F I r s t d r a f t

Moreover, the efforts of minor powers should also be taken into account among the sources of sustained momentum for disarmament negotiations.¹⁸¹ The issue was added to the agenda of the League’s first Assembly by three Scandinavian countries in 1920. The minor powers were to gain disproportionately more than the great powers from a general disarmament. Finally, “for the first time they were given, in the League, an opportunity to make their voice heard on all international issues.”¹⁸² The disarmament discussions at Geneva revealed the skill of the experts and the national egoism of the participating powers, as each great Power came up with an innovative proposal that called for the abolition of a category of arms in which its rival enjoyed clear superiority. All these proposals were supposedly made in pursuit of a principle of qualitative disarmament.¹⁸³

For instance, between 1919 and 1934, successive British governments managed to foster the impression both in words and deeds that they fully embraced the idea of disarmament. Later studies on disarmament between the two World Wars consistently indicate skepticism rather than enthusiasm among the British ministers and diplomats in the Foreign Office. Richardson links the politicians’ and professionals’ skepticism to their collective experience. He argues that ministers and career diplomats “... had grown up during the high-noon of the Empire, when British power was unrivalled, and found it difficult to adjust to the changed circumstances of the 1920s. They might declare themselves in favor of disarmament in public, but in the confines of the cabinet room they were reluctant to take decisions that would translate their word into action.”¹⁸⁴

Pointing to the link between domestic and international dynamics in the case of US, O’Connor argues that international disarmament caused tension between politicians and naval/military professionals at home. Such a tension was inevitable for each side set out with a completely different set of assumptions. For civilian decision-makers, security was at times viewed in the broader context of goodwill and international agreement, whereas for naval experts or professionals, it was an issue to be strictly regarded within the context of armaments. For instance, in America “... professional military views were clearly overridden by the civilian policy-makers, for the naval experts failed to secure the two-to-one superiority over the Japanese that they deemed essential, and they had to abandon the island bases in the Western Pacific... In effect, military advantage was sacrificed to the broader gains, which, at the time, seemed a real prospect”.¹⁸⁵

The Washington Conference culminated in a treaty that substantially limited capital ship tonnage for the navies of the United States, Britain, France, Italy and Japan. The Treaty of Washington was initially taken over-optimistically as a major step towards a worldwide disarmament.¹⁸⁶ In reality, the architects of the Treaty of Washington of 1922 shaped an international naval order which no single power might dominate.¹⁸⁷ They were hardly idealists; even Wilson himself appreciated the link between naval power and successful diplomacy. They were actually realists who tried to reconcile the forces for change with the international system as well as with conditions at home. Their common aim was to establish a more stable, less tension-filled international political and naval order than had existed before 1914.¹⁸⁸ The above analysis more or less accurately portrays the essence of American, British and Japanese behavior regarding naval disarmament.

Two lesser naval powers, France and Italy, differed in motivation from these three. To start with, the Washington limitations on capital ships did not generate any immediate practical impact on either French or Italian navies as their current tonnages stood far below the limits allotted to them under the Treaty. French participation in the Washington Treaty seemed to have been diplomatically motivated, whereas Italy became a party to the Treaty because it provided for Italian naval parity with France. Thus, the Treaty itself meant recognition of Italy’s great power status rather than a limitation on its naval power and ambitions. Writing in 1935, Chaput argued “that the Washington agreements included France and Italy was therefore purely incidental.”¹⁸⁹ The issue of naval parity brought to the fore Italy’s and France’s naval relations with other powers in the Mediterranean. Incidentally, Turkish naval plans and ambitions remained of utmost interest and concern to Rome and Paris throughout the interwar years.

At Washington, the idea of banning submarines altogether was hotly debated as well. When several proposals aimed at abolishing submarines or limiting their production failed, for a while attention shifted to the subject of submarines being used. A Republican Congressman, Elihu Root, came out with a proposition that would outlaw unwarned submarine attacks on merchant vessels as an act of piracy. The Treaty relating to the use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare of 6 February 1922 represents a futile attempt to regulate the use of submarines. Although it was signed by all signatories to the Treaty of Washington, it could not be put into effect because of France’s failure to ratify it.¹⁹⁰ Nevertheless, this Treaty would form the basis for the Nyon arrangement in 1937, concluded in response to attacks by unidentified submarines in the Mediterranean.

There were also efforts to extend naval limitations not only to other types of vessels but also to other naval powers. The British, for a while, tried to persuade naval powers which were not represented at Washington to reduce their forces. This idea was first brought up by Captain Roderick Segrave in July 1922 for pragmatic reasons rather than pursuit of the League’s disarmament principle. Silverlock argues convincingly that “the Admiralty saw in League action the prospects for a wide-ranging agreement which could only benefit Britain’s naval positions.”¹⁹¹

Consequently, a conference of experts was called to meet in Rome between 14 and 25 February 1924 to discuss the issue. Moreover, in October 1922, the Assembly of the League of Nations unanimously agreed to extend invitations to a number of non-members, including Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey, Hungary, Mexico, Ecuador, Hedjaz (Hicaz) and San Domingo. Of these, Turkey and the Soviet Union represented the two most problematic cases. The invitation to Turkey followed shortly the Turkish nationalists’ military victory over the invading Greek forces. This victory also brought Ankara to the brink of confrontation with London over the Chanak crisis.¹⁹² The Turkish participation in the conference hinged on the outcome of this crisis. The Soviets Union, on the other hand, was not recognized by Britain yet. While Turkey did not even reply to the invitation to attend the conference, the Soviet Union decided to participate it.¹⁹³ The conference turned out to be failure. Obviously, the idea of naval disarmament did not resonate well with most non-signatories of the Washington Treaty. Indeed, Spain, Brazil, Argentina and the Soviet Union rejected the idea of freezing or reducing their naval forces, though for different reasons.¹⁹⁴

At Rome, the Greek government declared that it would be willing to accept a 35,000-ton limit for capital ships on two conditions in the context of a proposed naval holiday until 1931. First, Turkey’s tonnage would not exceed this figure. Second, Greece would reserve the right to acquire or build a cruiser in place of the battlecruiser, Salamis, if the latter could not be completed.¹⁹⁵ In the 1920s, the better-trained and better-equipped Greek Navy enjoyed an unchallenged edge over its Turkish Navy. The latter had to make do with a collection of former Ottoman naval units that were being rushed into service.¹⁹⁶

Greek naval supremacy in the Aegean closely linked to the future status of the battlescruiser Yavuz. Prospects for her re-commissioning prompted the Greek government to renew its proposal for a ten-year “naval holiday” with Turkey along the lines of the Washington Treaty and the Rome Naval Conference deliberations. However, Athens added new conditions to its original proposal. It would reserve the right to build two cruisers to replace two pre-dreadnought battleships, Lemnos and Kilkis (the former USS Idaho and USS Mississippi respectively). This was the only way to secure Greek naval superiority over Turkey even if the latter eventually re-introduced the battlecruiser Yavuz into the Aegean naval equilibrium.¹⁹⁷

In contrast, the prevailing opinion in Ankara suggested that Greece would maintain its edge over Turkey in naval power even if the Yavuz could be refurbished and new naval units were ordered. The available documents do not reveal the extent to which the Greek proposal for a naval holiday, in its original or revised form, generated interest in Ankara. However, there is a document that provides evidence of Chief of Staff Marshal Çakmak’s view on naval limitations in general. In a short memorandum to the Foreign Ministry, he wrote that adherence to a naval holiday would only be possible after the Yavuz was re-furbished to operational status and new naval orders were finalized. He added that even with a re-furbished Yavuz and new naval units, they would not able to match the Greek fleet.¹⁹⁸

In 1924, however, Ankara’s response to the Greek proposal implied that Turkey would not be able to observe the proposed naval holiday as long as the Soviet naval power continued to grow in the Black Sea.¹⁹⁹ In other words, the appearant Soviet naval ambitions provided Ankara with a solid excuse to continue with its own naval program without regard to Greek proposals for naval limitations in the Aegean.²⁰⁰ The Turkish and the Soviet governments actually kept an eye on each other’s naval programs and movements that might tip the balance of power in favor of the other in the Black Sea.

Also at Rome, the Soviets made proposals that highlighted their naval ambitions. The Soviet delegate, Eugene Berens, argued that historical precedents and prevailing geographical conditions dictated that the Soviet Union builds a strong navy. Throughout the First World War, Russia’s northern and Black Sea coasts had been exposed and vulnerable to enemy attack. Hence, he adopted a position that linked the Soviet Union’s adherence to the idea of a naval holiday to the fulfillment of certain conditions that were supposed to enhance security for his country. The Soviet Union would be willing to freeze its navy at the Russian Navy’s 1921 level, if all Russian warships, wherever located, were included in the Soviet tonnage for 1921. The Soviet naval freeze would also be conditional on certain “insignificant” amendments to post-First World War arrangements, including closure of the Black Sea and revision of the Lausanne Convention which called for an international administration and demilitarization of the Turkish Straits.²⁰¹

The initial Soviet proposal demanded a capital ship tonnage allowance nearly comparable to those of the United States and Britain, the two greatest naval powers of the time.²⁰² In their subsequent proposal, the Soviets backtracked and offered to reduce their capital ship tonnage to 280,000 tons, on the following conditions:

“1. The Council of the League of Nations is replaced in the draft [treaty] by another organization.

2. The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles (the Straits) are closed, in accordance with the proposal which we [the Soviets] made at the Lausanne Conference.

3. The vessels of war belonging to non-riparian states of the Baltic are forbidden access to the Baltic by the Sound and Belt.

4. The Straits of Korea are demilitarized (disarmed).

5. The vessels of war at present retained at Bizerta are restored to the Union…”²⁰³

Domestic Constraints: Inter-service Rivalry
In the 1920s, Turkey was in a state of flux. This situation was reflected in Turkish naval policy. In addition to international naval disarmament, the inter-service competition imposed another constraint on the scope of naval policy. Nevertheless, there was one constant element in all naval proposals: the reconditioning of the battlecruiser, Yavuz Sultan Selim (renamed Yavuz). This battlecruiser became the symbol of Turkish naval revival, a symbol around which the Republican fleet was to come into life. For years, she had remained under the spotlight of international attention as well. Most foreign observers retained their skepticism regarding her fate until this battlecruiser could actually be re-commissioned in 1930.²⁰⁴

The Yavuz was by no means an uncontested symbol. The Army and the Navy had adhered to largely incompatible conceptions of naval power. The Navy clearly favored building a big surface fleet with dreadnoughts and destroyers in pursuit of naval superiority over other Balkan nations, including Greece.²⁰⁵ The Navy, indeed, was set to revitalize the overambitious naval program the Ottomans had embarked upon between 1911 and 1914²⁰⁶ This last Ottoman naval program had provided for forming a fleet centred on three dreadnought battleships, complemented by two protected cruisers, ten destroyers and four submarines. When war broke out in July 1914, the Ottoman Navy had two battleships nearing completion (Reşadiye and Sultan Osman), and a third one (Fatih) on order at British shipyards. The order for lighter units had been split between British and French shipbuilders. The lion's share had again gone to the British with an order for two protected cruisers, four destroyers and two submarines. The French shipyards had to settle for six destroyers and two submarines.²⁰⁷ Using the last Ottoman naval program as a yardstick for Turkish naval revival was certainly beyond the financial means of the Republic.

Moreover, the Republican Turkey also inherited from the Ottoman Empire popularity of naval power or naval-mindedness. The navy enjoyed a strong public support and had very influential friends in the press. This was the deep imprint which the last Ottoman naval program had left on the minds of the Turkish public. Between 1909 and 1914, the Ottomans from all walks of life had been called on to contribute financially by individual subscriptions to this program. The idea of building a navy to assert the international status of the Ottoman Empire had an undeniable appeal on the Ottomans. In particular, the big-gun dreadnoughts, partially funded by the donations of the people, ordered from British shipyards had captured the popular imagination.²⁰⁸ Moreover, their unlawful seizure by the Admiralty in August 1914 continued to haunt the people and naval officer corps. In 1924, two deputies in the TBMM tabled a motion for the revival of the Navy League. Before deciding on the issue, the government sought the opinion of the Turkish General Staff. Field-Marshal Fevzi Çakmak clearly drew attention to the priority of air power and aircraft over naval power and naval vessels. He recommended the resuscitation of the League as the Navy and Air League so that the funds at its disposal could be employed in the procurement of military and naval aircraft.²⁰⁹

In addition to military leaders' obvious inclination towards air power, the Republican political leaders did not seem as naval-minded as their Ottoman predecessors. President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had apparently not been very much influenced by the naval advocates of a large surface fleet. He directed that the Turkish naval programs' initial focus would be limited to training.²¹⁰ In the same frame of mind, Prime Minister Fethi [Okyar] reiterated how unenthusiastic the government was about ordering new naval units. First and foremost, what was left over from the Ottoman navy had to be refurbished to operational status.²¹¹ Hence, at least initially, the naval officer corps had to settle for much more modest navy than they imagined.

On other aspects of policy and strategy-making, the Navy continued to lose ground (and even its wings) to the Army-dominated General Staff. In the process of re-organization of the armed services, the General Staff decided to integrate army and naval air services under a single command. Though the Navy struggled to keep its wings under its own jurisdiction, it could not resist Marshal Çakmak's determination to organize all aviation units into a single air command. The sole naval aviation company stationed in İzmir was subsequently merged into the army aviation corps.²¹² This marked yet another clear departure from the Ottoman way. Indeed, even during the War of Independence, the nationalist forces operated naval aircraft from a detachment stationed at Amasra on the Black Sea. This token unit remained under the jurisdiction of the Navy Department. After the War of Independence, it was relocated to İzmir and its status was upgraded to naval aviation company in 1924.

Attention may be drawn to the Italian and British cases for similarity of experiences. When the Royal Air Force (RAF) was inaugurated in 1918 in Britain, the Royal Navy had to give away its aviators to this newly created service.²¹³ Around the same time, the Italian navy was also requested to give up its air arm the Italian air force.²¹⁴ Nevertheless, the Turkish case diverged organizationally and institutionally from both British and Italian cases. At the time of re-organization or merger of air units, an independent air force was not yet in existence in Turkey. As a matter of fact, the Turkish navy had to give away its wings, not an independent air force, but directly to the General Staff. Although it marked the end of an organic air arm for the Turkish navy, Turkey continued to procure dedicated naval aircraft and recruit naval officers for flying duties until the second half of the 1930s.²¹⁵

The General Staff's handling of this institutional matter pales in significance compared to its total domination in shaping the early Republican naval strategy. Turkish debates on naval strategy and doctrine mirrored in some respects the situation in most interwar navies. The sea power debates of the time brought to the fore two distinct types of naval vessels: the battleship and the submarine. Choice of one over the other as principal naval weapon implied a clear choice naval strategy as well.

Conventionally, the naval strategy had been about command of the sea. Such strategy had required huge investments in building and maintaining large surface fleets with big battleships and battlecruisers. The interwar alternative to this conventional understanding argued that both the submarine and the aircraft proved their worth and rendered battleships obsolete in future naval battles.²¹⁶ In essence, the naval strategy debate in Turkey developed along similar lines. In broad terms, the navy remained a committed advocate of a large surface fleet, while the army-dominated General Staff set its sights on lighter units. The latter's idea was to build an effective and low-budget navy with submarines and aircraft. The modest state of Turkish budget ruled out procurement of big battleships and most other types of warships. The navy itself was regarded as a low-return service by the General Staff which did not foresee much of mission for naval power in the defense of the Republic anyway.²¹⁷ Consequently, the budget argument worked hand in hand with Turkish military culture in suppressing the Republican navy's appetite for a fleet."²¹⁸

The army-dominated Turkish General Staff enjoyed an unchallenged monopoly in setting military strategy and priorities. In the early 1920s, the Turkish military mind perceived a serious gap in Turkish defenses as a result of the demilitarization requirement for the Turkish Straits under the Lausanne Convention. In Turkish calculations, demilitarized status of the region exposed dangerously country’s western coastline to the Italian threat. The main strategic objectives were hence geared towards compensating this perceived defense gap as well as developing capacity to neutralize a possible sea-borne assault by Italy from the Dodecanese in the Aegean. In the context of both objectives, the navy was relegated to a secondary role. This was merely a reflection of the prevailing culture of the officer corps. The first generation of the Republic’s military leaders had fought in defensive land battles from the Tripolitan War in 1911, the Gallipoli Campaign in 1915 all the way to the end of the War of Independence in 1922. In all these conflicts, friendly naval forces functioned on the margins of military operations. Consequently, the major mission that the early Republic military leaders conceived for the navy was coastal defense. Operationally and tactically, the navy was regarded as a natural (even organic) extension of the army.²¹⁹ In summary, submarines and sea mines were the most suitable weapons for Turkish defense, and they were affordable in contrast to the expensive surface vessels which navy favored.²²⁰

Both the submarine and the aircraft were weapons of choice for the Turkish General Staff from the start. In 1924 two military commissions were touring Europe almost simultaneously. While one of the commissions visited Britain, France, Germany and Italy to buy aircraft, and the other toured France, the Netherlands and Sweden to buy submarines.²²¹ Their missions clearly reflected the military priorities of the new Republic. However, airpower enjoyed a distinct advantage. Its popular appeal in Turkey was no less than its appeal to the Turkish military mind. Aircraft and the aviator offered useful symbols of progress and power for the image of the new Republic in Turkey. This helped the Turkish government to overcome funding problems for at least one aspect of its armament program. A countrywide fund-raising drive translated aviation's popular appeal into the finances to create a 200-aircraft air arm in the 1920s. Only the Yavuz could compete with aircraft in capturing the hearts and minds of the Turkish public.²²²

The Republic could spare only limited funds for the naval program. However, in the 1920s, even these small funds had to be diverted to other areas of national defense.²²³ The Mosul crisis with Britain and the Sheik Said rebellion in 1925 presented serious threats to the Republic’s survival. The security of the eastern borders and provinces become a top military priority for Turkey. The Turkish General Staff quickly discovered the use of airpower in dealing with insurgencies in remote areas, ²²⁴ as the Royal Air Force had experienced earlier in neighboring regions of Iraq.²²⁵ For problems encountered in the east, the government depended on the army backed by air power. In the west, both offered the primary means of defense against a possible Italian assault. Hence, warships were relegated to the bottom of the arms procurement priorities of the new Republic. A final indication of the primacy of air power over all other considerations was the Turkish interest in developing a national aviation industry. To this end, Ankara probed for a prospective cooperation with Berlin which was seeking a way around the Versailles restrictions on German air power and industry.²²⁶