Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Readiness – I/L – Generic Retention

PMFs drain the militaries human capital

Singer 4 (Peter W, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings, http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/pp04_private–military.pdf, AD: 6/22/10) jl

While soldiers have always had competing job options in the civilian marketplace, such as the ballyhooed example of Air Force pilots leaving to fly airliners, the PMF industry is different in two key manners. The first is that offers from PMFs keep the individual within the military sphere, meaning that there is not a requisite additional training and the transition is far smoother, in some cases effortless. Many PMF employees also believe that, as they are carrying out a public function, they carry on the same code of honour and patriotism, the only difference being that they are being better paid. But, the PMF industry also differs by being directly competitive with the military. It not only draws its employees from the military, it does so to fill military roles, thus shrinking the military’s purview. The overall process is thus brilliant from a business standpoint and self-defeating from the military’s perspective. The PMF uses public funds to provide higher pay and then charges back the military at a higher rate, all for the human capital investment that the public institution originally paid for.
Private firms crush force retention – massive pay difference

Singer 4 (Peter W, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings, http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/pp04_private–military.pdf, AD: 6/22/10) jl

While the data is still hard to come by, as the retention issue in the U.S. has become politicized and “stop–loss” programs that force soldiers to stay in the military skew the results, it is inarguable that the PMF industry draws its employee base from former soldiers who are often exceptionally talented. It is also inarguable that PMFs directly recruit both soldiers in Iraq and those just returned (indeed, beyond the advertisements in military magazines and handing out of cards in the operational zone, most job fairs take place at military base areas), offering them an opportunity to face the same risks, just at several times the pay.

PMFs destroy retention – economic incentives for PMFs

Singer 4 (Peter W, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings, http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/pp04_private–military.pdf, AD: 6/22/10) jl

A more particular problem area that Iraq has brought to the fore is how an expanding PMF marketplace has the potential to hurt the military’s retention of talented soldiers. Soldiers in the PMF industry can make anywhere from 2-10 times what they make in the regular military. In Iraq, the rates have grown astronomically, with former U.S. special forces garnering as much as $1000 a day, former South African troops making as much as $4–6000 a month, and Nepalese Ghurka fighters making more than $2000 a month, each far past what they would make at home.

Readiness – I/L – US Retention

PMC’s destroy retention – no incentives to join the military

Kidwell 5 (Deborah C, Assistant Professor of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies”, http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf AD: 6/24/10) jl

The third critical question that policy makers must consider is far-reaching and more difficult to assess. Does the current extensive use of private military companies ultimately benefit American society and its citizens? Government managers must consider the potentially significant implications that derive from the increased use of contractors on the battlefield. Americans may do well to consider the social legacy of participation in World War II—the competency and independence women gained in the home and workplace, the educational levels attained through GI Bill benefits, and the affluence that resulted from full employment. It is reasonable to assume the current policy will have a similarly unique legacy. It is too early to identify many of these possible changes; however, a few are clear. The extensive use of private military companies can be disruptive to civil-military relations. More study is necessary to determine the long-term implications of change to the traditional dynamic. The loss of an avenue of national service for young people not bound for college may lead to a loss of prestige for military service. In turn, recruitment and retention may become more costly and difficult as the private sector offers more lucrative employment opportunities for military skills. The psychological cost of more frequent combat engagements is unknown and may be an untenable choice.

PMC’S don’t only destroy readiness – they make conflict worse

Kidwell 5 (Deborah C, Assistant Professor of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies”, http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf AD: 6/24/10) jl

The second relevant question requires a consideration of the complex relationship between the social, economic, and political aspects that contribute to military capabilities. Does the use of private contractors in the current environment contribute to military effectiveness? The present military force structure shows signs of fatigue and instability that indicate the overuse of contractors may detract from overall military effectiveness and capability. Certainly, PMC’s contribute skills that can be costly to acquire and maintain in the military; in addition, significant cost savings can result from a smaller core of military personnel in times of relative peace, while retaining the capability to respond to contingencies. These concepts also conform to the political traditions of smaller government and the traditional distaste for a large “standing army” that are the cornerstones of American government. Theories of business management also point toward the useful aspects of structuring military forces with a mix of private and public assets. However, overreliance on theory rather than practice and private assets rather than public, particularly during prolonged periods of conflict, has no precedent. In sum, PMC’s lack the exemplary performance record of American military forces in combat, coordinated action and protection is more difficult, costs rise unpredictably, and legal ambiguity often leads to great personal risks to both contractor employees and military units. Thus, a number of significant risks accrue to the extensive use of contractors on the battlefield. This increased risk detracts from overall military effectiveness.