Final Draft December 2009 Bhavna Sharma, Marta Foresti and Leni Wild Table of contents

Section 3: Critical reflections on the role of NSA in development

NSAs have a critical role to play in development. They are a vital link to the grassroots; they can articulate the needs, demands and interests of groups; and they can help reach remote and marginalised communities. These are roles that the state and donors sometimes cannot or should not fulfil. Consequently, there has been a growing recognition and explicit articulation of the role of NSAs in the development process. They are no longer perceived as simply beneficiaries and/or implementers of development programmes but recognised as having roles to play in driving the development agenda, particularly through their contributions to systems of accountability. Thus, NSAs occupy multiples roles and can provide critical added value to the development process as service providers, experts in their fields, watchdogs, implementers and funders of development programmes.¹⁷

However, NSAs are not a homogenous group, nor do they represent one set of interests and they are not exempt from the political and power dynamics that shape the rest of the polity: the role of NSAs must not be accepted uncritically or naively. Furthermore, generic (and sometimes ideological) claims that NSAs should be involved in every single step or aspect of development processes as a matter of principle are not always the most useful way of promoting a realistic and meaningful approach to ensure that NSAs, alongside the state, can have a positive and durable role in contributing to reform and policy change processes at country level.
This section provides some critical reflections and perspectives on the roles of NSAs in development policies and programmes. It reveals some of the limitations, challenges and assumptions which need to be considered when determining engagement strategies with NSAs. And it re-orientates discussions of NSAs in their fundamental roles as interlocutors between citizens and the state.

3.1. Bringing the state ‘back in’

Since the late 1990s, the concept of the state has been (re)gaining importance and states are now acknowledged as having central roles to play in shaping development and poverty reduction processes in poor countries. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness emphasises the state as a key development partner for donors and highlights national ownership as one of the driving factors for improving the effectiveness of aid.

The state was out of favour with many development thinkers and practitioners for much of the 1970s and 1980s, as a reaction to what was perceived of as gross state inefficiencies, an inability of the state to manage development processes effectively and elite capture of the state to serve its own purposes. As a result, the solution advocated was a reduction of the role of the state and a retraction of state functions to be replaced with market led systems that would correct the inefficiencies of the state. However, these approaches are increasingly recognised as flawed or ineffective in meeting current development challenges Thus, emerging thinking focuses on the extent to which the state can be strengthened, to protect the provision of basic services, and act as a coordinating mechanism for development policies, programmes, budgets and actors. Lack of state capacity and effectiveness are now recognised as being some of the key constraining factors to developmental progress, including attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)¹⁸.
Support to NSAs has, in parallel, focused on strengthening engagement with the state. As Unsworth highlights, “The state itself plays a critical role in the constitution of civil society… [and] the ability to aggregate interests and channel them through representative institutions is an essential ingredient in creating state capacity to respond.”¹⁹ In other words, state capacity and responsiveness to demand go hand in hand. This implies that NSAs are significant primarily in terms of their roles as interlocutors between the state and its citizens. As Hudson states “domestic accountability emerges (or doesn’t) through the operation of accountability systems that bring together a variety of institutions”²⁰ – NSAs may comprise some of these institutions but the key focus should remain on the state and the quality of its relationship with citizens. This is a useful reminder when approaching NSA engagement in new aid modalities.

3.2. The relationship between voice and accountability

NSAs occupy part of the ‘civil society space’ between states and their citizens, and can play important roles in strengthening citizens’ voice and accountability, something which is increasingly seen as significant for development outcomes. But it is important to challenge some dominant assumptions regarding the linkages between voice and accountability. As a recent evaluation highlighted, “it cannot be easily assumed that strengthening voice on its own will somehow lead to improved accountability”.²¹ Whether voice contributes to accountability depends largely on political context and whether states are effective, capable or willing to respond to citizens’ demands. It is also important to critically reflect on who is able to have ‘voice’, and how representative they are, as not all voices are equal or equally heard. Voice may undermine accountability where it strengthens the ‘voice’ of particular individuals or groups and weakens accountability to broader sections of society. This makes it necessary to question simplistic models which posit greater voice leading to more accountability. In reality, the voice and accountability relationship is a multi-faceted one: “In short, voice and accountability are dynamic and complex rather than static and simple: actors play different roles differently, depending on the context”.²²

3.3. The diversity and legitimacy of NSAs

Over the last 15 years, there has been a massive proliferation in the breadth and number of NSAs in many developing countries. This has led to a wide diversity in the ways that NSAs relate to each other, to citizens and to the state. This proliferation highlights the need to be cautious about notions of the inherent ‘good’ of various NSAs. Unsworth questions the simplistic dichotomy between civil society as an ‘autonomous, democratic sphere’, in opposition to an ‘authoritarian state’.²³ In reality, there may be as many challenges posed by ‘civil’ society as there are positives. For example, reviews conducted in Mozambique and Nepal found that a proliferation of civil society organisations did not necessarily reveal the strength of the political system, as many groups (particularly NGOs) were in reality “little more than personal enterprises” and vehicles for receiving funds.²⁴ Moreover, there is a dominant tendency to focus on the ‘usual suspects’ in terms of NSAs such as national NGOs. This can lead to a lack of questioning of the legitimacy, representativeness and credibility of these actors. But it has also excluded ‘non traditional’ actors such as trade unions, social movements, and religious groups.²⁵

At the same time, the impact of NSAs on aid and development effectiveness needs to be constantly interrogated. Section 4 discusses tensions in the concept of ‘ownership’ and highlights calls for broader ‘ownership’, through engagement with a range of state and NSAs. Yet Booth reminds us that there is mixed evidence of the impact this might have, not least because “parliaments and civil societies face incentives that are hardly less binding, and not always more conducive to progressive policy actions, than those motivating presidents and ministers”.²⁶