F I r s t d r a f t

All these proposals and counterproposals indicate Turkey’s dilemma as a middle power. In the Balkans, it could lead in the formation of a coalition of like-minded countries. At times it, though subtly, used its regional preeminence (or regional great power status) to add credibility to the coalition or deter its regional opponents from undermining it. Therefore, the Balkan Pact is a good example of coalition-building by middle powers. In contrast, Turkish diplomats were aware of their country’s limitations to provide leadership in building a coalition in the Mediterranean. Therefore, Ankara adjusted itself to the conditions there and displayed a different aspect of middle power behavior. It was as willing to take part in multilateral coalitions “built on them” by stronger actors as long as they were designed to preserve the status quo.⁶²⁸ The problem was that great powers that could potentially lead such coalitions were reluctant to assume such roles in the Mediterranean. Both France and Britain were preoccupied with the status quo in Europe than in the Mediterranean. While Italy grew into a major security problem for Turkey and its Balkan Pact partners, to Britain and France it presented just a nuisance that could be overlooked for the sake of a possible coalition against Germany in continental Europe.


9. THE MEDITERRANEAN AND BEYOND?
Turkish diplomatic had to be readjusted after 1935. The prevailing conditions in the Mediterranean warranted a different type of diplomatic activism than in the Balkans. To start with, building coalitions in the former was a province of great powers. Turkey could only assume the role of a follower rather than initiator in any coalition aimed at preserving the status quo. From the Turkish perspective, it had to be the broadest possible coalition in order to provide a multilateral framework for the whole Mediterranean region. As a corollary to it, it would be based on accommodation rather than exclusion or isolation. In practical terms, even Italy, the most likely revisionist in the region, would have a place in this coalition. In this case, Ankara took the less traveled road by supporting Italy’s accommodation into a multilateral arrangement rather than forging an alliance with another great power to balance it. Turkish diplomacy continued to evolve along these lines until 1936 when the Italians could consolidate their military gains in Abyssinia. The end of the Italian campaign marked also the end of middle power activism phase in the interwar Turkish diplomacy.

In 1935, Italy had greatly increased its military strength in the Eastern Mediterranean. It concentrated its forces between the Adriatic, the Dodecanese Islands, and the Red Sea, and expanded the construction of the 1934-35 naval program beyond its original scope.⁶²⁹ The expansion of the Italian Navy in the Eastern Mediterranean could be an indicator of Mussolini’s belief that the time was ripe for the total conquest of Abyssinia.⁶³⁰ Italy had already secured the acquiescence of France and Britain regarding Italian interest in Abyssinia. Shortly afterwards, Italy launched a campaign to invade this country in October 1935.

Since Mussolini’s 1934 speech, Ankara was observing warily and vigilantly every Italian move to gauge Rome’s ultimate intentions. Frequent news of Italian vessels that sailed out to unknown destinations continued to unsettle Turkish leaders, including President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself, until the Italian attack on Abyssinia.⁶³¹ In fact, even the reported preparations for that attack at first caused alarm in Ankara. In the meantime, the Italian Navy grew into a real nuisance in the Aegean for Greece and Turkey. For instance, Italian naval activity off the Greek island of Crete irritated President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. He questioned Prime Minister İnönü about the measures the government was contemplating to deter a similar Italian act on Turkey.⁶³²

Moreover, Ankara concluded that the Italian fortifications on the Dodecanese, particularly on Leros were measures against Turkey. Foreign Minister Tevfik Aras told the US diplomats that the Italian fortifications of the Dodecanese islands could only be intended to facilitate ultimately a campaign against Turkey.⁶³³ In fact, the free hand Italy secured under its accords with France added fuel to Turkey’s anxiety in regard to Italian activity in the vicinity of its western coasts. According to a US diplomat in Athens, Lincoln MacVeagh, Turkey desired the Balkan Entente to trade its unconditional adherence to the Pact (the Rome agreements between Italy and France) guaranteeing the independence of Austria in return for some sort of guarantee of the territorial status quo in the Near East.⁶³⁴

At this point, it is difficult to say that Ankara’s anxiety about the Italian policy in the Mediterranean was shared, or seen as justifiable, by others. For instance, in February 1935, the British Ambassador in Turkey wrote “the Turks habitually exaggerated this [Italian] danger.”⁶³⁵ A few months later, Italian naval activity on and off the Dodecanese noticeably stepped up. Apparently an overseas campaign was in the offing. Its ultimate target remained uncertain. Braced for the worst contingency, the Turkish fleet was deployed to its designated forward areas in the Marmara Sea in anticipation of an Italian landing in Turkey.⁶³⁶

Scattered documentation in the Republican archives, on the other hand, indicates that Turkish diplomats abroad had provided Ankara with remarkably accurate assessments about the Italian intentions. For instance, a report to the Foreign Ministry by the Turkish Ambassador in Rome identified Abyssinia as the most likely target for Italian military action. The ambassador concluded that although at that time Italy was not fully prepared to launch a full-fledged military campaign, Mussolini would not hesitate to act as soon as favorable domestic and international conditions emerged.⁶³⁷

Whether Ankara’s fears of an Italian attack justified is contested issue. The conventional Turkish account does not rule out Turkey’s becoming a victim of Italian aggression. The minority view, however, argues that the Turkish fears of Italian aggression were exacerbated by an unnecessarily alarmist Turkish Consul at Bari, who was an eye-witness to the departure of the Italian fleet for a destination unknown. On the other hand, Turkish Ambassador in Albania, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, who was asked if he would corroborate with the Consul’s conclusions, argued that the Consul had completely misjudged the Italian intentions. The Consul regarded the Italian fleet’s departure as the beginning of an Anatolian rather than an Abyssinia campaign. In his memoirs, Karaosmanoğlu grants that drawing on Mussolini’s unpredictable behavior in the past, Yugoslav Ambassador in Tirana, also concurred with Turkish consul’s conclusions at that time.⁶³⁸ Interestingly, the late Admiral Afif Büyüktuğrul in his seminal work on Turkish naval history adheres to this minority view espoused by Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu.⁶³⁹

Immediately after the Italian campaign in Abyssinia was launched, Turkish diplomacy preferred to work through the League of Nations in handling the situation. At the time of the crisis, Turkey was a member of the League Council where Aras figured prominently and vocally as an advocate of implementation of sanctions on Italy. Moreover, Turkey was elected to the Commission of the Five that was set up by the Council of the League of Nations to find a peaceful settlement to the Abyssinian question. The Committee consisted of representatives of Britain, France, Poland, Spain and Turkey. Subsequently, Aras made a special trip to Paris to convince the French Foreign Minister Laval to join the British and the other powers in implementing sanctions. As for the British, they were prepared to give the Italians compensation in other directions if they abandoned their plans of conquest in Abyssinia. They had even suggested an international conference at which colonial questions could be discussed following the settlement of the Abyssinian adventure.⁶⁴⁰ Aras anxiously added:

“Do not forget that the British have provided only an opening, that when nations go into conference and when the door is opened for discussion, anything may result, and it is by no means out of the question that, if a colonial conference takes place, it may end in a shuffling about of frontiers, especially in Africa, with the ultimate result that Italy will obtain something substantial of its own in a region where no other interests would be disturbed”.⁶⁴¹

Along with two other Balkan Entente members, Greece and Yugoslavia, Turkey promptly decided to observe the sanctions imposed by the League of Nations on Italy during the Abyssinian War.⁶⁴² Then, Britain furnished guarantees to these three countries against any Italian threat during the implementation of the sanctions. In turn, Ankara reciprocated by furnishing a similar assurance to Britain in order to assert its legal, if not political or naval, equality with the latter.

Martin Wight uses the case of the Abyssinian Crisis and the issue of sanctions as an example of a status quo bias of minor powers in the international system. He argues:
“When sanctions were imposed on Italy in 1935-1936 to restrain its aggression against Abyssinia, the small powers showed a resolution and readiness for sacrifice, which do much to answer the argument that they can afford to champion international ideas because they do not have the responsibility of enforcing them. It was the great powers who destroyed the League system, by a combination of aggression and defections”.⁶⁴³

Turkish diplomacy during the Abyssinian crisis did not conform the behavior pattern Wight attributed to powers of lesser degrees. Ankara assumed a high-profile diplomatic role and indicated its ability and willingness to assume responsibility from the beginning. Inauguration of a diplomatic mission at Addis-Ababa constituted an early indicator of Turkish diplomatic activism regarding the Abyssinian issue. B. Nizamettin Ayaşlı, had arrived in Addis-Ababa as the new Turkish Chargé D’Affaires in August 1935. Although Ankara opened a diplomatic mission at Chargé D’Affaires level in 1926, no new appointment was made after the first Turkish diplomatic representative Münür had left Addis-Ababa.⁶⁴⁴ Just before the Italians unleashed their attack, Turkey was officially added to a handful of states, including Britain, France, the United States, Belgium and Greece, that had diplomatic missions in Abyssinia.

The Turkish diplomatic mission at Addis-Ababa served as a valuable source of information (and intelligence) on Italian military activities in Abyssinia. As soon as he took up his post, Turkish Chargé D‘Affaires began to dispatch reports to Ankara that predicted the imminence of an Italian attack. Indeed, a private letter to Turkish authorities specified even the date of a possible Italian attack as 21 September 1935.⁶⁴⁵ The reports of the Turkish Chargé D’Affaires indicate that Ankara was particularly interested in finding out what the British reaction would be in the case of an Italian attack on that country. In his report of 27 September, 1935, B. Nizamettin ruled out any direct British intervention, unless London secured French military support. He also speculated that the British military involvement, if it were to occur, would be confined to supplying arms and ammunition to the Abyssinians. Another possibility he pointed to, was that the British troops stationed in Sudan could be sent deep into Abyssinia to control key strategic terrain, such as Lake Tsana where Italian and British troops advancing from opposite directions could converge. Consequent showdown would in turn trigger a new Fashoda-style incident. Such a situation inherently ran the risk of escalation into a full-blown military conflict between Italy and Britain. General Kazım Karabekir, a veteran of the Turkish War of Independence, also predicted a military conflict to happen more or less along the lines described in the Turkish Chargé D’Affaires’ memorandum.⁶⁴⁶

In a subsequent message, Turkish Chargé D’Affaires Ayaşlı described the military situation in Abyssinia and the state of Abyssinian defenses based on what he identified as a “secret report.” He had been shown this report by Belgian officers who were frustrated with the Abyssinians’ failure to raise a modern force of six thousand troops after more than six years of training at their hands. According to the report, a prolonged military campaign would quickly exhaust food supplies of the Abyssinian troops. The Italians might therefore be able persuade the Abyssinian troops and locals to surrender in exchange of food. This, of course, would be contingent on the Italians ability to transport food and supplies in large quantities. Since desert warfare required long and meticulous preparations and it was possible to make only modest advances (or progress), a possible Italian campaign would be difficult and costly. Taking control of the whole Abyssinia territory would demand patience.⁶⁴⁷

After the Italian military campaign progressed, the Turkish General Staff sought ways of getting first hand assessment of the military situation on the ground. Observing a potential adversary in the field was a matter of utmost significance for the Turkish defense. In November 1935, the Turkish General Staff sent a request to the Ministry of Interior for dispatch of two war correspondents, one to the Italian army headquarters, and the other to the Abyssinian army headquarters. Stating that this was a matter more for the government than the military, Chief of Staff Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak complained about dependence on foreign sources for information on the Italian-Abyssinian War. He recommended that the correspondents should be selected from among reserve officers recently discharged from active duty. Their recent experience with military profession would enable them to accurately assess the military situation on the ground. Pointing to the presence many foreign war correspondents accredited to the Italian and Abyssinia military authorities, Field Marshal Çakmak demanded prompt attention to his request, which he considered a vital issue for Turkey.⁶⁴⁸

Once again, it was evident that this was more of a matter of financial means than of will. Subsequent correspondence between the Interior Ministry and the Finance Ministry reveals how tight Turkey’s budget was in 1935. Appropriating 28,360 TL to cover the expenses of two war correspondents became a serious challenge for the Finance Ministry. In view of the prohibitively high costs of fielding two correspondents into a war zone, Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya discussed the issue with Deputy Chief of Staff General Asım Gündüz who settled for only one correspondent to be accredited to the Italian military authorities. He also agreed to cut down substantively the provisions for wire charges on the grounds that “the correspondent is in fact not needed for the kind of news that will be wired and should be writing letters rather than wire reports.” He was convinced that 7,000 TL would be sufficient and asked that the matter be resolved urgently and swiftly.⁶⁴⁹

Meanwhile, the Venizelist coup in 1935 in Greece accentuated Turkish fears regarding the Italian aspirations that had already been outlined by Mussolini in his speech a year before (in March 1935). Aware of Venizelos’ profound opposition to the Balkan Entente, Ankara was worried that his return to power could result in Greece’s move away from the Entente to the Italian orbit.⁶⁵⁰ Such a major departure in Greek foreign and security policy would in effect consolidate Bulgaria’s position, again within the Italian orbit.⁶⁵¹ During the crisis, Athens felt the immediate consequences of its support for sanctions on Italy. While Greek territorial waters were violated by Italian naval vessels, there were frequent incursions into Greece’s airspace by Italian military aircraft. Evidently, Roma was trying to punish Athens by exerting naval and military pressure on the latter, particularly in the Aegean. The Italian muscle-flexing in turn infuriated Greek public opinion.⁶⁵²

Italian pressure on Greece also heightened Greek fears of Turkish motives in the Aegean. The major concern was that Turkey could be tempted to take advantage of Italian-Greek tension to take control of some of islands in the Aegean. Indeed, in the fall of 1935, there were reports that Turkey was poised to seize the Greek Islands of Chios, Mytilene and Syra if the tension between Italy and Greece had erupted into an armed conflict. Although these were unconfirmed reports, the Greek General Staff took them very seriously. In fact, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras had earlier indicated Ankara’s desire to re-acquire the Dodecanese.⁶⁵³ The British diplomats were of a similar opinion as they argued the Dodecanese had remained in sharp focus for Turkish diplomacy during the Abyssinian crisis. This perception compelled Greece to purse a policy to avoid alienating Italy at any cost.⁶⁵⁴

Like Greece, Turkey supported the sanctions on Italy. However, it did not feel the heat of Italian pressures as much as Greece did. According to Aras the difference lay in that “Italy’s distrust of Greece was greater than its distrust of Turkey.” ⁶⁵⁵ British Ambassador in Athens, Sir Sidney Waterlow, had concluded earlier that the relationship between Italy and Greece had resembled essentially that of a wolf and a lamb.⁶⁵⁶

The British reluctance to extend military support to Greece also limited Athens options in regard to Italy. The British military and naval authorities tried to gauge effectiveness of Greek forces in countering an Italian attack in reaction to Athens’ implementation of the sanctions. They concluded that Greece would be a liability rather than an asset in the Mediterranean naval situation. Therefore, the Greek request for material assistance to augment its armed forces did not receive priority treatment from London.⁶⁵⁷

In the final analysis, Greek policy during the Abyssinian crisis reflected typical dilemmas of a minor power, caught between two great powers. During the crisis Athens unsuccessfully sought a great power patron, namely Britain, to be able to resist another great power, Italy. Obviously, history continued to cast its long shadow on their thinking as Greek diplomats and generals were convinced that they had to manage multiple threats simultaneously. Turkey was regarded as one source of potential threat to Greek security, though far remote compared to those from Albania and Bulgaria.⁶⁵⁸

In March 1936, American Chargé d’Affaires in Ankara, G. Howland Shaw, sent a dispatch to Washington on Turkey’s present international position in the light of war between Italy and Abyssinia. The dispatch counted Germany, Britain and the Soviet Union among the important countries for Turkish foreign policy. Ankara cared mostly about its relations with these three countries. He argued that a rapprochement between Turkey and Germany had not been planned or deliberately pursued. However, certain factors, such as economics and the emigration of some German citizens to Turkey, had contributed to it. As for Britain, Shaw drew attention to the convergence in British and Turkish positions regarding the Mediterranean issues. He emphasized that the Turks had stood openly by the British with respect to sanctions, the assurances to the British government in the event of Italian aggression and the several replies to Italian remonstrances. However, the self-centered attitude of France in the Abyssinian question was contrasted at Ankara with previous French declarations concerning the protection of small countries. ⁶⁵⁹ Finally, as far as Ankara’s relations with Moscow were concerned, both Turkey and the Soviet Union wished for peace in order to consolidate their revolutions. To this end, Turkey desired first good relations with its neighbors and then with countries more distant from its frontiers. G. Howland Shaw wrote that Turkey definitely felt herself in danger in a world which was rearming and was prepared to make every sacrifice to maintain credibility and efficiency of its means of defense.⁶⁶⁰

Italy had become a major source of worry for Turkish diplomats and generals. The element of fear from Italy would be hanging over their heads as long as the Dodecanese Islands remained in the Italian hands. The Abyssinian Crisis ushered in a new era of distrust and antagonism between Rome and Ankara.

The foreign press monitored by the Interior Ministry included translations from Italian newspapers such as Il Giornali that carried out a feature article critical of the Turkish press stance in the Abyssinian crisis. Il Giornali argued that Turkey’s stand against Italy in the Abyssinia issue did not make any sense as Turkey had no interest or stake in Abyssinian territory. Moreover, according to the Italian paper, Turkey no longer considered itself representative of the Muslim world or a protector of its interests. Finally, Il Giornali reminded its readers of the relative positions of Turkey and Italy in the international power hierarchy dominated by the great powers.⁶⁶¹

From the beginning, Ankara opposed Italian policy towards Abyssinia. Until the Italian conquest of Abyssinia was complete, Turkey focused on strengthening existing regional pacts and encouraging the formation of new ones against Italian expansionism. During the Abyssinian crisis, the Turkish press carried reports and feature articles that emphasized Turkey’s military and naval strength in the Eastern Mediterranean. For instance, an interesting commentary in Tan argued that Turkey’s military and naval strength had to be taken into account more seriously than that of any other power of lesser degree in the event of war or quest for supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁶⁶² Again, according to the Turkish press, neighboring countries had begun to consider Turkey’s contribution to international peace in the context of the Mediterranean conflict.⁶⁶³ In fact, Turkey promised Yugoslavia “unlimited assistance” in the case of an Italian attack on Belgrade.⁶⁶⁴ Belgrade considered the Turkish army as a force that could deter Bulgaria and stand fast against Italy. After a military delegation from Turkey had visited Romania and Yugoslavia in November 1935, a tripartite military conference was held in Belgrade between the three countries that resulted in the signing of a military convention.⁶⁶⁵

During the crisis, Turkish Permanent Representative at the League of Nations Cemal Hüsnü Taray confided to his Greek colleagues that Ankara was skeptical regarding the great powers’ handling of the Abyssinian crisis, as London and Paris were inclined to concede to Italy’s demands.⁶⁶⁶ Therefore, the Abyssinian Crisis drove home the need for a strengthened Balkan Entente. Subsequently, this became a fundamental objective of the Turkish diplomacy. Moreover, Bulgarian aspirations in Thrace were not considered dead by Ankara. On the other hand, Turkey remained optimistic about bringing Bulgaria into the Balkan Entente’s fold. American diplomats linked Ankara’s optimism to President Atatürk’s fondness for the country in which he had served as military attaché. But it was felt that watchfulness was in order.⁶⁶⁷ Moreover, the Italian attack on Abyssinia had already added fuel to the Balkan countries’ apprehensions regarding Italy. For instance, on 16 August 1935, Titulescu received from Belgrade a draft military convention proposing cooperation between Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey. A similar text was sent to Ankara though not to Athens. On 15 October 1935, Yugoslavia and Turkey joined Romania in its request that a committee be established to study the issue of sanctions against the Italian invasion of Abyssinia.⁶⁶⁸