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Table 1: Middle Powers of Europe
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Table 1: Middle Powers of Europe 1927
Area Population Army Aircraft Navy (tons) Hungary 92.928 8.364.653 35.103 n/a n/a Poland 388.279 29.249.000 290.000 n/a 2.812 Spain 511.985 22.444.000 113.434 600 117.100 Turkey 762.736 13.139.000 120.000 n/a 45.623 Yugoslavia 248.488 12.492.000 107.541 n/a 2.912 1932 Hungary 92.928 8.683.700 34.993 n/a n/a Poland 388.000 31.148.000 265.980 700 6.020 Spain 511.985 22.940.000 119.210 n/a 129.783 Turkey 762.736 13.648.000 140.000 n/a 44.466 Yugoslavia 249.000 13.931.000 112.610 568 13.57 1936 Hungary 92.928 8.949.000 35.026 n/a n/a Poland 388.000 33.823.000 266.005 700 6.091 Spain 511.985 24.849.000 117.092 208 136.341 Turkey 762.736 16.201.000 194.000 370 53.720 Yugoslavia 247.542 14.950.900 115.864 552 9.512 1939 Hungary 92.928 n/a 149.522 n/a n/a Poland 388.000 35.090.000 300.000 n/a n/a Spain 511.985 24.849.000 n/a n/a 90.994 Turkey 762.736 16.158.000 194.000 370 63.948 Yugoslavia 247.542 15.630.000 134.128 484 16.057 Source: (The Yearbook of International Disarmament, 1927-1939) A simple survey of available data on area, population, size of the army, number of aircraft and total tonnage of naval units presented in the Yearbooks for these five countries yields a rather interesting result.105 A further distinction may be made as to the lower-echelon and higher-echelon middle powers among them. While Poland and Spain stand out as two higher-echelon middle powers due to the magnitude of resources they commanded at that time, the interwar Hungary and Yugoslavia can be regarded as lower-echelon middle powers. Having fared worse than the two higher-echelon middle powers but better than the two lower-echelon middle powers in most data categories, Turkey indeed presents the ultimate middle power in the context of interwar Europe from the conventional perspective. Only in terms of geographical area, Turkey stood a cut above the rest. On the other side of the coin, size of population was the category in which Turkey was dwarfed by two higher-echelon middle powers – Poland and Spain. Indeed, many foreign observers regarded under-population as a serious vulnerability for the new Turkey. Ankara’s obvious lack of appetite for cross-border activism was also linked to its urgent need to repopulate Anatolia and Turkish Thrace. For instance, writing in the early 1930s, an Austrian diplomat in Ankara identified two problems with Turkey’s population. First, given the size of the country (approximately equal to the size of Germany and Italy combined), Turkey was under-populated to raise an army to defend such a large territory. The mismatch between its population and territory posed a defense problem, particularly in and around the coastal regions.106 Second, an under-populated Turkey could be seen as potential outlet for settling immigrants from European countries, such as Germany and Italy, who had been strained under population pressures.107 This final observation is indeed a confirmation of a typical middle power dilemma that results from the mismatch between its relatively large size and strategic importance and the limited means at its disposal to defend itself. This dilemma provides a strong motivation for multilateralism among the middle powers. Their interest in collective security is also linked to this mismatch. Consequently, they make reliable and active partners in international organizations.108 Turning to less tangible manifestations of middle power activism in international relations, the case of Turkey in the 1930s features strong parallels with the Australian and Canadian relocations in the international system in reaction to lack of economic leadership in the 1980s. Half a century earlier, in the absence of leadership from traditional powers, Turkey had taken various initiatives and actively promoted cooperation in the Balkans. One major difference, however, is that, as Turkey evolved from a regional (great) power to a middle power, its diplomacy could count on fewer and less developed international and regional organizations than their Australian and Canadian counterparts several decades later. As it is already mentioned, the quality of a viable diplomacy is considered a middle power asset. The new Turkey inherited not only the core geography of the Ottoman Empire but, to a great extent, its diplomatic infrastructure.109 This heritage facilitated gradual enhancement of the new Turkey’s voice in international fora. Building on their experience with the Ottoman capitulations and debts, Turkish diplomacy also took on an economic dimension after the World Economic Crisis of 1929. The failure of various international initiatives led Turkey to turn its attention to regional arrangements such as promoting cooperation in the Balkans where there had been a marked absence of leadership from traditional sources.110 In evaluating Turkey’s middle power activism in international economic affairs, it has to be borne in mind that Ankara operated within a far less connected and interdependent international economy than Canada or Australia would decades later. In fact, the Turkish economic diplomacy was largely confined to bilateral economic and trade relations and proved unable to offer sufficient incentives for multilateral regional arrangements. Nevertheless, Ankara figured as an enthusiastic supporter of various initiatives for Balkan economic cooperation and even integration, none of which materialized though.111. Turning to security issues, Turkey was faced with dilemmas and exhibited foreign policy behavior typically attributed to middle powers. As mentioned earlier, the Italian attack on Abyssinia and acts of piracy in the Mediterranean during the Spanish Civil War drove these points home. Apprehensive of its own security, Ankara regarded the Italian attack on Abyssinia as a clear breach of an independent country’s territorial integrity. It went along with the international community in imposing and implementing sanctions on Italy. Also during the Spanish Civil War, it politically supported the international action regarding submarine activity in the Mediterranean, though it stopped short of supplying naval units to international patrols in the Mediterranean. That became a divisive domestic issue that created a rift between the proponents and opponents of the internationalist (activist) line in Turkish foreign policy at the time. Regional great power is another concept employed occasionally to identify Turkey’s position in the world. Osterud identifies the new Turkish Republic as a regional great power, though only in the Middle East context. “The break-up of empires meant new political realities in regional affairs, with nationalist Turkey as a new ‘regional great power, in the Middle East...”112 However, it should be noted that middle power and regional great power are two categories that are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Wight argues that the latter refers to states “with general interests relative to a limited region and capacity to act alone.” Hence, “great power” prerogatives of such states are strictly confined to a sub-system in the regional context. Although middle powers and regional powers are portrayed as two distinct categories, the latter is occasionally an interim step to becoming a middle power. In other words, “such regional great powers will probably be candidates, in the states-system at large, for the rank of middle power.”113 On the other hand, Poland, which fits both middle and regional great power categories in the interwar context and the choices it made, offers a contrast in behavior as a comparably situated international actor. Poland preferred to act as (or pretended to be) a great power. In other words, Turkey and Poland presented two opposite diplomatic and military/naval choices and styles both regionally and internationally in the interwar period. To begin with, while Poland signed a treaty of alliance with France in pursuit of protection from Russian and German powers, Turkey took the opposite way and tried to preserve its diplomatic independence. These two different types of middle power behavior may partly be related to the varying degree of intensity of great power rivalry each was exposed to. Poland was caught between Germany and Russia and allied with France, which in turn was preoccupied with Germany, whereas Turkey at this time did not stand in such close proximity to any great power rivalry. Italian-British rivalry in the Mediterranean came much later to affect Turkish foreign policy behavior.114 Similarly, Neumann argues: “For an aspiring regional great power, there is a difference between being constrained by geographically distant powers with an abstract interest in regional balance, or by immediately neighboring great powers with specific hegemonic interests and aspirations. Poland was exposed to the latter experience, and could actually count two great powers among its regional challengers.”115 Turkey and Poland stand at two different ends of the spectrum of middle powers and/or regional great powers in evolutionary terms as well. While Turkey represents more or less a power that stepped down from a higher rank, Poland is a power that graduated up to the same rank from years of non-existence. It should be added though that Poland and the Ottoman Empire had also enjoyed similar status in the European states system until the second half of the Seventeenth Century. The great powers of Eastern Europe at that time included Poland, Sweden and the Ottoman Empire, but not Russia.116 The simultaneous, yet temporary decline of both Germany and Russia after the First World War facilitated Poland’s graduation to a higher rank in the European power hierarchy. However, this sudden change of status in turn prompted “an inflated view of its own role in the European system... especially after the conclusion of the Russo-Polish War in 1921.”117 The Locarno Treaties represented a shock both to Polish security and to its great power aspirations (or pretensions). It was a watershed for Polish dreams of equality with great powers. However, even this watershed did not end Polish self-perception of great power status.118
Finally, while population, indeed underpopulation, presented a security challenge for Turkey in the interwar period, it gave Poland as false sense of equality with great powers of Europe around the same time. Neumann offers a vivid description of Poland’s dilemma in the interwar period from the perspective of population: “With a population of around 30 million and a standing army of over 250.000 men, Poland did not lag hopelessly behind a great power like France... Because of its weak economy, however, Poland could ill-afford to keep an army of this size. In the 1930s, defense costs reached as much as 27.5 percent of government expenditure.”120 Hence, the Poles viewed various schemes of regional security, from the Little Entente to the suggested “Eastern Pact,” as impediments to its regional leadership aspirations. In contrast to Turkey’s success in restoring its relations with its small power neighbors, Polish diplomacy failed to achieve similar results by peaceful means in the interwar period. Moreover, it took advantage of its neighbors' troubles with great powers to advance its own interests. There are two cases in point. After the Anschluss in 1938, Poland delivered an ultimatum to Kaunas (Lithuania) to establish diplomatic relations. Also, following German intervention in the Sudetenland, it took Teschen by force from Czechoslovakia.121 Poland’s problems with its smaller neighbors can be linked to the fact that Lithuania and Czechoslovakia had just gained their independent nation status from multi-ethnic empires and their governments and people were intent on guarding jealously their new states’ independence. A neighborhood of newly independent states indeed points to the existence for Polish diplomacy of an operating environment similar to one that was in place in the Balkans for Turkish diplomacy. Understandably, Poland’s neighbors were reluctant to forego this by the “forging of a union of states under Polish leadership...” To the new elites in Kaunas and Prague, to play a subordinate role once again in a union of states was not a tempting option.122 By 1936, Polish imperial ambitions were stated more bluntly. The authoritarian government began to demand colonies as a solution to both its overpopulation and “the Jewish problem.” In a similar frame of mind, Poland embarked on naval rearmament to become a naval power overseas. Shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War, In 1939, General Sosnkowski announced that “Poland’s youth were to play the role due to Poland”.123 Such moves completed Poland’s isolation. The ultimate manifestations of sharply contrasting Polish and Turkish diplomatic behaviors can be found in their reactions to Mussolini’s ill-conceived Four-Power Pact proposal. Both resented and rejected Mussolini’s proposal, however, for diametrically opposed reasons. Mussolini basically proposed a European order to be dictated and managed by four great powers: Italy, France, Britain and Germany. The proposal deepened the Turkish suspicion regarding great powers’ ulterior motives. Ankara was convinced that despite intensity of rivalries among themselves, the great powers would cooperate at the expense of smaller states in the Balkans and the Mediterranean, if their interests warranted so. Consequently, Turkey intensified its diplomatic efforts for Balkan cooperation and, therefore, chose an “activist” path after March 1933. Polish reaction, although featured a strong element of deep resentment, differed in its causes. The Poles were resentful not over the scheme itself but over their exclusion from the circle of great powers. Polish Prime Minister even hinted at pulling his country out of the League of Nations. In so doing, he indicated that his country would choose isolation to “constant interference by the big-four.”124 Re-discovery of Turkey’s and Poland’s middle power credentials had to wait until the end of the Cold War. The Cold War international order did not provide either country with opportunity for diplomatic activism as middle powers. For instance, Spero’s recent work is a typical example dealing with Poland’s restoration to middle power status. Based on the Polish case after the Cold War, Spero defines middle power in behavioral terms and indeed associates typical middle power behavior with a function called “bridging.” He defines bridging as “alignment by middle powers with all neighbors to lessen historic security dilemmas rather than playing countries off against one another, or hiding behind neutrality or nonalignment.”125 In other words, bridging represents a type of alignment different than ‘balancing against’ or ‘bandwagoning with’ specific states, or aggressive alignments for territorial aggrandizement or regional domination. Accordingly, he argues that Poland as a middle power sought security by bridging with other middle or great powers in the post-Cold War era. This represents a strategy based not on “self-help” but “other-help” view of the world. The choice of such an alternative strategy stems from Poland’s own historical experiences because self-help strategies had previously failed to guarantee Polish security and sovereignty.126 The historical experience and fear of losing sovereignty and independence are two explanations for the Polish change of heart.127 In this respect, it is very reminiscent of a path that Turkish diplomacy had attempted to follow in the interwar period. The Ottoman diplomatic experience suggested to the new rulers of Turkey that self-help strategies had worked only to a certain (or limited) extent to keep the Empire from unraveling. Like Poland’s, Ottoman sovereignty was, however, very much compromised by the great powers. So the new Turkish strategy was indeed aimed at bridging first the Balkan and then the Mediterranean divides in light of the lessons learned from the Ottoman experience. Ankara took great strides in persuading others of the utility of common institutions and structures both at regional and international levels. Therefore, bridging offered an untried but a promising diplomatic strategy to secure Turkey’s survival without compromising its sovereignty and independence. Finally, there were striking parallels in their approaches to their neighbors, particularly the ones that were established in their former territories. Turkey tried to develop and maintain good relations with its western neighbors such as Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia in the interwar period. In a similar fashion, Poland would pursue “good relations with its Eastern neighbors – Lithuania, Belarusia and Ukraine – without raising the issue that these states were established partially on former Polish territories” after the Cold War.128 2. BUILDING A VIABLE STATE: DIPLOMACY AND FORCE After it came into being as a republic, Turkey looked like a country with very slim prospects for survival throughout the 1920s. It was cast out of the collective security system of the League of Nations. A number of issues that had defied settlement at Lausanne hindered the normalization of relations with its neighbors. Some of them were great powers such as Britain, France and Italy. At home front, problems of regime consolidation and domestic opposition, occasionally in the shape of armed uprisings such as the Sheik Said rebellion, militated against a swift recovery of Turkish power. The external and internal sources of instability that had to be tackled almost concomitantly stretched the modest diplomatic and military resources of the new country to the limit. Moreover, the new rulers of Turkey embarked on the ambitious task of creating a modern republic. Their appetite for internal reform was not devoid of external motives. The reform process was also meant to remove the traditional great power pretexts for domestic interference in the Ottoman affairs. This task inevitably required transforming the society and institutions inherited from the Ottoman Empire into a society and institutions loyal to the Republic. Another external motive was related to the pursuit of admission (or re-admission) to the European states system. It was as challenging as the former. Turkey's formal recognition under the Lausanne Treaty did not immediately result in admission into the European states system or new international institutions or arrangements, such as the League of Nations or the Locarno Pact. Its international isolation, in a way, deepened after the Mosul debacle with Britain in 1925, by choice as well. The Turkish nationalists could occasionally enlist open or covert support of varying degrees from a number of major powers, including Italy and France during the War of Independence between 1919 and 1922.129 The fledging Soviet regime was another source of support.130 By 1925, the Soviets remained the only partner of convenience that Ankara could rely on for cooperation. In addition to troubled relations with Britain, France and Greece, Mussolini's ascendance to power led to the revival of Italian imperial ambitions in and over Turkey. "The fear from the West" describes accurately the state of mind of the early republican elite.131 Their fears were aggravated by the proximity of the territorial possessions or mandates of such powers to the Turkish mainland.132 However, it is difficult to suggest that this mindset ever justified or turned into a siège mentality. At the beginning, as an international outcast, Turkey did not have much of an option other than adopting self-help strategies, although the Ottoman experience was a proof that they were inherently prone to fail in the long-term. In the struggle for viability, the republic was to count on its military and diplomacy as instruments of self-help. Naturally, their institutional transformation had become a priority for the new regime. Among the two, however, the instruments of force (military and navy) had a clear priority, because the ruling elite needed them in the emerging domestic political struggle as well. The proclamation of the Republic on 29 October 1923 led to a sharpening of the rivalry between the proponents and opponents of reforms who would eventually split into two political parties in the Assembly (TBMM). The Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası (The Republican People's Party) led by Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk], the founder and first President of the Republic, was formed by the ruling group, whereas the opposition had already organized itself into the Terrakiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Progressive Republican Party). Transforming the Instruments of Force: The Army and the Navy Former comrades of the War of Independence gradually began to part their ways and were engaged in a political struggle over the future shape and direction of the new Turkey. Hüseyin Rauf [Orbay] rose as the key figure in opposition to reform-minded Mustafa Kemal. His comments in the İstanbul press about the Republic, and his visit to the Caliph were seen as open challenges to the new regime.133 To expand their support bases, both individuals tried to recruit political allies. Rauf Orbay was joined by two prominent military leaders of the War of Independence, Generals Kazım [Karabekir] and Ali Fuat [Cebesoy]. Karabekir would soon be the official leader of the new opposition party. On the other hand, President Mustafa Kemal secured the support of Chief of Staff Field Marshal Fevzi [Çakmak] and Prime Minister İsmet [İnönü] on his side. The latter group decided to press on with the reforms, including the abolition of the Caliphate in March 1924, to tighten their grips around power. The President and his political allies might have played up element of fear from external powers in pushing their domestic reform agenda. In February 1924, the Turkish military leaders were summoned for war games in İzmir. The war games dealt with the contingency of an Italian assault on Turkey from the West. In war games or exercises, no country would normally be named as a potential aggressor. Therefore, some generals like Kazım Karabekir, questioned the wisdom of identifying Italy as the potential aggressor in contrast to established military customs. Moreover, he did not regard such an assault as not even remotely possible for another decade.134 It should be granted that the Turkish military leaders might have had a point in singling Italy out around that time as the most likely threat to their country's security. Previously, Mussolini had resorted to force or threatened to use force for political objectives elsewhere. The Fiume and the Corfu incidents had taken place in rapid succession in 1923. Turkish political and military leaders were probably alarmed to draw their own conclusions regarding the next likely target of Fascist Italy. Turkish war games merited extensive coverage by the national press as well. Some columnists even argued that Turkey might face a joint Italian-Greek assault.135 Such an Italian attack, with or without the collusion of Greece, never took place in 1924. The whole venture, however, led General Kazım Karabekir to conclude that the 1924 war games served as smokescreen for the abolition of Caliphate in March 1924, as they were of little military value.136 Yüklə 0,95 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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