Nigeria 2015: analysis of election issues and future prospects

Will President Jonathan win again?

To win, President Jonathan needs to obtain over 50% of the vote and at least 25% of the vote in two-thirds (24) of Nigeria’s states and the Federal Capital Territory.

Jonathan’s record in office

When President Jonathan took office in 2011, he promised a ‘Transformation Agenda’ for Nigeria. What is his record in office?

On the positive side:

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  Nigeria has consistently averaged over 7% real annual GDP growth under his watch. This has led some to view the country as an emerging economic giant (see section 2.2).
  
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  The restive Niger Delta has been relatively peaceful. He has continued to support the Niger Delta Development Commission, created in 2000, but also announced in April 2014 a ‘Presidential Initiative for the North East’, which is intended to promote development in that conflict-affected area.
  
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  He has not engaged in any frontal attacks on the formal institutions of democracy and in some cases – such as INEC and the National Human Rights Commission – backed strengthening them.
  
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  He has signed Freedom of Information and National Health Bills into law and created a Sovereign Wealth Fund.³⁹ He also has significant infrastructural achievements to his name.
  
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  In 2014 he commissioned a ‘National Conference’ to come up with proposals to transform Nigeria for the better in future (see section 2.1).
  
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  Nigeria’s Ebola outbreak was handled effectively.
  

On the negative side:

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  Nigeria’s domestic security situation has dramatically deteriorated, with the state until recently appearing relatively unconcerned about it.
  
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  The Government’s response to the kidnapping by Boko Haram in April 2014 of 270 schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno state, was widely criticised for its complacency – similar accusations have been made since then.⁴⁰
  
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  The security forces continue to commit serious human rights abuses. Corruption remains pervasive.
  
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  The Sovereign Wealth Fund mentioned above is yet to start operating effectively.
  
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  Promised reforms – for example, opening up the petroleum and power sectors to private ownership and investment – have proceeded slowly, if at all.
  
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  Progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals has been patchy.
  
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  Nigeria remains a major importer of refined fuel and the country still suffers from chronic fuel and power shortages. A 2012 attempt to end the subsidy on fuel was partially reversed following large-scale street protests.
  
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  In recent months, the country’s foreign reserves have been depleted by an only partially successful attempt to prop up the Nigerian Naira as global oil prices have slumped.
  
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  President Jonathan and other senior officials have failed publicly to declare their assets, as required under Nigerian law, thereby preventing the country from becoming a member of the 2011 Open Government Partnership, which was established “to provide an international platform for domestic reformers committed to making their governments more open, accountable, and responsive to citizens.”⁴¹
  

While outsiders might expect President Jonathan’s track-record to be electorally vulnerable, most observers assess that he is the favourite to win, provided that he can sustain broad enough elite backing through the effective deployment of the patronage and resources at his disposal. This is far from guaranteed.

An incumbency factor?

President Jonathan enjoys the advantages of incumbency. Moreover the PDP has managed, more or less, to maintain its unity and discipline in the run-up to the presidential election. He can expect strong backing from voters in the south-south and south-east but needs to neutralise the APC’s apparent initial advantage in most of the north and in the south-west. As in 2011, Jonathan has already had a measure of success in dividing elite opinion in the north, with several leading figures there coming out in support of his re-election.⁴²

Writing in October 2014, two scholars sought to assess the effect that party incumbency at state level might have on the presidential vote. On this basis, assuming that the election is broadly comparable in terms of fairness to 2011, they said that the most likely scenario is that Jonathan will win a majority of the vote in the first round but will not manage to obtain 25% of the vote in two-thirds of Nigeria’s states, so taking the country into a second-round run-off for the first time since the return to civilian rule in 1999.⁴³

A second-round?

A run-off is a real possibility. It would be new and hazardous territory for Nigeria. Might an elite deal to be struck to ensure that the country is not seriously destabilised by it?

Some claim that there was a ‘secret pact’ in 2011 between Bola Tinubu, then of the ACN, and the PDP, whereby the latter would let the ACN have a “free run in the state governorship polls in the south-west” in return for ACN supporters backing Jonathan in the presidential election.⁴⁴ There is no way of knowing if this happened or not.

In any event, at present both the PDP and APC appear to be in a ‘winner takes all’ frame of mind.

Will the APC be allowed to win?

While some of the sheen may have come off the APC’s brand during 2014, it remains a formidable opponent. Its National Convention in December 2014 went better than many expected and it must be hopeful that Nigeria’s economic problems in recent months might damage the chances of President Jonathan and the PDP. In early January 2015, Jim O’Neill, the former chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management and a well-known ‘Nigeria watcher’, even suggested that world financial markets “might react positively” to an APC victory.⁴⁵

Victory in both the presidential and legislative elections demands that the party wins well in the north-east, north-west and south-west.⁴⁶ In more normal times, it might feel pretty confident of achieving this. However, the poor security situation in the north-eastern states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states could, if it suppresses the turn-out – as it currently seems likely to – undermine the prospects of the APC.⁴⁷ There are 1.5 million Internally Displaced People in the north-east and it is unclear how many will be able to vote.⁴⁸

The APC claims that the PDP is intent on sabotaging the polls in those states and alleges that, for this reason, the PDP has an interest in ensuring that the security situation remains poor.⁴⁹ The PDP repudiates such allegations and argues that the APC may resort to its own dirty tricks if the result goes against it.

Boko Haram has declared that it will seek to sabotage the elections. There is no sign of its armed attacks abating as the presidential and National Assembly elections on 14 February draw closer.⁵⁰ Indeed, they are intensifying. For example, in recent weeks, Boko Haram has attacked and seized control of the border town of Baga in Borno state, where a new ‘multinational task force’ involving troops from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger has established its official headquarters. Their forces did not put up a fight and hundreds of civilians in the town and surrounding areas were killed by the group.⁵¹

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