F I r s t d r a f t

On the one hand, the fascist regime was trying to facilitate settlement of outstanding problems between Turkey and Greece since Lausanne. This was part of Rome’s new strategy to form a bloc in the Balkans to counter Yugoslavia. On the other hand, this alignment would also help Rome curb the influence of France, the main supporter of Yugoslavia in the region. The diplomatic observers’ views on the viability of the Italian plans varied. For American diplomats, for instance, the proper groundwork for a tripartite agreement between Turkey, Greece, and Italy had not yet been in place. While the British diplomats concurred with the American assessments, the Hungarian diplomats were convinced of the certainty of such a tripartite agreement.³²⁹

Moreover, American diplomats in Ankara, in general, had serious doubts as to the extent to which the Turkish and the Italian intentions overlapped. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew wrote: “I decidedly doubt if Turkey’s new found friendship with Italy has any definitely planned anti-French intent, since an aggressive policy against any nation is entirely inconsistent with Turkey’s present interests and her determination to remain independent of political combinations and entanglements”.³³⁰ It was even more doubtful that Turkey would commit itself to any anti-Yugoslav alliance.

The Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement that was signed between Turkey and Italy in May 1928 received extensive coverage in the Turkish and the Italian presses. Some of these found their way into American diplomatic reports. To give but a few examples, the Cumhuriyet wrote that Italy had become convinced of the desirability of developing Turkey as a market rather than a place of colonization and of political penetration. A member of the TBMM believed that the signing of the agreement would completely disarm people who had motives for reporting Italy as being ready to attack. Another deputy wrote in the Journal d’Orient on 30 May 1928 that this agreement would prevent third states from settling other Mosul questions with the threat of an alleged Italian invasion and would likewise facilitate the settlement of the on-going Turkish-Greek controversy.³³¹

The Turks were not alone in their conviction that some European countries were trying to keep Turkey from settling of its political problems. The Americans referred to the views of German Ambassador in Turkey regarding settlement of Turkish-Greek problems. German Ambassador thought the French were working in Greece to undermine efforts for resolving the population exchange question. It was the only major impediment to a Turkish-Greek rapprochement. Along similar lines, the Italian press also accused France of conveying a distorted image of Italy in the Near East. Giornale d’Italia stated: “Being the greatest Mediterranean power, Italy has, more than any other country, direct responsibilities in maintaining order in that region”.³³²

The US Embassy in Rome summarized the benefits for Italy out of an understanding with Turkey as follows: First, it was represented just another move in the Italian-French game for influence in the Mediterranean. Second, it might facilitate bringing about the settlement of Greece’s difficulties with Turkey, and the conclusion of Greco-Italian understanding. Third, it would fit the ultimate Italian objective to establish ascendancy in the Near East in general and in the Balkans in particular.³³³ The Americans also added that the signature of the Turkish-Italian Treaty was a political loss to France and gain to Italy.³³⁴ As for Turkey, the American diplomats had drawn attention to the emerging pattern in Turkish diplomacy. For some time it had been centered on the negotiation and conclusion of neutrality and non-aggression pacts, such as the one signed with Italy. Such pacts were devised to enhance Turkey’s security against the political and territorial aggression and ambitions of its neighbors. This in turn would empower Turkish leaders to reap the full benefits of a much- needed period of years of peace for implementing internal, legislative and economic reforms and for putting its house in order.³³⁵

Interestingly enough, the French Ambassador, Count de Chambroun, confided to the Americans that he saw no immediate danger in such treaties as the Turkish-Italian pact, but five, or ten or twenty years from then it might be a different matter. If it were Italy’s and Turkey’s intention, tacitly or otherwise, to develop a political encircling movement around Yugoslavia, bringing Greece, Bulgaria, and eventually Hungary into the circle, France would be fully able to take care of the situation when the moment should be ripe.³³⁶

However, on 28 April 1929 when Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras visited Rome, to reciprocate Mussolini’s welcoming speech. He stated that the Turkish government had given many proofs of its sincere desire for peace and considered French-Italian friendship of prime importance for peace in the Mediterranean.³³⁷ In fact, an American diplomat in Rome reported to Washington that Italy was seeking to benefit economically from the cordial relations established between Italy and Turkey since the political results in favor of Italy of the Italian-Turkish Treaty of Neutrality were rather symbolic and meager.³³⁸

Foreign diplomats in Turkey had attributed Ankara’s desire for an agreement with Italy to its natural willingness to ward off for some years the menace of an Italian descent upon the Anatolian coast as well as to heighten its own prestige in Asia and elsewhere by the conclusion of an agreement of this character with a European power.³³⁹ Other commentators argued that the apparent ideological similarities between the Italian and Turkish regimes also facilitated rapprochement between Turkey and Italy. Moreover, beyond the Mediterranean balance of power, Italy needed Turkey for a secure access to Soviet natural resources.³⁴⁰

5. BREAKING OUT OF INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION:

THE MEDITERRANEAN ORIGINS
Mending fences with Italy and Greece constituted first steps towards breaking Turkey’s international isolation. Ankara could reap the immediate benefits of improved relations with these two Mediterranean neigbours in amplifying its international status. To start with, the short-lived rapprochement with Italy helped Turkey on three major accounts. First, the Italian government was ready to underwrite Turkish naval orders from Italian shipbuilders in order to consolidate its hold in Turkey. Rome, thus, financed the first major Turkish naval program of the interwar era. Second, Mussolini was anxious to promote Greek-Turkish conciliation as a part of his Mediterranean strategy. Although the Greek-Turkish reconciliation can hardly be linked solely to the Italian efforts, both Turkish and Greek governments had given, at least rhetorically, credit to Italy for the outcome. Finally, Italy sponsored Turkey’s admission into a number of interwar proposals of pan-European or international cooperation. The Italian sponsorship of Turkey was not devoid of ulterior motives. Rome always kept France’s influence in mind and was obsessed with the relative gains Paris could make out of such proposals. Instead of rejecting them outright, Italy tried to undermine and complicate them by insisting on accommodation of as many powers as possible. In the final analysis, Turkey seemed to benefit more militarily and diplomatically than Italy from the short period of warmth in bi-lateral relations, as it was followed by an accelerated process of Turkey’s international normalization as well as its naval modernization.

Italian-Turkish Naval Arms Trade
In the first decade of the republic, there were indications that the old arms trade patterns of the Ottoman Empire could survive even after the First World War and the Turkish War of Independence. Against all political and diplomatic odds, even the British connection with Turkish military and naval affairs displayed a certain degree of resilience. It should be borne in mind that on the eve of the First World War, the last Ottoman government had placed a large order for naval units, including two dreadnought battleships, from British shipyards. In April 1914, the Ottoman Ministry of Marine awarded additional contracts to British shipbuilders for a third dreadnought and a large number of lighter units, including cruisers, destroyers and submarines. Although the payments made by the Ottoman government for the two ill-fated dreadnought battleships had been counted towards the Ottoman debts at Lausanne to a large extent, some contracts remained outstanding.

Occasionally, new government of Turkey sought to acquire some of the naval units outstanding from the 1914 Ottoman order. For instance, in 1923, Ankara authorized Captain Hamdi [Denizmen], who was a deputy in the TBMM, to procure one such submarine from Britain.³⁴¹ This procurement could never materialize and Ankara turned to another traditional supplier, Germany, for the submarines in 1924.

Problems related to the Yavuz’s reconditioning presented Field-Marshal Çakmak with an unexpected but very much welcome opportunity to restore his authority over Turkish defenses which he regarded as compromised by the existence of an independent ministry of marine. Shortly after awarding of the contract for reconditioning, a plethora of technical problems emerged with the floating dock. The corruption charges against Minister of Marine Ali İhsan Eryavuz further complicated the situation. The result was a significant delay in the project. The corruption charges caused not only the impeachment of the Minister but also resulted in the abolition of the Ministry of Marine in December 1927. The demise of the Ministry of Marine can be linked to several factors. The first one was the personal rivalry between Minister of Marine Ali İhsan Eryavuz and Prime Minister İsmet İnönü.³⁴² Secondly, Chief of Staff Field-Marshal Fevzi Çakmak had never approved of the idea of an independent ministry of marine. Minister of Marine Eryavuz never shied away from publicly asserting his jurisdiction over the Navy. In June 1927, when the opportunity arose in the form of corruption charges against the Minister, Marshal Çakmak recommended in unequivocal terms that the Ministry be disbanded to ensure unity of command in the Turkish armed forces.³⁴³

In sum, corruption charges thus provided Çakmak with a convenient pretext to get rid of the Minister and his Ministry. A third factor that may be added to the above is that by 1927 the Republican regime could afford to dispense with the Ministry of Marine. It had consolidated its rule domestically and achieved complete control of the Turkish military by 1926. In addition, the opposition party, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, had been closed down in 1925. Later some of its members were tried and executed for their alleged involvement in the attempted assassination of President Mustafa Kemal in 1926. The leader of the party, Rauf Orbay, had to flee the country. It is argued that the Sheikh Said Rebellion which erupted nearly concomitantly with the Mosul debacle with Britain in 1925 in a way contributed to the consolidation of the new regime.³⁴⁴ The ruling elite’s consolidation of power marked the beginning of single-party rule in Turkey, which was to last until 1946.³⁴⁵

The abolition of the Ministry of Marine in 1927 was a decisive institutional victory for the General Staff. The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff took over the functions of the defunct Ministry of Marine; the latter’s army-dominated ranks recovering ultimate authority over the navy and naval strategy. Chief of Staff Field-Marshal Fevzi Çakmak had long been noted by foreign observers as a formidable opponent of expensive naval programs.³⁴⁶ For instance, the British naval attaché interpreted the corruption charges against the Minister of Marine as an indication of the Turkish government’s desire to cancel the contract, because, as a fighting unit, Yavuz had very little to offer. Moreover, after being re-commissioned, Yavuz would need a destroyer escort to protect her against submarine menace. The bill for the naval program was likely to mount with the cost of acquiring destroyers, to the dismay of Field-Marshal Çakmak.³⁴⁷

Now that Field-Marshal Fevzi Çakmak had recovered his full authority over the navy, a loss of momentum in naval programs was considered unavoidable by foreign observers. However, the turn of events proved otherwise. It should be borne in mind that back in 1925 Marshal Çakmak had already indicated that it would be premature to agree on any naval holiday before the Yavuz’s re-conditioning and finalization of contracts for new naval units.³⁴⁸ In April 1928, the TBMM authorized a 30-million Turkish Lira appropriation for the first ten-year naval program.³⁴⁹ Secondly, in September 1928, the Greek Navy conducted an exercise off the Dardanelles which was perceived as a provocation. Ankara reciprocated with a similar exercise personally commanded by President Atatürk. The 1928 incident in a sense defined the parameters of the Turkish naval policy. The aim was to possess a fleet in the Aegean comparable, if not exactly equal, to that of Greece. Consequently, Yavuz’s reconditioning gained momentum and the shipbuilding program was revived, though on a modest scale.³⁵⁰ The upcoming Turkish naval order was to include two destroyers, two submarines and a number of lighter vessels.³⁵¹ Funding remained a crucial issue for the procurement of new naval units.

In the new Turkish naval program, an unsatisfied European power, Italy, began to loom large. The process witnessed Italy’s transformation from a source of threat into a major supplier of arms to Turkey. French-Italian rivalry in the Mediterranean after 1927 solved the funding problem with Turkey’s modest naval program in a convenient way.³⁵² Fascist Italy began to entertain the idea of establishing an Aegean bloc consisting of Italy, Turkey and Greece to counter French influence in the Adriatic and the Balkans. Consequently, Rome sought not only to improve its bi-lateral relations with Turkey and Greece but also encouraged these countries to reconcile their differences. In May 1928, Turkish-Italian negotiations resulted in the conclusion of the Italian-Turkish Treaty of Neutrality and Reconciliation. The Treaty marked a drastic change in Fascist Italy’s image of new regime in Ankara. Turkey was no longer seen as a potential colony but as a sovereign state which had to be won to the Italian side through political, economic and military penetration. In the context, arms supplies stood as appropriate instruments for such a policy.³⁵³

The Italian shipyard Odero had offered to supply destroyers to the Turkish Navy long before the ten-year naval program was adopted. In December 1926, the Italian Air and Naval Attaché in Turkey, Lieutenant Commander Maroni, hailed the Oderoshipyard’s offer to supply destroyers to the Turkish Navy as a promising venture for Italian penetration into Turkey.³⁵⁴ Shortly afterwards, Italian Ambassador Orsini Barone called on the Italian Foreign Ministry to encourage Italian shipbuilders to bid individually or collectively for the Turkish naval programs. He argued that the new mood in Turkey was clearly in favor of Italy.³⁵⁵

Rome was among the European capitals that had attentively followed the process of recruitment of German naval advisors in Turkey. Indeed, the other naval attaches were made aware of the Turkish decision to hire retired German officers by the Italian naval attaché in Istanbul. The Turkish naval affairs were of great interest to Rome. The Italians were quick to conclude that the delivery of the German-funded Dutch-built submarines was deliberately coordinated with the arrival of the first German naval advisors in Turkey. For them, this was just a manifestation of an established pattern that the supply of naval units would increase the buyer’s dependence on the supplier for training. Supply of naval units and training were, in turn, keys to political and military penetration to Turkey. With this in mind, Mussolini expressed his disappointment over the absence of any Italian military or civilian experts in Turkey. He particularly detested the fact that although 43 German, 17 French, two Austrian and one English advisor were then employed in the Turkish military service not any single Italian hired for even in civilian service in Turkey. He also encouraged the Italian Ministry of Marine to invite Turkish military and naval missions to promote the Italian arms industry, while cautioning them not to show any secret facilities or weapons to the visiting Turks.³⁵⁶In response to Mussolini’s remarks, Maroni reported that it was a long-established great power practice to exert military influence on the Ottoman Empire through military/naval advisors. He pointed to the current fierce rivalry between France and Germany, each with a large number of advisors in the Turkish military service. Italy had been absent from this rivalry until a few months earlier. This was due to Rome’s indifference before the First World War and then because of Turkish suspicions.³⁵⁷ Historical experience suggested to the Italians a strong link between arms transfers and the presence of foreign military/naval advisors. They concluded that the supply of arms was a tested great power method of gaining economic, political and military influence in Turkey.³⁵⁸ With the first signs of warming in Italian-Turkish relations in 1927, the Italians were further encouraged by the noticeably positive attitude towards Italian shipyards in Turkish military circles.³⁵⁹ It seems safe to argue that the political significance of the Turkish naval tender to the Italian government far exceeded its commercial significance for the Italian shipbuilders. Rome was willing to provide a financial guarantee for the tender that no other foreign government could match. This guarantee was significant, as the financing of the Turkish naval order was the key question. Turkey had not recovered economically from the devastation of the wars. It was also struggling to settle the Ottoman debt.³⁶⁰ Ankara could afford to order ships only under long-term financial agreements with favorable terms. Rome agreed to provide Italian shipbuilders with a financial guarantee for up to seventy percent of the value of a possible Turkish order.³⁶¹ Maroni drew attention to the political and military significance to the contract of the Italian government’s guarantee. First and foremost, it decisively demonstrated lack of aggressive motives in the Italian approach to Turkey. Secondly, it proved Italy’s genuine interest in, and its wholehearted commitment to, strengthening Turkey militarily.³⁶²British shipbuilders were among the most serious contenders for the Turkish naval tender. Like their Italian rivals, British bidders combined their efforts to meet the diversity of vessel types the Turkish tender involved. The most prominent tie-up was the one between two large British shipbuilders: Vickers-Armstrong and J.I. Thornycroft & Co., Ltd. Unlike the Italians, the British did not find the Turkish repayment proposal financially acceptable. Ankara’s proposal involved a ten-year payment schedule according to which two percent of the contract value was to be paid upon signature of the contract, another two percent in 1929-1930, and then five percent in 1930-1931. The balance was to be paid off in seven years through Turkish treasury bonds, at around 13 percent each year. The British shipyards’ financially acceptable minimum was 20 percent of the value of the contract during the construction period of three years, the balance payable in treasury bonds over six years from the contract date. They accurately predicted that they might lose the tender to the Italians who enjoyed government backing.³⁶³ The disarmament-oriented British government was not able or willing to furnish similar financial guarantees to the private arms producers competing for overseas markets.The Italians enjoyed a psychological edge over the British shipbuilders, too. In 1927, the Italian shipbuilder Ansaldo made an important gesture that tilted the scales further in favor of the Italians. This was related to a financial dispute that dated back to the Ottoman Empire. In 1907, the Empire had ordered a protected cruiser from Ansaldo. Shortly before the outbreak of the war in Tripoli, the Italian government had commandeered the cruiser, Drama, on the grounds of non-payment. The cruiser was subsequently commissioned as the Libia by the Italian Navy in 1913.³⁶⁴ Ansaldo had never returned the payments the Ottoman Empire had made for the cruiser. However, on the eve of the Turkish naval tender, Ansaldo turned surprisingly accommodating and agreed to repay the Turkish government 70,000 pounds sterling for the disputed Drama/Libia cruiser.³⁶⁵The Italian move contrasted sharply with the British shipbuilders’ uncompromising stand in a somewhat similar dispute a year before. In 1926, the Turkish government sought unsuccessfully to settle another leftover Ottoman financial dispute with British shipbuilders. When the First World War broke out, the two dreadnought battleships ordered in Britain for the Ottoman Navy faced a fate similar to that of the Drama. The British commandeered the Reşadiye and Sultan Osman dreadnoughts built by Vickers and Armstrong for the Ottoman Navy. After the war, the British shipyards did not return the payments for these two ships. Indeed, Turkey was barred from claiming compensation for the two dreadnoughts under the Treaty of Lausanne.³⁶⁶ The legal remedies the Turkish government sought against various British companies were unsuccessfully concluded in 1926.³⁶⁷ Hence, Ansaldo’s move in settling the Drama/Libia dispute was wisely timed and executed. It must have helped the Italians to eclipse their British competitors in the first major naval contact for the Turkish Navy. After the Italian shipyards submitted their bids in December 1928,³⁶⁸ there were frequent contacts between the Naval Undersecretary of Turkish General Staff, Captain Mehmet Ali Dalay, and the Italian Naval and Air Attaché, Lieutenant Commander Maroni. On 9 December, 1928, Italian Ambassador Orsini reported Maroni’s conversation with Undersecretary Dalay about the tender. Maroni was led to believe ‘the contract may be split between the French and Italian shipbuilders, although the French designs are technically inferior and Turkey’s political relations with France do not warrant such a deal.’³⁶⁹ A week later, Dalay visited Maroni in his residence to discuss matters of significance to Italian-Turkish naval relations. During his visit, he assured Maroni that the contract would be awarded to the Italian shipyards. Undersecretary admitted that the present political climate worked in Italy’s favor. The Italian attaché then brought up the issue of German naval advisors in Turkey. This was an issue of significance second only to the supply of warships in terms of offering a venue for the Italians to penetrate the hitherto inaccessible Turkish military. The Undersecretary confirmed that ‘their contacts will terminate in the coming April and will not be renewed as the General Staff has not been very satisfied by their performance.’ The attaché finally offered the services of Italian officers in their stead, adding ”in the case of serving officers not being preferred, retired Italian navy officers may act as instructors to the Turkish Navy.” Captain Dalay promised to relate this offer to Deputy Chief of Staff General Asım Gündüz. He also expressed his gratitude for the permission granted to two Turkish navy officers to visit the Italian warships.³⁷⁰On 24 May 1929, the conclusion of the Turkish naval tender in favor of the Italian shipbuilders was announced to the public. According to a Turkish daily newspaper, Cumhuriyet, Italian and British bidders had pulled down their bids to financially affordable levels, yet the Italians won the tender because the British bidder was found politically unreliable. The notorious ‘merchant of death’, Basil Zaharoff, was serving on the Vickers’ board of directors. Italian shipbuilders were asked to submit an accelerated delivery schedule to finalize the agreement.³⁷¹ Next day, the Italian Foreign Ministry officially notified the Ministry of Marine in Rome that the contract to supply warships to the Turkish Navy had been finalized.³⁷² The order included only two destroyers, two submarines and three submarine chasers, well below the highly inflated numbers advertised previously.³⁷³The Turkish orders given to Italian shipyards represented the high water mark in Italian-Turkish relations in the interwar years. The Italians were quick to conclude that the naval contract also signified a substantially modified view of Italy in the Turkish military mind. The new cordial atmosphere in Italian-Turkish relations produced immediate consequences of military significance. In 1929, the Turkish General Staff changed the location of the annual large-scale military exercise from İzmir in the west to Diyarbakır, near the Iraqi and Syrian borders in the east.³⁷⁴ The shift in Turkish threat assessments was obvious. Also in 1929, the Turkish Navy sent its first junior officers to Italy for training. In 1929, Italy seemed on the verge of gaining a stronghold for itself in the Turkish military. The growing Italian connection with the Turkish Navy led some foreign observers to conclude that “an Italian mission is about to take over [from the Germans] the supervision of the rejuvenation of the Turkish fleet.”³⁷⁵As for the impact of Turkish naval orders on relations with Greece, an intelligence report from the US Mission in Istanbul included nearly apocalyptic predictions on the potential consequences of such an arms race in the Aegean between the two navies. The report is significant as it offers a vivid description of how Turkish motives were perceived and explained at that time:This Turkish naval order is important in the sense that it will be a starting point of a struggle for naval armament between Turkey and Greece, the only struggle which for the moment can envisage a Turkish naval reorganization. It is a cloud which rises on the political horizon of the Orient… One of these days, the Aegean islands, especially Chios and Mytiline will be in danger… Turkish circles have it that the creation of a navy (an absolute right of Turkey, to be well understood) does not allude to any individual and that it has for its object nothing else but the defense of the country’s coasts, which are very numerous in Turkey… It is to ignore the nature of the human heart, and in particular the Turkish character, to believe that such will always be the thought of government in Angora. Physiology teaches us that it is the organ which creates the action. This is also true in politics as well as in the life of people. The Turko-Greek naval concurrence will infallibly bring about a war in the more or less near future.”³⁷⁶