious instruction in secondary school. By the end of the reporting period, the ECHR had yet to announce whether these changes aligned the country's religious curriculum with Convention principles.
“In March 2007 the Council of State (Danistay) upheld an Istanbul lower court's 2006 ruling in favor of an Alevi father who requested his son be exempt from religious courses. The lower court's decision had been appealed by the Istanbul Governor's office.” [5e] (Section II)
See also Section 22.52: Children Education

Return to contents

Go to list of sources
Non Muslim minorities
18.34 The US State Department (USSD) report 2007, published on 11 March 2008, noted that: “A separate government agency, the General Directorate for Foundations (GDF), regulates a few administratively critical activities of non Muslim religious groups and their affiliated churches, monasteries, synagogues, and related religious property. There are 161 ‘minority foundations’ recognized by the GDF, including Greek Orthodox foundations with approximately 70 sites, Armenian Orthodox foundations with approximately 50 sites, and Jewish foundations with 20 sites, as well as Syrian Christian, Chaldean, Bulgarian Orthodox, Georgian, and Maronite foundations. The GDF also regulates Muslim charitable religious foundations, including schools, hospitals, and orphanages.” [5g]
18.35 The European Commission 2008 Progress report, published 5 November 2008, stated that: “Turkey's approach to minority rights, which refers to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne remains unchanged. Without prejudice to the Treaty, the Turkish authorities consider Turkish citizens as individuals with equal rights before the law, rather than as individuals belonging to the majority or to a minority.” [71d] (p25)
18.36 As noted in the USSD 2008 report on Religious Freedom published 19, September 2008:
“Religious minorities report difficulties opening, maintaining, and operating houses of worship. Under the law, religious services may take place only in designated places of worship. Municipal codes mandate that only the Government can designate a place of worship, and if a religion has no legal standing in the country, it may not be eligible for a designated site. Non-Muslim religious services, especially for religious groups that do not own property recognized by the GDF, often take place on diplomatic property or in private apartments. Police occasionally bar Christians from holding services in private apartments, and prosecutors have opened cases against Christians for holding unauthorized gatherings.” [5e] (Section 2)
18.37 The US State Department (USSD) report 2007 noted that: “The constitution establishes compulsory religious and moral instruction in primary and secondary schools. Religious minorities are exempted. However, a few religious minorities, such as Protestants, faced difficulty obtaining exemptions, particularly if their identification cards did not list a religion other than Islam. The government claimed that the religion courses covered the range of world religions; however, religious minorities asserted the courses reflected Sunni Islamic doctrine, which they maintained explains why non-Muslims are exempt.” [5g] (Section 2)
18.38 The USSD 2008 report on Religious Freedom published 19, September 2008 also noted that:
“The authorities continued to monitor the activities of Eastern Orthodox churches but generally did not interfere with their religious activities; however, significant restrictions were placed on the administration of the churches. The Government does not recognize the ecumenical status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, acknowledging him only as the head of the country's Greek Orthodox community. High-level government leaders often assert publicly that use of the term ‘ecumenical’ in reference to the Patriarch violates the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. However, government officials privately acknowledge that Lausanne does not address the issue.” [5e] (Section II)
18.39 The US State Department (USSD) 2007 report noted that: “Many Muslims, Christians, Jews, and ’Baha’is faced societal suspicion and mistrust. Jews and Christians from most denominations freely practiced their religions and reported little discrimination in daily life. However, religious minorities asserted that they were effectively blocked from careers in state institutions.” [5g] (Section 2)
See also Section 18.19 Alevis
Return to contents

Go to list of sources
Christians
18.40 The USSD 2008 report on International Religious Freedom – Turkey, published 19 September 2008, noted that: “The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and other laws and policies contributed to the generally free practice of religion, but constitutional provisions regarding the integrity and existence of the secular state restrict these rights.” [5e] (Introduction)
18.41 The USSD 2008 report on Religious Freedom noted that: “Despite the legality of religious speech and persuasion, the police occasionally prevent Christians from handing out religious literature… No law explicitly prohibits religious speech or religious conversions; nevertheless, many prosecutors and police regarded religious speech and religious activism with suspicion. Police occasionally prevented Christians from handing out religious literature. Proselytizing is often considered socially unacceptable. Christians engaged in religious advocacy were occasionally beaten and insulted. If the advocates were foreigners, they might have been deported, but generally they were able to reenter the country. Police officers may report students who meet with Christian missionaries to their families or to university authorities.” [5e] (Section 2)
18.42 The USSD 2008 Religious Freedom further noted that: “After the April 18, 2007 killings in Malatya of three Christians, Turkish victim Ugur Yuksel was denied a Christian burial and given an Islamic/Alevitic burial instead. Turkish victim Necati Aydin was buried in a Protestant churchyard in Izmir. The Governor of Malatya was initially hesitant to permit the burial of the German victim in Malatya. He told the German victim's widow that no Christian should be buried in the country's soil.” [5e] (Section 2)
18.43 The US State Department (USSD) report 2007, published on 11 March 2008, noted that: “Several foreigners who are practicing Christians and have lived with their families in various cities for many years reported increasing governmental harassment during the year, including denial of residence and work permits that had been granted in previous years, monitoring by jandarma, and receiving threats to themselves and their families. These persons reported that they worshiped in their homes but did not proselytize by distributing bibles, going door-to-door, or undertaking similar activities.” [5g] (section2)