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Early in 1938, Ankara gave the impression to British Ambassador Percy Lorraine that it would solicit British assistance to materialize its naval and air armament programs.752 Shortly, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras officially notified the British Embassy of the details of the second ten-year naval program which called for two cruisers of 10,000 tons, 12 destroyers of 1,200 tons and 30 submarines (15 coastal types and 15 medium types). The fleet would be divided evenly into two groups each consisting of one cruiser, four destroyers and 12 submarines. Four destroyers and six submarines would be spared as reserves. Finally, one group would be assigned to the Mediterranean and the other to the Black Sea. The war games conducted recently at the war academies validated their centrality to Turkey’s defense. The first cruiser was slated to be ready for commissioning in 1942 and the second by 1945. Until the second cruiser was delivered, the battlecruiser Yavuz would serve as a stopgap. The long-term plans included building a 23,000-ton battleship, to be commissioned between 1950 and 1960. The destroyers and submarines were priority. In the first phase, Turkey needed four destroyers and 10 submarines to be built as quickly as possible. This urgent order would be followed by an order for four additional destroyers.753 The credit facilities were indispensable for the realization of this naval program. Various informal inquiries by the Turkish authorities to this end met with favorable response, because Turkey’s status had been consistently upgraded as a priority customer of British arms after 1936. Initially, Turkey had been grouped together with Greece, Afghanistan and Persia whose requirements would be second only to those of Iraq, Egypt and Portugal. By 1938, it was rated equal third with Portugal in the Mediterranean.754 Nevertheless, British credits for Turkish arms could be made available with two limitations. First, Ankara should not demand or expect urgent deliveries, to avoid interference with Britain’s own arms buildup. Moreover, London urged Ankara to revise its requirement for Washington cruisers and consider instead 8,000 ton cruisers armed with 6.1 inch guns.755 In April 1938, Britain opened a six million pound sterling credit to Turkey, of which 3.6 million was earmarked for Turkish naval air orders. Turkish orders were of such vital importance in the Admiralty’s view that it was ready to tolerate reasonable delays in its own program.756 The reorientation of Turkey’s naval arms trade from revisionist to status quo suppliers proved its changing international status in the 1930s. However, operating on a much restricted leeway, Ankara had to move away from its policy of avoiding alliances with great powers. By 1939, Turkey was compelled to make a clear choice. Security depended less on diplomacy or building coalitions of like-minded states but more on arms and alliances. The essence of the link between arms and alliances was captured by a British diplomat who urged his government to expedite arms shipments to Turkey. He argued: “It is undoubtedly almost as important to arm the Turks as to arm ourselves as they are our most solid ally.”757
Bridging is a manifestation of middle power behavior in international relations. In fact, there is little disagreement on Turkey’s intermediary or secondary status in the world affairs. Moreover, it is not contested either that Turkey can and did punch above its weight. For instance, Mustafa Aydın argues: “[its political involvement and exposed position assign it an importance hardly matched by any other medium power.”759 There is evidence to suggest that Turkish diplomats were very much aware that they were trying something different in the 1930s. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that Turkish statesmen or diplomats ever defined Turkey, at least openly, as being in an intermediate category or a middle power. Turkey stood a cut above its neighbors in certain power resource categories and was recognized, for instance, by the British diplomats as a “small great power.”760 Due to inaccessibility of the Republican diplomatic archives, it is not possible to figure out the prevailing mindset of Turkish diplomats or policy-makers through diplomatic documents written with their own words. In other words, we do not know at present if a policy document similar to the Crowe memorandum exists, expressing with comparable degree of clarity and boldness the line of thinking of Turkish diplomats.761 In the absence of such evidence, any attempt to map out early republican foreign policy ideology has to rely in part on the foreign diplomats' assessments of Turkish diplomatic mindset. However, it is evident that these are not necessarily objective assessments. In most cases, they reflect the biases and prejudices of their authors. The performance of Turkish diplomats at Lausanne prompted conclusions that they were no different than their Ottoman predecessors. For instance, Deringil quotes British Ambassador to Ankara, Sir Percy Lorraine who remarked "The Sick Man is dead but he has left behind many lusty children,"762 Such remarks should be taken with a grain of salt, as the British views on the diplomatic styles of others were probably tainted and even conditioned by their own understanding of international relations, marked by pursuit of balance of power.. Despite the Ottoman heritage, Turkish diplomacy was not premised on great power pretensions or an inflated view of their country. Although Turkish diplomats never shied away from asserting Turkey’s legal equality with others, including great powers, they saw their interests as being more identifiable with those of the minor powers or weaker actors in the international system. Therefore, Ankara principally looked for like-minded partners from among the comparably situated actors in the international hierarchy. This choice clearly reflected the Ottoman experience with both defensive and offensive versions of realpolitik. The defensive realpolitik, based on balancing against great powers, could only slow down the disintegration of the Empire. A shift to offensive realpolitik, based on bandwagoning only hastened the process. Before the First World War, the Ottoman foreign policy was driven by the conviction that “international relations should be seen as entirely determined by military success.”763 The republic inherited the imperial bureaucracy but not necessarily its mindset. During a conversation with an American diplomat in 1934, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras suggested that those who lost must learn how to adapt themselves to the consequences of war- exactly as Turkey had done-because war was a terrible experience.764 Hence, as self-help strategies were doomed to fail in the long-run, Ankara experimented with other-help strategies particularly after its admission to the League of Nations in 1932. Considering the mismatch between the size of its territory and limited means of defense at its disposal, Turkish diplomacy was premised on good international citizenship. Commitment to help others meant Turkey would also deserve the solidarity and support of others in time of need. Turkish policy during the Abyssinian crisis was shaped along those lines, at least initially. Although middle power activism in general calls for an involvement in global issues beyond their immediate concern, middle power status may come after a country first earns regional prominence. On Turkey’s path to becoming a middle power, its regional initiatives in the Balkans played an important role.765 For Ankara, the Balkan Entente was meant to serve, inter alia, as a step towards, or a building block for, a more comprehensive arrangement in the Mediterranean. It was probably not a coincidence that Turkish Foreign Minister Aras had talked for the first time about the Mediterranean project during the meeting of the Balkan Entente in October 1934. To his way of thinking, this pact would need to include France, Italy, the Balkan Entente and even the Soviet Union. Turkish diplomatic leadership occasionally gave thought to, or at least voiced, policies that would imply involvement in global issues. For such policies, Turkish diplomacy enthusiastically hoped to rely on means of multilateral diplomacy, particularly the framework of the League of Nations. For instance, in 1934, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras got so enthusiastic about Turkey’s election to the League Council that he said to an American diplomat that he would work for some sort of universal arrangement which the United States could join, pointing out that the Kellogg Pact was not sufficiently strong to accomplish its purpose.766 Such variations are usually overlooked in most studies. Instead the emphasis is put on themes such as “neutrality”, “isolation,” indifference” in explaining Turkish diplomatic habits. The pursuit of admission to European states system or whatever was left of it was a topped Turkish diplomatic agenda. “Neutrality” or “isolation” would be fundamentally at odds with such a pursuit. In fact, Ankara resisted isolation and exclusion strongly even when it was deliberately left out of initiatives for cooperation or integration in Europe. Briand’s proposed European Union is a case in point.767 Neutrality might be an objective but it did not necessarily mean isolation or indifference. On the contrary, Turkish diplomatic activism in the second half of the 1930s may be construed as an effort to help reconfigure the international setting for sustainable Turkish neutrality. As the world was gradually drifting into yet another major conflict, Ankara was busy contemplating ways to contributing to peace. In 1938, Turkish diplomats assumed that Turkey could best contribute to peace in two ways: First, it should avoid any situation likely to increase the tension between the opposing groups of major powers. Turkey was on its guard against becoming involved in any ideological front or other alignment of powers. The Turkish government could be tempted to identify its interests with those of great powers. It had received offers and inducements from various quarters- but the Turkish government was convinced that their aligning themselves with any group of powers would tend inevitably to embroil them in the situation and create new difficulties and dangers.768 Turkey seized on any opportunity to exert a helpful influence in reconciling any of the antagonisms existing in various parts of Europe. It had built up for itself a respect and prestige disproportionate to its rather meager material resources. This was due to its scrupulous observance of obligations, its renunciation of irredentism and its consistency in maintaining relations of good will and helpfulness with other countries. Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras added that even though his country was one of the smaller powers, it was actually in the position of being an influence for good.769 After 1937, there was not much latitude left for middle power activism in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Balkans or elsewhere. After Munich, the world began to resemble more and more Mussolini’s Four-Pact ideal. Great powers compromised a minor power’s territorial integrity and existence without even consulting the minor power in question. Hence, on the eve of the Second World War, comparably placed states, Turkey’s natural partners, began to side with one or the other great power. There were not so many of them in the Mediterranean where Turkey attempted to act like a middle power by promoting multilateral arrangements for security. The Mediterranean once again turned into a stage for great power rivalry, limiting the scope for initiatives by others. In conclusion, the outbreak of war prevented Turkey from consolidating its status as a middle power. As such, it remained a middle power in the making.
Admiralty (ADM) 116/4198 M02082/38 1/9992 NID 0286/MO87/40 Foreign Office (FO 371)
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Service Historique de la Marine (SHM), Vincennes Carton 1BB2/89 Carton 1BB2/86 Carton 1BB2/91 Carton 1BB2/97 Carton 1BB7/150 Carton 1BB7/169 Carton 1BB7/189
Pacco 1704/7859 Pacco 1714/7889 Pacco 1714/7890 Pacco 1719/7938 Pacco 1720/1727 Pacco 1720/7939 Pacco 1727/7948 Pacco 1727/7975 Pacco 1727/7988 Pacco 1728/2319 Pacco 1731/8003 Pacco 1732/8021 Pacco 1732/8022 Pacco 4171/584
Busta 6/8, Turchia Busta 6/48, Turchia Busta 7, Rapporti Politici Busta 7-Turchia Busta 7/5-Turchia Busta 11/1 Turchia, Busta 11/2 Turchia, Busta 13/6 Turchia Busta 15/1 Turchia Busta 19/1 Turchia
45.292.15 48.307.20 59.89.19
62.420.3 68.451.8 73.23.19 77.66.11 78.77.14 78.77.15 80.525.8 205.814.3 222.498.4 238.605.2 238.606.7 254.712.20 266.798.6 266.798.7 266.798.8 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Sultanahmet, İstanbul 99/4-2, 1338, C26 Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivi, Çankaya, Ankara A.IV-6, D. 54, F63-10 A.IV-6, D. 54, F 64-3 A. IV-6, D. 54, F85-4 A. IV-6, D. 54, F85-15 A. IV-6, D. 54-1, F79 A.IV-6, D. 54-1, F90 A.IV-6, d. 54-1, F90-1 A.IV-6, D. 54-1, F97-1 A.IV-6, D. 54, F100-3 A.IV-6, D.54, F102-63 A.IV-16-b, D. 65, F 3-(302-302) A.IV-16-b, D. 65, F5-17 A.IV-16-b, D. 65, F20-10 A.IV-16-b, D. 65, F20-18 A.IV-18-b, D-74, F1-21 A.IV-18-b, D-74-2, F1-194 United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland Record Group (RG) 59 M530, R 5, Constantinople M530, R 5, Lausanne M530, R 5, Rome M530, R 5, Sofia T1245 ROLL 1, Ankara T1245 ROLL 1, Istanbul T1245 ROLL 4, Bucharest T1245 ROLL 4, Sofia T1245 ROLL 6, Athens T1245 ROLL 10, Ankara Published Documents France Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932-1939, 1ere Série (1932-1935) Vol. IX (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale: 1980). League of Nations (Geneva) Commission of Enquiry for European Union, Minutes of the Second Session of the Commission, C.144.M45. 1931. VII (Geneva, 16 to 21 January 1931). Commission of Enquiry for European Union, Minutes of the Fourth Session of the Commission, C.681.M.287, 1931. VII (Geneva, 3 and 5 September 1931). Documents relating to the Organisation of a System of European Federal Union, A.46.1930. VII (Geneva, 15 September 1930). The Yearbook of International Disarmament (Geneva), 1926-1939. Verbatim Record of the Thirteen Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Plenary Sessions (26 September 1932). Turkey Düstur, Series III (1175-1352), Vol. IX (1927-1928). [Hariciye Vekaleti]. Siyasi Müşavirlik, Briyan Projesine Verilen Cevaplar Hakkında. Ankara: Hariciye Vekaleti Matbaası, 1930. [Hariciye Vekaleti]. Daire IV U.M., Avrupa Federal İttihadı. Ankara: Hariciye Vekaleti Matbaası, 1931. Hariciye Vekaleti Yıllığı 1959, ([Ankara]: T.C. Hariciye Vekaleti, 1959), Meray, Seha L. Lozan Barış Konferansı, Tutanaklar-Belgeler. Vol. 1. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1993.. T. C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: Montreux ve Savaş Öncesi Yıllar (1935-1939), Ankara: T. C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Araştırma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlüğü, 1973. TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Vol. II, Term II; Vol. III Term IV. Interviews Bargut, Şemsettin, Captain (Ret.), Turkish Navy (13 April 2001), Ankara. Urs, Numan, Captain (Ret.), Turkish Navy, (20 February 2003), Gölcük, Kocaeli. Memoirs Bossy, Raoul V., Recollections of a Romanian Diplomat 1918-1969, Diaries and Memoirs of Raoul V. Bossy. Vol. I, ed. G. H. Bossy and M. A. Bossy . Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2003. Büyüktuğrul, Afif, Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Kuruluşu Sırasında 60 Yıl Hizmet (1918-1977. 2 vols.İstanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 2005.
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