Federal political system resolve the problem of premature dissolutions of government in

4.3.1 The Pre-Constitution Phase (1935 – 1956) 
The Government of India Act 1935 provided for setting up a federation consisting of 
Indian provinces (totalling 11 in number) and princely states.
198
The division of 
powers was comprised of three lists of subjects, i.e., federal, provincial and 
concurrent.
199
Residuary powers were vested in the Governor General who exercised 
them as he pleased. 
The 1935 Act almost gave the federating units a federal autonomy.
200
However, there 
were certain constraints provided by the special powers given to provincial 
governors. The Governor General had legislative powers as he could pass 
ordinances and governor's Acts without having to seek consent from the provincial 
legislature and he could also withhold his assent from the passing of provincial 
legislation or veto the entire bill.
201
The provincial governor could also proclaim an emergency and put the whole 
province under federal authority.
202
It is remarkable to note that this power 
198
George Dunbar, A History of India from the Earliest times to the Present Day, vol II (Nicelson & 
Waltson 1943) 236. 
199
The Government of India Act 1935, Sch 7, section 100. The Federal list contained 59 subjects, 
the provincial list 54 and the concurrent list 36 subjects. 
200
Federal autonomy is the kind the researcher argues for. 
201
The Government of India Act 1935. 
202
ibid section 93. 

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49 
continues to be present in the evolved constitution as late as February 2009 when 
Governor Rule was implemented in Punjab. 
The most important and relevant provision of the 1935 Act is that it gave the 
Governor General powers to issue a proclamation of emergency in the entire country 
and assume powers.
203
This power was, as we shall see, exercised in its original and 
its evolved shape several times in the constitutional history of Pakistan. 
Although a bicameral legislature was adopted under the 1935 Act, there was no 
equal representation in the upper house.
204
In the lower house the dilemma was no 
different from that which Pakistan still faces, that is seat allocations. However, the 
historical position under the 1935 act was illogical in a rather different way from 
the current position. Allocation was distributed not on the basis of size of population 
but by reference to the perceived importance of the state. For example, Bombay, 
with a population of 18 million, was allocated 16 seats, whilst Bengal, with a 
population of 20 million, had 20 seats.
205
Likewise, in Royal India the Princely States 
were also given peculiar representations, their total population was 23% and yet 
they were given an allocation of 33% of the seats in the lower house and 40% in the 
upper house.
206
In fact, the creation of Pakistan itself can be construed as the 
disintegration of India as the result of lack of one of the key factors selected for the 
purposes of analysis here i.e. equal representation of all dominions. 
As the Act of 1935 clearly and greatly empowered the agent of the Empire i.e., the 
Governor General, it is reasonable to infer that the legislation was designed to 
preserve the crown’s supremacy. There is, it is argued, evidence of British self-
interest behind the design of the 1935 mode. The decisive authority was vested in 
the British Parliament rather than the Indian parliament. The Viceroy or Governor 
General was granted enormous powers including, but not limited to, legislative and 
executive powers. The Act fails to implement equal representation to the extent that 
even the chief executive was unelected. There was no separation of powers as all 
the powers were vested in the Viceroy and, most importantly, there were no checks 
and balances on this chief executive. Democratic federalism and the key factors 
selected for the purposes of analysis, it is argued, cannot be achieved without 
203
ibid section 102. 
204
ibid. 
205
S M Boss, Working Constitution in India, A Commentary on Government of India Act 1935 (OUP 
1939) 89. 
206
ibid. 

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50 
sovereignty, mainly because of the diminished will or say of the people. India was 
not a sovereign state but a colony and, on this analysis, any so-called federal 
constitution given to her by the Empire was therefore de facto non-federal and non-
democratic. 
Despite its diminished functionality, the 1935 Act was adopted both by India and 
Pakistan in 1947 as they did not have their own constitutions at the time. 
Since the provision allowing the governor general to proclaim an emergency was still 
present in the 1935 Act, the first Pakistani legislature was dissolved in 1954 by the 
then Governor General. The Act of the Governor General was argued to be 
unconstitutional in the Maulvi Tamizuddin case.
207
However, it is argued here that 
although the act may have appeared unconstitutional, it was not strictly speaking 
in violation of the 1935 Act, in fact it was not unlawful at all since the act of 
declaring an emergency was within his powers under the prevailing legislation.
208
This case was the first time in the history of Pakistan that the doctrine of necessity 
was invoked. The Governor General dissolved the Constituent Assembly before the 
expiry of its due term and Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan contested the act of dissolution 
and filed two petitions
209
in the Chief Court of Sindh seeking: 
• A petition for mandamus against the Federation of Pakistan and the 
reconstituted Council of Ministers prohibiting them from interfering with his 
functions as President of the Constituent Assembly.
• A Writ of quo warranto challenging the validity of the appointment of the 
members of the reconstituted Council of Ministers. 
In his ruling, Chief Justice Munir said that 'necessity knows no law', in line with 
Braxton’s maxim,
210
'which is otherwise not lawful is made lawful by necessity' and 
the Roman dictum, 'the wellbeing of the people is the supreme law'. 
207