Volume II. Guth na Bliadhna ' leabhar II.]

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of Scotland have ever had. Upon one pretext on another, but usually with the plausible pretence of establishing " law and order " in Celtic Scotland j our sovereigns and their rulers, having first artfulljfl fomented disorder, were wont to step into the Highlands with fire and sword, and all manner of] barbarity, in order to convert the unfortunate Gael of Scotland to the mild example of Lowland rule! Let us approach this question impartially! and as men from whose eyes the scales of ignorance! and prejudice have miraculously fallen. Let usj acknowledge that, undoubtedly, on many occasions] the Gaels of Scotland acted a part which theid best friends must find it impossible to defend.] Let us frankly acknowledge that their internecine] feuds were contemptible, and no less destructive! of the peace of the country than they were disl astrous to themselves. Let us acknowledge tha» if they received severe castigation, they certainlyi gave great provocation. But after all is said and] done, and the case against the Gael of Scotland! as law-breaker, malcontent, and so forth, is rendered as long and as black as it can possiblyfl be, we must remember these things at least in his behalf—namely, that the country now called Scotland was colonised by him, that he gave it3 his name, that the ancient kings of Scotland wer&| of his blood, that his, language was the ancienfej language of the country, and that, in a word, fori many hundreds of years Scotland was his and hej ruled it as his own.

Under these circumstances the wonder had been, surely, if the Gael of Scotland had not resisted the efforts made to bring about his political subjugation. We are accustomed to think that' every question has its two sides; but really in

this case it is difficult to speak with calmness and moderation of the policy of the aggressors; and it is difficult to resist the suspicion that there has been some sort of organised conspiracy on the part of Lowland historians to falsify the facts and obscure the issues as much as possible, when treating of the early history of our country. Other­wise, surely, the opinion that the Gael was a barbarian and a savage, whose delight was in bloodshed, whose conduct was systematically pro­vocative, and whose extinction by fair means or foul was the legitimate aim of successive Scottish sovereigns and statesmen, would be far less common than, unfortunately, it even now is. After all, the Gael, when he plundered the Low­lands and revenged himself upon their inhabitants, was merely combining the struggle for existence with a perfectly intelligible desire to possess him­self of what he regarded as rightfully his own, whilst at the same time striking terror into the hearts of those who opposed his pretensions and disputed his claims. And when, owing to the state of anarchy into which Celtic Scotland was plunged in consequence of our rulers' attachment to the Lowland tradition, the Gael became an outcast and a fugitive in the land which was justly his own, at whose door, pray, is the blame for so much misery, barbarity and bloodshed rightly to be laid—at the door of the unfortunate victim of innovation, or at that of those whose deliberate design it was to filch the country from its original possessors, and to oblige them to pass beneath a yoke which they despised and detested ? For my part, and I am disposed to think that all fair-minded men will agree with me, I think that the moral responsibility for so much anarchy and

bloodshed rests entirely with the Lowland tradij tion, and with those who, conscientiously, or fromi bad or interested motives, supported it. It mayj be objected that the conflict in Scotland between Teuton and Celt was inevitable; and that tha struggle was conducted against the losing party] with as little barbarity as the times and the cir| cumstances permitted; and no doubt those whg are of opinion that everything can be justified] by success will find many to applaud this pious opinion. But, granting, for the sake of argumen that the Gael's subjection was justifiable because inevitable, we shall yet find the situation gravely compromised, so far as the Teuton is concerned] by reason of the campaign of calumny and misre^ presentation which the Saxon, through the channel of his accredited historians, has been carrying on against the Gael, almost without interruption] since the Lowland tradition came into being. Ifj ever there was a case in which injury was aggra-j vated by insult, the hard case of the Gael of Scot-J land and his impudent and mendacious detract surely supplies it. To be robbed of what belo to one, to be violently assaulted and despoiled] by one stronger than oneself, is scurvy treatment! to meet with ; but to be insulted and abused into] the bargain by an impudent scoundrel who has rej lieved one of his watch, or other valuables, is] ordinarily speaking, more than human flesh and! blood can stand. For my own part, my sentia ments when contemplating this shabby chapter] in our national story are so indignant that I prefej not to give a loose to them, lest by doing so I should seem to injure by my violence the trans­parent reasonableness and justice of the cause] which I have at heart.

But, fortunately, there is no need for the Gael of Scotland to take a leaf from his detractor's book in order to compass his just revenge. The Low­land tradition has "landed" the nation where its [principles and undertakers were bound to conduct it, sooner or later, namely, to an incorporating lunion, whose end is national extinction. The policy inaugurated by the first David, and prose­cuted—with but few exceptions—with unflagging fzest and zeal by his successors upon the throne of Scotland, down to the Union of 1707, has resulted in the complete subjugation of our country. The 'Lowland tradition may have been successful even beyond intelligent anticipation in reducing the Celtic population of Scotland to a condition of ab­solute dependence upon the Teutonic inhabitants; but inasmuch as it has undone us as a nation, icursed us with the curse of central government, and brought about almost the complete extinction ,of national pride and sentiment in Scotland at a ruinous cost, it is not too much to say that, in compassing these things, it has virtually ac­complished its own destruction.

The king is dead! Long live the king! The ILowland tradition has been absorbed by the wider land stronger tradition of the English people, and lives no longer as a separate entity ; but the Celtic race survives its death, and, with the birth of new ideas, new hopes and aspirations, and with a spirit chastened and purged by centuries of misfortune [and oppression, may we not confidently look for­ward to realising, some day, some of those great and good things, which the future should have in 'store for us, as for the other races of mankind ? The resurrection of the Celt as a social and poli­tical factor is what honour, no less than interest,


198 The Lowland Tradition

obliges us to endeavour. To this end, therefore, let us address ourselves. On this noble ambition let us concentrate all our faculties, and to it let us consecrate all our talents. Every Gael can help, no matter how humble his employment, slender his capacity, or obscure his situation. Let us, indeed, at long last stand shoulder to shoulder, as our own familiar maxim has been vainly urging us to do these many hundreds of years past; and when we have successfully negotiated the inevit­able period of danger, difficulty and trial, and the Gael of Scotland is once more a free and inde­pendent agent in the land which bears his name, then, perhaps, in turning our backs upon the un­lovely, ungrateful past, and taking thought for the morrow, we shall surrender the destinies of our country, not to a foreign but to a truly native tradition.

H. M.
_{Guth na Bliadhna}
LEABHAR II.] AN SAMHEADH, 1905. [AIREAMH 3.
the passing of unionism

If the war in the far East has produced its crop of surprises, it must be confessed that the same catastrophe has been attended with startling re­sults in Europe. The war in Manchuria has been characterised as a " colonial war " so far as Russia is concerned; but the inadequacy of that description is best illustrated by the far-reaching consequences which it has produced in Europe. The sentiment, which was generally voiced before the outbreak of hostilities, that whatever happened, peace, when­ever it should come, would find one at least of the combatants in much the same position as she was in before war began is now seen to have been a singularly fallacious one. The war has already produced its crop of far Eastern problems, which seems like to engage the attention of politicians all the world over for many years to come, and upon whose discussion we at all events are not prepared to embark at this conjuncture. But in addition to these problems, this Titanic struggle has had what is for the most part a totally unexpected result, inasmuch as it has violently agitated the political waters of Europe itself.

Now, with the view that the war between Japan

and Russia, if suffered to go on for any length of time, must carry with it more than great risk of producing, sooner or later, European "complica­tions," we feel constrained to acknowledge ourselves not in agreement. That the existence of such a struggle is not unattended with a certain amount of danger to the peace of the rest of the world, is a proposition whose reasonableness and justness we should be the last to dispute. But that Russia or Japan would deliberately embroil non-belligerent Powers has always seemed to us a negligible hypothesis. In the first place, we doubt ex­ceedingly if any such Power would allow itself to be so grossly exploited; in the second, we fail to see what either party could hope to gain by so shocking an eventuality as a general conflagration.

But though the danger of a war in which the Great Powers of Europe should be simultaneously engaged has always seemed to us more in the nature of a nightmare than a solemn and canvassable probability, yet the political consequences of the struggle between Russia and Japan have already profoundly affected not only the balance of power, but the actual cosmogony of Europe. In the first place, the war is revolutionising Russia itself; in the second place it is precipitating the question of the future of the Balkan peninsula ; in the third place,] it has produced the Morocco problem and its cog­nate questions; in the fourth place, it has caused, or rather given occasion to, the breach between Norway and Sweden; in the fifth place, it has quickened the differences between Austria and Hungary, and is about also to precipitate the crisis between those two countries; and lastly, it has produced a general feeling of political unrest and uneasiness throughout the length and breadth of

Europe—no inconsiderable crop of consequences it must be allowed, if the state of Europe before, and, now, after the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Japan is considered. What further surprises there may yet be in store for us, it is impossible, of course, to say. That the political condition of Europe, however, is eminently favour­able to the production of yet further radical changes no candid and careful observer of recent events will be prepared to deny.

It seems to us that, in view of these striking events, there is both a lesson to deduct, and a meaning to understand, therefrom. The lesson is, that things are not always what they seem, especi­ally in regard to empires which figure abundantly upon paper. As to the meaning or significance which underlies these recent changes, what is still going on, and what must assuredly come to pass, our view is, that you can no more hope to tyrannise, in perpetuity, over nations, than you can over men.

With regard to the first, we do not propose to speak at any length on this occasion. The fact itself is apparent; and what is more, history shows it to be unavoidable. Every empire, like every dog, must enjoy its day; and neither the one nor the other is immune from the destructive verdict of time. With regard to the second, interest, as well as occasion, bids us speak out. It is a subject which necessarily appeals to us; and what is more, it is of practical importance to our own country.

Of the events which have recently taken place in Europe, the dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden, the growing estrangement between Austria and Hungary, and the abolition of some of the religious and political disabilities of the Russian Poles, under pressure of the dis­oomfiture of Russia in the far East, and dissension and dissatisfaction at home, are those which naturj ally possess the greatest interest for the Gaels Scotland and elsewhere. The dissolution of t union between Norway and Sweden is of inter to us, because Scotland is now united to England by a legislative union. The approaching dissoluj tion of the union between Austria and Hungary is! of interest to us for precisely the same reason. Ourj sympathies are naturally aroused when we hear that] the Russian Poles have been promised some relief! from persecution in respect of their religion and] language.

The first-mentioned event, however, is that which excites our interest and curiosity—to say] nothing of our admiration—in the highest degreeJ It has been remarkable for two things: for the] quietness, dignity and decorum with which it was! accomplished; and for the unanimity with which] the demand for dissolution was formulated by the] Norwegian people. It is safe to say that nearly] every prophecy entered into by English statesmen,! in regard to that union, have been falsified by] events. The late Mr. Gladstone solemnly affirmed that such a union never could, or would, be un-J done. His opponents, on the other hand, as emj phatically affirmed that disturbance and bloodshed! must inevitably attend any attempt to dissever that] tie. Every one knows that both these prophecies] have been signally falsified.

It is unnecessary on our part to discuss the pros and the cons of the recent dispute—now happily ac-a commodated—between Sweden and Norway. The] event itself is that which claims our attention; and, incidentally, the infinitely solemn and deliber-j ate manner in which it was accomplished. Apart] from the question of autonomy, Norway appears to have had no outstanding differences with her ighbour Sweden. Both peoples are of the same lood : the differences in respect of their languages are not great, we believe. Neither country was dissatisfied with the reigning dynasty. Both are agreed that for purposes of mutual defence any [resistance which they may offer must be the fruit-of co-operation. No religious question has caused them to be divided. And yet in the coolest, most solemn, passionless, matter-of-fact manner imagin­able they have separated! Why ?

Our answer to this question must needs be relatively brief. We believe that the dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden is due to a double cause, and that here, as elsewhere, subjective, as well as objective, forces have been at work. Norway has separated from Sweden because she is of opinion that she can do better without her; but tne disruption of the union is also due to the spread of autonomous principles throughout the globe, their manifestation in the Scandinavian peninsula being but an isolated in­stance of their growing prevalence and power.

The history of the crisis between Norway and Sweden illustrates the increasing disposition there is to regard as antiquated and cumbersome the prin­ciples and machinery of political unionism. All [forms of international political connexion which are not based upon a voluntary principle, and which ¹ do not provide for autonomy, are merely so many survivals of an age when might rather than right was the principal consideration governing international arrangements. The change from absolutism to constitutionalism, which is so observable in the monarchies of Europe, is but another manifesta­tion of the growth of a similar dissatisfaction] with the ancient order of things. The pivot of] the political, as of the natural universe, is change;] and nothing can be more absurd, dangerous andj injurious than the disposition which is observable] in some quarters to venerate a thing or institution] merely because it happens to be old, and to seek to] preserve it at all costs, for the same reason only! The spirit underlying the penal laws, the sort of] fanaticism that made it a criminal offence for a] man to worship his Maker or to exercise the] franchise, not as his conscience, but as the State] directed, is just that spirit which animated thèj protagonists of international Unionism. That this] political device for preserving the peace, and for] tiding oyer temporary State difficulties, was suc-fl cessful in some cases we are, for the sake oh argument, prepared to admit; but our recogni-l tion of its usefulness in times past by no means] blinds us to the view that society has com-] pletely outgrown such antiquated, extravagant, and] cumbersome expedients, and that, consequently,! their retention nowadays can neither be excused! nor justified for a moment. No self-respecting] individual, presently subsisting, tolerates any inter-1 ference, on the part of the State, in the matter of J his creed : the application of the same principle tol national affairs—in other words, the substitution of] autonomy for interference and dependence—is just] that rock on which Unionism will suffer shipwreckl wherever it obtains.

The extraordinary unanimity which characterised the Norwegian demand for Home Eule is one of] the most significant and interesting features of that! now historic dispute. And here, one would think,] is abundant food for reflection for Scotsmen. The

nation united to throw off the yoke of Unionism— to claim for itself that perfect freedom and liberty which, in the case of the individual, is nowadays but rarely denied. We imagine that a shrewd, hard-headed nation such as the Scots are reputed to be, will not lose sight of these significant facts. There was no angry feeling against Sweden: on the contrary the two peoples were, and continue, very good friends—it was simply a case of one nation wishing to set up house, as it were, entirely for itself, being perfectly persuaded that itself and [itself only could best understand its own interests, and provide for them; and so, with one voice, the Union was undone. Deliberately, calmly and dis­passionately the sterling common-sense of Norway spoke out. " The Union has served its turn," said the nation, in effect. " Such political devices are obsolete : we wish henceforth to manage our own [affairs. We do not pretend that we could manage yours as well as you yourselves can do; and you must pardon us if we think that we are the best judges of our own requirements. So far as we are concerned, the Union is no more."

There is but one thing that prevents Scotland from following in the footsteps of Norway; and that is the party system of government which obtains in England. Every patriotic Scotsman, whatever his creed or politics, must admit that as a nation, we are every bit as capable of taking \ our national concerns into our own hands as the Norwegians are. Every Scotsman knows that we must necessarily be in a better position to judge as to what our country's requirements are than are our neighbours of England, who have more than I enough to attend to in their own country. Every Scotsman knows, or should know, that the Union is an expensive affair, draining this country of an immense sum of money every year. Every Scots­man knows, or should know, that many necessary reforms are denied to Scotland on account of the difficulty of passing them through Parliament. Every Scotsman knows that the voice of Scotland, even in respect of those things which admittedly concern her alone, is apt to be drowned in the clamour of English tongues; and that English votes frequently prevent the just wishes and aspirations of Scotland from being given effect to. Every one who has had any experience of it can testify to the ruinous cost and the irritating delays consequent on what is called private bill legislation. And where is the Scotsman who can doubt that if we had a Parliament of our own, our national concerns would not receive more careful, more sympathetic, more systematic and more frequent attention than they now receive, or ever can, or will receive, at Westminster ?

But alas ! the English party system blocks the way. The question of autonomy for Scotland, instead of being a national question as the Nor­wegians, to their everlasting honour be it said, made the question of national emancipation for Norway, is dragged at the tail of English political factions. The question of questions is a mere party question. By an irony of fate which is almost without parallel in the annals of political action, the party whose predecessors were most violently opposed to Unionism has now become its most un­compromising supporter and defender; whilst the descendants of the Whigs are those who are most favourably disposed towards autonomous govern­ment ! If ever there was a measure which, on the face of it, appealed to Conservative principles and sympathy, it is surely the abrogation of the Union between Scotland and England—the work of that party's political enemies—yet so widely has that party in Scotland departed from its original principles and conceptions, and so completely has it passed under the yoke of purely English political exigencies, that such a thing as a National Scottish Conservative is nowadays practically unknown. The English party system has almost destroyed Scottish Nationalism. The best interests of our country are being daily sacrificed to its preservation, in order that the real or pretended interests of the " predominant partner " may be exclusively served. Indeed so high is this preposterous humour ac­customed to be carried, and so violent and ignorant is the prejudice against autonomy excited thereby, that the name of patriot is not infrequently withheld from those Scotsmen who are unable to see eye to eye with the vast majority of the English people in this matter, and who think that Scotland was in­tended to be governed, not by Englishmen, but by their own countrymen.

Fortunately, however, the progress of humanity cannot be arrested for long, nor can the future of peoples and nations indefinitely remain the sport of political factions. On every side we see a growing uneasiness under and distrust of what is called Unionism, which is a device to keep countries together savouring strongly of political swaddling clothes, and such like primitive and infantile haberdashery. The consciousness of possessing a national individuality, which interest no less than pride bids a people freely to exercise, renders society increasingly impatient of all such artificial restraints. The countries our sons have founded across the seas enjoy the blessings of Home Rule.

Their example, joined to that of other nations and peoples, has already profoundly affected political thought. The change from Unionism to freedom cannot now be long delayed. It is time for the Gael of Scotland, who has everything to gain and nothing to lose by autonomy, to be up and doing, lest, peradventure, he be left behind in the race.

the gaelic language and " society"