F I r s t d r a f t

The Lausanne Conference provided Mussolini with a venue to further his quest for recognition among the great powers. On his way to the conference, Mussolini stopped at Territet, several miles short of his ultimate destination. In so doing, he compelled his French and British counterparts to meet him for a pre-conference discussion. This may be regarded as an achievement in terms of securing recognition of Italy’s equal status with France and Britain. Indeed, the official communiqué issued after the meeting emphasized this equal status. However, such recognition inevitably implied that previously Italy had not been exactly equal.²⁸⁴For Mussolini, international conferences such as the one at Lausanne were not the only fora where Italy could assert itself. He also demonstrated that Rome could resort to violent methods in the Balkans without regard to international organizations. When the Lausanne Conference was drawing to an end in July 1923, Italian expansionism manifested itself over the port city of Fiume on the Adriatic coast of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Mussolini proposed the incorporation of Fiume into Italy. His plan was to annex the city if Belgrade rejected the proposal. However, the chain of events prompted him to shift his immediate attention to Corfu, a Greek island in the Adriatic. Italy attacked the island, yet had to withdraw its troops under British pressure. Intimidated by Italy’s aggressive behavior during the Corfu incident, Belgrade eventually conceded and recognized Italy’s full sovereignty over Fiume.²⁸⁵ These developments led Ankara to conclude that Turkey would be the next target of Italian expansionism in the Balkans. However, Mussolini’s attention at that time was directed towards the Adriatic coast of the Balkans where he found himself blocked by French dominance.²⁸⁶ France remained “public enemy number two” for Italy but after the collapse of Austro-Hungary there was no “public enemy number one”.²⁸⁷ The fascist leader was obsessed with the idea of putting an end to French influence in the region. The best way to undermine France was to weaken its ally, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Only after that, could he turn to Turkey, whose viability as a new state, he believed, was questionable. In the latter half of the 1920s, Mussolini was better situated to implement his strategy once he had consolidated his power domestically and taken complete control of the Palazzo Chigi. Thus, the fascist leader openly announced his dictatorship.²⁸⁸ The authoritarian state was also reinforced in the foreign office by the dismissal of many officials and their replacement by committed fascists. In fact, Mussolini was convinced that the foreign office ought to be the most fascist of all government departments. He gave preference for diplomatic posts to those with party membership dating back to before October 1922.²⁸⁹ With these new civil servants in place, Mussolini was able to put his assertive foreign policy into practice with tono fascista. The new phase in Italian foreign relations had a clear impact on Italian-Turkish relations. Italian diplomatic papers indicate growing Italian interest in 1924 and 1925 in the strength of Turkish defenses along the Western coast.²⁹⁰ Two events specifically, the Mosul issue and the signing of the Locarno Treaties in 1925, marked a transition in Turkish-Italian relations. On the one hand, the Locarno Treaties concerned Italian policy in Europe and the Balkans, and, therefore, inevitably concerned Turkey as well. On the other hand, Rome expected that the Mosul issue between Ankara and London would lead to the disintegration of Turkey and would provide Italy with a share of Anatolia.

Distinct from the question of Mosul, Mussolini’s visit to Tripoli around the same time was to give similar messages to Turkey. Ankara was visibly apprehensive regarding Italian colonial aspirations in Anatolia as a result of Mussolini’s demonstrative Mediterranean cruise. The Turkish press pointed out Italy’s recent activities in the Balkans and carried commentaries about the loan recently granted to Greece for the purchase of ammunitions. In fact, according to Mussolini, the British-Greek-Italian alignment was a great conspiracy against Turkey. After the Corfu incident, the new regime of Theodoros Pangalos in Greece offered Mussolini opportunities stemming from this alignment. ²⁹¹

Transformation of Greece’s status from victim into potential junior partner for Italy followed the rise of Pangalos to power as military dictator in Greece. In fact, in the winter of 1925-1926, Mussolini apparently contemplated a Corfu-style descent on Turkey.²⁹² US High Commissioner Admiral Bristol reported from İstanbul to Washington that Mussolini’s visit to Tripoli preceded by Greco-Italian “pourparlers” was coincidental with the British Ambassador’s return to Turkey and the reopening of the Mosul negotiations. All these developments occasioned considerable concern to the Turkish government as well as general uneasiness on the part of the public.²⁹³

What made Greece a potential collaborator with Italy in Turkish eyes were the enduring problems of population exchange and the status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul. Under the Treaty of Lausanne a massive exchange of populations was agreed upon between Ankara and Athens.²⁹⁴ Subsequent influx of dispossessed and dislocated refugees in large numbers created a formidable barrier to the improvement of bilateral relations on both sides in the 1920s.²⁹⁵ The implementation of the exchange of populations resulted in two technical problems. First one was about the scope of the exemption granted to the Greeks of Istanbul from the compulsory exchange. Naturally, Athens was prone to construe the exemption far more broadly than Ankara was ready to accept. Second technical problem was about the compensation for the properties that the exchanged people had to abandon. The value of such properties was to be estimated and any outstanding balances would be covered by the host country. The negotiations on the value of abandoned properties dragged on for five years after signature of the Treaty. In 1925, the rift between Turkey and Greece deepened over the election of a new Patriarch to the Greek Orthodox Church in Istanbul. Ankara did not approve the new appointment and expelled the Patriarch-elect on the grounds that he was subject to exchange of populations under the Treaty of Lausanne.²⁹⁶ Finally, Greece’s reluctance to officially renounce the Megali Idea (Great Idea) in the 1920s only exacerbated Ankara’s suspicions regarding the Greek motives.²⁹⁷

While the Turkish leaders were suspicious of the existence of an Italian-Greek alliance in the 1920s, they were equally apprehensive about collaboration between Italy and Britain. In fact, when Mussolini and Chamberlain met at Rapallo, the semi-official newspaper Milliyet wrote that it would have been highly desirable for the Italian ambassador in Turkey to have informed the Turkish public regarding the nature of the Mussolini-Chamberlain Rapallo interview. By the end of April, there was already news in the Turkish press on the nature of the Rapallo Conference.²⁹⁸

The Turkish press stated that the news of an Italian-British agreement dividing Abyssinia into spheres of influence had thrown light on the situation. They added that the clouds which at present darkened the European horizon had not been dispersed but on the contrary were becoming darker because of the violation of the country’s independence.²⁹⁹ According to the Turkish press, such a violation would indicate first that there existed no difference between the mentality of present-day European statesmen and that of their pre-war predecessors and secondly, that there was no international principle or doctrine which could resist violation by the ambitious and egoistic designs of European states.³⁰⁰

Turkey’s feeling of insecurity concerning the European powers continued all through the 1920s. Although Turkey accepted the solution to the Mosul issue in June 1926 in favor of Britain for reasons of its own security, it was aware that political instability in the region could create further problems for Ankara. After the signing of the treaty between Britain and Turkey on the Mosul issue, an American diplomatic dispatch drew attention to the Daily Express of London which published an article on the decision by Italy to occupy its former “sphere of influence” in Turkey and claimed that Britain had requested the intervention of the United States in order to maintain peace.³⁰¹

Even though there was no evidence of the accuracy of the Daily Express’ report, certain milieus in Turkey feared Italian-Greek cooperation in an Italian occupation of Cilicia. The American diplomats in Bulgaria reported that Soviet and Turkish Commissioners for Foreign Affairs discussed at Odessa the alleged existence of an Italian-Greek-Bulgarian pact, supported by Britain, against Turkey.³⁰² At the beginning of 1927, the Turkish press wrote that Britain, in return for Italy’s military cooperation in China, accorded Italy absolute freedom of action in its Turkish policy.³⁰³

These kinds of rumors showed the degree of Turkish suspicions vis-à-vis the intentions of the European great powers such as Italy and Britain. The fact that secret deals were still made, as had happened in the First World War, fed into the Turkish distrust of the world system. For instance, the way the Mosul issue was resolved at the League had a case in point for Turkish political leadership. During the Mosul discussions, Lord Balfour said that the way had been left open for the Council to say that Turkey would only be asked to take part in its deliberations upon terms of inequality with other members of the Council.³⁰⁴

The Mosul crisis between Britain and Turkey offered an opportunity for Italy to carve out a future sphere of influence in Anatolia. In this way, Mussolini would be able to realize the Italian colonial dream in Anatolia since he expected the disintegration of the Republic of Turkey during the crisis. Therefore, fascist policy was geared towards reviving the old expansionist designs of Italy over Turkey by profiting from the conflict between Britain and Turkey. At the height of British-Turkish tension, in January 1925, Italian diplomats in Turkey urged the governor of the Dodecanese Islands to gather intelligence on the Datça and Marmaris for a possible Italian landing operation. The Italian Consul in Antalya even complained that his location was not suitable for obtaining information on Turkish military measures on the coast facing the Dodecanese.³⁰⁵

Ankara was very much alarmed to the possibility that Italy might be tempted to send troops to Anatolia due to the Mosul crisis.³⁰⁶ The Turkish press reports of the time emphasized the possibility of Italy using Rhodes as a military base in the case of war.³⁰⁷ In fact, Italian diplomatic reports included extracts from daily Turkish newspapers such as İkdam whose headlines pointed in alarm to Italian military preparations.³⁰⁸ Moreover, the Turkish press in Antalya published articles against the presence of Italians in the province. The press proposed that Italian schools and hospitals be closed. The perpetuation of these institutions, the press argued, proved that Italy had not given up the idea of taking over Antalya. The governor of the province had a similar opinion. He openly stated to the Italian authorities his belief that Italy still had territorial ambitions concerning Antalya and that the existence of Italian hospitals and schools confirmed these intentions. ³⁰⁹

The Italian mindset, which was fixated on colonialist expansion plans, was unsurprisingly reflected in the strategies developed by some Italian diplomats in Turkey. A telegram sent from the Italian Embassy in Turkey to the Italian Foreign Ministry focused on the advantages to Italy of pursuing colonial goals in southeastern Turkey. The telegram identified 1927 as the critical year in which to pursue colonial expansion into Turkey as the new Turkish regime began to consolidate domestically and before it acquired effective means to defend itself. It suggested that Italy occupy the Adana region, instead of İzmir and Antalya, as an Italian presence in this region offered better economic as well as political benefits. The Adana region was rich in resources that would be a great contribution to the Italian economy. ³¹⁰

Politically, possession of the region would be a substantial reward for Italian expansionism. It would enable Italy to link with up Britain in the Middle East. Since Italy would provide a counter balance in the Adana region, Britain could be at ease in Mosul. Moreover, if the opportunity arose for Italy to support a Kurdish revolt in the region in cooperation with Britain, the door to Persia and the Caucasus would also be wide open. The telegram also claimed that such a scenario might even help Italy to come to better terms with the Soviet Union. In other words, if Italy could offer the Soviets economic advantages in the Mediterranean, then Moscow might withdraw its support of Turkey.³¹¹

Between 1923 and 1927, the Turkish Foreign Ministry let Rome know on various occasions that they were suspicious about the policies of great powers vis-à-vis Turkey. On such occasions, Turkish diplomats used a heavy dose of traditional balance of power language. For instance, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras openly declared to the Italian Ambassador in Ankara, Felice Orsini that, in the case of Italian-British collaboration, Turkey would consider approaching other great powers. More specifically, Aras warned Orsini that Turkey might even conclude an agreement on the Mediterranean with France, although Turkey was not at all on good terms with France at the time. Ankara had in fact signed a convention of friendship and good neighborhood with France in May 1926. The main purpose of this convention was to secure the border between Turkey and Syria, then a French mandate, in the case of armed confrontation with the European powers, particularly over Mosul. However, Rome saw the signing of the 1926 convention as the Turks courting the French. ³¹²

Thus the nature of Italian-Turkish relations in general had not changed when Mussolini came to power. The Italian colonial intentions on Turkey remained unchanged since the first decade of the twentieth century. Moreover, The Italian possession of the Dodecanese islands complicated Turkey’s security situation which had already been compromised by the demilitarization of the Straits at British insistence during the Lausanne Conference.³¹³ Intelligence reports indicated possibility of an Italian assault on Turkey with other great powers’ acquiescence.³¹⁴ The Italian involvement in Albania heightened Turkish uneasiness towards Italy. In fact, the Turkish fear of Italy was hardly unjustified. Recalling his conversation with the Italian Consul-General at Mersin, a British diplomat reported that his Italian colleague: “was at no pains to hide his belief that at no distant date the flag of Savoy would be waving in the fertile Cilician plain.”³¹⁵

A possible Turkish-French agreement would definitely work against the Italian interest in the Mediterranean where France was taken as Italy’s main rival. Furthermore, the settlement of the Mosul without a British-Turkish confrontation denied Mussolini the opportunity to stake a claim in Anatolia. Finally, the new Turkish state did not unravel under the impact of domestic and international pressures. Ankara conceded to London on the Mosul issue to rule out intervention by other great powers. A Turkish newspaper, Milliyet, reported Italian perspectives that appreciated Turkish way of handling the issue. Ankara’s decision to adhere to the League’s decision had ruined all the hopes and plans which Italy cherished with regard to Turkey. A drastic change of in the Italian press would arguably be in order with toned down language as regards to Turkey. It would not be surprising to see the Italian press speak of Turkish friendship and publish “Turcophile” articles.³¹⁶

This was quite an accurate assessment of the situation. At that stage, Italy could not conceive an attack on Turkey without British support. During the Mosul crisis, it was in the British interest to collaborate with Italy in order to create more pressure on Turkey. However, as soon as the crisis was concluded to the British interest, London had to divert Italy’s attention of Italy away from the Near East. There was a risk that Italian belligerence might get out of hand in the region. Nevertheless, Chamberlain owed Italy a favor. Mussolini’s belligerence towards Turkey had contributed to Britain’s success in the Mosul question. The best choice for Britain was to encourage Italy in Albania which Chamberlain was prepared to recognize as “Italy’s Belgium.”³¹⁷
Italian Overtures to Turkey
The settlement of the Mosul problem meant removal of an element of antagonism with a European great power. It provided the Turkish leadership with a breathing space so that they could focus regime consolidation at home. It was also followed by moderation of Italy’s stand towards Turkey. Ankara, for its part, was inclined to reciprocate the Italian moderation. Italian diplomatic papers indicate that both Rome and Ankara prospected for a high level Turkish diplomatic visit to Rome by the end of 1927. Various factors contributed to the changing relations between Turkey and Italy. By 1926, Turkey’s land frontiers were secured under the friendship treaties concluded with the Soviet Union and Iran. Moreover, in order to solve the Syrian-Turkish and Iraqi-Turkish border problems, in May 1926 Turkey signed a convention with France and in June 1926 a treaty with Britain. Turkey had already realized by that time that it could not afford to confront the great powers on all fronts. In 1927, Turkey was finally able to turn its attention from its land borders to the Mediterranean Sea.

Secondly, contrary to Rome’s expectations, the Mosul issue did not lead to the collapse of the Republic of Turkey. Ankara chose to make concessions to the British on the Mosul issue for the sake of the survival of the Republic. The Turkish leaders knew that they were ill equipped militarily to tackle Britain on matters such as Mosul. In a sense, they had to compromise in order not to aggravate their international isolation. Turkey’s political leaders did not want to give the great powers a pretext in the Mosul issue that could lead to the collapse of the new Republic.³¹⁸ With the resolution of the Mosul problem, Turkey would be less likely to disintegrate or fall into the hands of the great powers.

Thirdly, Fascist Italy’s frustration with the existing international arrangements continued to grow. Rome contemplated to enlist international outcasts like Turkey and the Soviet Union on its side to amplify Italy’s voice in world councils. Indeed, this view had a long history that dated back to the time of the Treaty of Lausanne where Italy was presented with an ultimatum by the British on the status of the Dodecanese Islands. The ultimatum included a threat by the British Prime Minister to sign the treaty without Italy. Back then, this British ultimatum prompted Mussolini to seriously consider siding with Turkey and the Soviet Union as a diplomatic alternative. According to Lowe and Marzari, a sufficient basis for such a diplomatic option was already in place:
“The Consulta had supported Russia’s request for equal treatment at the [Lausanne Conference] and cordial contacts had been maintained throughout with the unofficial Russian delegation. Moreover, the Italian Navy pronounced in favor of the Russian and Turkish programme for the Turkish Straits, that they remain under Turkish control, and against the British programme that the transit be free and the region demilitarized.”³¹⁹

Above all, Rome began to view Turkey in a different light. Turkey was no longer identified only with Anatolia but was increasingly seen as part of the Balkans. The Italian image of Turkey changed mainly in step with the new situation in the Balkan Peninsula. There were signs of profound change in the treatment Turkey merited in the Italian press around 1927. Rumors of Italian preparations for an attack on Anatolia were described as “fantastically false” in the Popolo d’Italia of 30 December 1927.³²⁰ In July 1927, it was evident that Mussolini was taking great strides in the realization of a Turkish-Italian rapprochement.³²¹ According to Mussolini a Turkish-Italian rapprochement would also be a step towards a pro-Italian alliance in the region.

Its troubled relations with Belgrade triggered such a dramatic shift in Italian strategy towards Turkey within the Balkan context. In the winter of 1925-1926, there had been attempts to bolster an Italian-Yugoslav rapprochement. Rome had already created a kind of supremacy over Yugoslavia by the Pact of Rome signed in January 1924. In fact, France and Czechoslovakia wanted to join the Italo-Yugoslav treaty. Mussolini rejected this because the Pact of Rome not only “liberated” Fiume from Yugoslavia but also Yugoslavia “from French tutelage”.³²² During the 1925-1926 negotiations, King Alexander proposed to Rome that the two powers partition Albania. At the same time, in order to defy Italy, Belgrade aimed at a Yugoslav-Greek rapprochement that might prepare the ground for a Balkan Locarno.

Mussolini was as adamantly opposed to a Balkan Locarno as he was to the partition of Albania with another power. In fact, he decided to sign the Pact of Tirana with Albania to secure complete control over this country. In response, Belgrade turned to Paris and concluded an alliance in November 1927 with France to deter Italian aggression. This alliance in a sense consolidated French influence in Eastern Europe whose origins can be traced back to the formation of the Little Entente in 1922. The alliance with France was soon followed by the Yugoslav parliament’s refusal to ratify the Conventions of Nettuno, signed with Italy on 20 July 1925.³²³

The Paris-Belgrade alliance prompted Rome to seek closer links with Ankara as an extension of Mussolini’s plan to create a group of client states that looked exclusively to Rome.³²⁴

French influence in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and in Romania, and the entente system which Paris established in Eastern Europe constituted a model for the new Italians to emulate with Turkey in the Balkans. At that stage, Turkey transformed from a potential colony to a regional partner in the Italian calculations. Mussolini’s diplomacy then took on a new dimension in dealing with Ankara. Rome was set to take advantage of Turkey’s international isolation and to turn Ankara into a pro-Italian actor. Not a member of the League of Nations, Turkey looked like a promising candidate to join an Italian-led system in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Furthermore, Mussolini’s failure to persuade the Soviets to sign a friendship pact with Italy in the 1920s probably enhanced Turkey’s diplomatic and political value for Italy.³²⁵ Turkey, on the other hand, had close relations with the Soviets since the early 1920s. In short, Turkey began to matter to Rome in its pursuit of proxies, partners and allies against France in the Mediterranean. The French, for their part, had a “rooted distrust” of Italy.³²⁶ Another source of discord between the two countries was the Italian pursuit of recognition of equality with France in various venues. Before the ascendance of the Fascists, Italy had already been granted parity with France as a naval power at the Washington Conference in 1922. The Fascist Italian government did not bother to participate in the subsequent Geneva Naval Conference of 1927, as France would certainly oppose the extension of this parity to other categories of naval units. Later, Mussolini confided to the US Ambassador that Italy “had been granted parity with France at Washington in 1922 and was determined not to give it up. The Fascist government could scarcely accept less than its predecessor had won”.³²⁷ The Italian demand for parity with France in every category of naval vessel had already undermined the progress of preparatory negotiations for the Conference. In fact, as Italy’s financial position was not seen as promising for competitive shipbuilding, its insistence on parity was considered as having merely been an issue of prestige for that country.³²⁸