Masaryk university

5.5 Partial conclusion

Our analysis with a particular focus on normative aspects in bilateral contractual relations demonstrates existence of an extensive normative agenda on the table. However, the wording of the EU in the documents under consideration slightly varies, thus giving us a clue to determine the most emphasized ones. In this respect, Action Plan is taken as a guiding document. Top priorities of Action Plan bring to focus 4 normative principles – democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and rule of law. This wording completely matches with our previous qualitative analysis of the EU normativity in the framework of ENP. The same norms are repeated, although in a different context of monitoring results, in the implementation documents. Therefore, our first category in defining whether the EU acts as a norm promoter in Azerbaijan fulfils the first requirement set in the theoretical part as the relations are based on normative values. But it is also necessary to add that each of above-mentioned principles is a broad category in itself.

Therefore, by focusing on each of those categories (democracy, human rights, rule of law and fundamental freedoms) we can specify what exactly EU advocates in Azerbaijan. For the matter of democracy, the EU directs attention to electoral reforms and transparency of elections in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 reports. In the area of human rights EU consistently emphasizes gender equality (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) property rights (2010, 2011, 2012) and properly functioning Human Rights Commissioner (Ombudsman) institution (2010, 2012, 2013). Major concern of the EU regarding the rule of law is the lack of independence and inefficiency of judicial system (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). Most extensively represented area in bilateral documents have been issues concerning fundamental freedoms. Freedom of assembly is present in all documents under consideration and the EU wording on this matter is quite explicit. Action Plan does not mention freedom of association among priorities. However, its sister elements such as civil society and NGOs are advocated throughout the documents. Either directly or implicitly through references to NGOs and civil society problems, freedom of association is covered in all documents we have analysed. Finally, from the document analysis we can conclude that freedom of expression constitutes another normative domain where the EU wording is quite strong. Despite Action Plan does not mention either freedom of expression or its components (media, press, internet) all other documents, particularly progress reports, demonstrate a continual attention of the EU on this problem.

As for normative means, the documents reiterate political dialogue to be the framework for bilateral cooperation. Political dialogue ensures regular contacts with Azerbaijani government. Moreover, it is supplemented by reciprocal visits of high-level officials from both sides. Action Plan additionally mentions exchange of best practices as mean of norm diffusion. We can also add a broad form of normative interaction – partnership, which is encountered frequently in the texts. All these means are aiming to approximate legislation of Azerbaijan, harmonising it with international standards. Hence, normative goals deriving from aforementioned documents consist in guaranteeing all detected normative principles, implementing its commitments to Action Plan and complying with recommendations reflected in the progress reports.

At last, we should also add that our analysis of the documents exposed other non-normative elements as well. Especially, broad chapters dedicated to energy cooperation and oil/gas developments in the light of the European interests in strengthening own energy security, may justify concerns of some authors who point to this factor as an obstacle for exerting normative impact. However, the question of normative impact requires a more insightful approach to verify if the EU brings into play normative results. Therefore, next chapter will be devoted to this aim.

Assessing the impact of the EU on Azerbaijan

6.1 Process tracing

Having defined the EU’s normativity in terms of values, norms and goals placed at its foundation on one hand, and projection of them in regard to Eastern neighbourhood on the other hand, we have finally demonstrated abundant presence of normative aspects in bilateral contractual relations between the EU and Azerbaijan. However, it is common knowledge that contractual relations should produce practical outcomes. Moreover, putting this into Normative Power Europe perspective, invoking normative changes becomes an indispensable part of the entire concept. Adequate evaluation of normative role played by the European Union in Azerbaijan which is a main research problem of the thesis, cannot be made without the third indicator detached from the theoretical concept we have applied. This is – normative impact. Therefore, to assess the EU’s normative performance in Azerbaijan we need take into account corresponding impact (if there is) on the ground. Simultaneously, this impact should be called into play by actions of the European Union as long as our aim is to identify its normative role in the country.

Apparently, value-based nature of the European Union is too broad to make accurate evaluation of all 4 categories we have defined. Thus, I am narrowing the scope of the research to the analysis of freedom of expression in Azerbaijan. Qualitative analysis of the EU documents have brought to surface 4 primary values – democracy, human rights, rule of law and fundamental freedoms. Fundamental freedoms incorporate freedom of assembly, association, expression, religion. Fundamental freedoms and namely freedom of expression have been even more consistently reflected in the EU-Azerbaijan contractual relations as our second qualitative analysis concluded. At the same time, the developments in the country expose troublesome situation in this domain.³⁶ So it is reasonable to believe that the reaction of the European Union in this particular problem has been strong and explicit enough to invoke positive changes. This explains our choice of freedom of expression as a specific case for analysis. Therefore our main research question in this part is: Does the European Union invoke normative impact on the freedom of expression in Azerbaijan? Obviously, in the process of finding the answer we will find out if the EU was acting normatively to call in the changes. Here, it is necessary to specify what we mean under normative impact on freedom of expression. Taking into account a scope of the problem in Azerbaijan from legislative framework to unfair sentences and continuing intimidations, to each of these cases we should attach individual indicator of impact. For the legislative framework such indicator will be amendment/adoption of respective laws recommended by the EU; for arrests and sentences it will be – release and fair trial; for intimidations and attacks – to prevent attacks and bring to justice perpetrators. Freedom of expression is defined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the following formulation: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Correspondingly, the study will include observation of TV, printed and internet media as well as legal capacity of the media environment in which journalists are able to carry out activities independently.

Tocci (2008: 11) argues that “a traceable path” between players’ activities and a target environment should be discovered in order to confirm the materialization of normative impact. Therefore, I consider it justifiable to apply process tracing method to answer our main research question. Process tracing will cover the time span from 2009 to 2013 to be in line with previous document analyses. The year 2009 marked the launch of Eastern Partnership which envisioned intensification of bilateral relations. Therefore, indications of the EU impact are most likely to be encountered in the developments taking place during 2009-2013. Developments in the media domain will be supplemented by respective reactions expressed by high level officials. Stakeholders from the European Union include presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy as well as European Parliament. This selection reflects the most important actors that have been defined by the Lisbon Treaty as the ones responsible for conducting foreign policy of the EU and ensuring its compliance with fundamental values and principles. According to new competence division the role of the European Parliament has been significantly strengthened. Along with extending legislative power to 40 areas, the treaty enabled the Parliament to influence political agenda by granting the right to elect the Commission (Europarl.europa.eu 2015). This shows also how influential its resolutions and rulings have become in the EU policy setting environment. Position of the President of the European Council was established by the Lisbon Treaty. According to Article 15(6) of TEU, he represents collective voice of all member states in international arena and especially in common foreign policy. In other words, we can assess his statements and position as the highest official viewpoint of the European Union. Since Article 17(1) empowers the European Commission to promote general interests of the Union, the President of the Commission acts as a guardian of the EU interests. Hence, hypothetically the President of the Commission has a duty to advocate normative interests of the Union as well. Accordingly the President is a vital stakeholder when the freedom of expression is concerned. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is another novice introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The role of the High Representative in strengthening consistency and visibility of the EU’s external action (Article 18(4)) makes us believe that in regard to freedom of expression in Azerbaijan he/she will act decisively to prove the external representation of the EU. Finally, the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy is the head of a respective department in the European Commission and and the promotion of EU values and principles is his primary responsibility. Considering thematic character of the Commissioner’s competences and his involvement into this particular region, we can assume that the problem of freedom of expression constitutes a major topic in his meetings and negotiations with Azerbaijani authorities.

It is equally important to take into account viewpoint of Azerbaijani government which is frequently expressed by officials from the Presidential Administration and can also be detached from speeches and interviews of President Ilham Aliyev. Juxtaposing these two opinions allows to uncover actual intentions of the statements and to ascertain whether they move beyond declaratory connotation in practice. However, domain of freedom of expression resides not solely on the agenda of the European Union. A number of other international organizations, particularly Council of Europe and its Venice Commission and OSCE, in this regard have an extensive list of expectations and recommendations to member countries. Therefore, for the sake of accuracy of our findings, it is vitally important to take into account their activities and reactions as well.