Otto-suhr-institute

6. Conclusions

The presentation of the publications on the drawing as a method of selection / distribution in politics has put in before the diversity and interdisciplinary interest which he has been subjected since the end of the Second World War. The analysis of this evolution by the employment of methods scientometriques allows in addition to confirm the hypothesis of the quantitative development of a new center of thematic interest within the political philosophy since the end of 1960. The authors and publications on the draw moves closer, whether between-cite, increasingly rely on each other in their arguments, are and discuss: a real network is in training. The study does not prove however that it was not matter has the appearance of a " theory prize draw " on even if it reinforces the intuition that it exists. To confirm or refute the hypothesis definitively it is going to be detailed in the following chapter the discursive content of texts which have been shown the proximity and analyze frames anything economically exploitable employed by the authors is interesting in the draw in politics in order to see if the dynamic quantitative se double of a proximity qualitative leading to the emergence of a theory of democracy random.

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This chapter is intended to confirm or deny the existence of a " theory of democracy " on random, by analyzing the speech of authors supporters of the cleros in politique1. We begin by defining and structuring the search field (1). We will be interested then the analyzes made by the authors of the systems current policies (2) before to itemize their common expectations concerning the employment of the draw in policy (3), continued what we will put forward the differences and the diversity of arguments (4). This work will enable us to respond in the affirmative to the question of the birth of a theory of the draw in politics - here qualified to theory of democracy random - which we can then draw the contours through a development in historical perspective and analytical (5)2.

1This chapter does not include critical analysis of proposals and expectations formulated in the texts of the corpus. The latter will be made in chapter 6.

2It is for this reason that we will talk about " authors aleatoriens " or " theory of democracy ≪ random throughout this chapter when the reference is made to the authors of the corpus.

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1. Definition of the field of investigation

1.1Corpus

The study was debate carried out here is based on the part of the corpus of chapter 2 including the exploratory texts and the texts supporters regarding the sortition3. Three reasons for this choice: first of all, the proposals of sortition are the more close to the real in the sense that they are for existing part, as we will see in the next chapter: there are hundreds of implementation of the proposal of mini-public (cf. chapter 4, p. 200 et seq. ) but any realization of the distribution of custodial sentence by drawing (Lichtmann 1996). Then, a discursive study of the entire corpus would exceed the framework of this work. Finally, the inclusion of exploratory texts allows you to retrieve a large part of the argument of the whole of the authors working on the drawing. Such a limitation reduces the number of texts taken into account here has 67. In agreement with the results of the previous chapter, include as a priority the authors the most central of the corpus4. In order to facilitate the reading, however, would be limited references has two or three for each argument.

1.2Structuring was debate of the study

The first characteristic that struck during the course of the observation is that the vast majority of texts considered follows a structure binary was debate, albeit often presented in a different order: either the author is interested primarily has one (or several) use past or present of the drawing before drawing any conclusions on its potential for the existing democracies, either he begins by identifying what seems to him to be the crises of the present political system before resorting to the draw as a solution, drawing on the historical examples and/or current use. In a minority of cases, the authors are a proposal ex nihilo, that is to say directly with arguments a-historical. The rest of the chapter will resume this binary structure in the following form: we will begin by presenting the criticism made by the current political system (2.1 to 2.4 ) before looking quickly at the bottom joint

3It is therefore in the context of the sortition, as defined in chapter 1, point 4.3.1.5 , p. 78 et seq.

4As a reminder, the five authors the most central are Burnheim, Barber, Elster, Manin and Fishkin.

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For examples of uses of the draw mobilized by the authors (2.5 ). We will detail then the expectations they formulate regarding his employment in politics (3.1 to 3.5 ).

2. The "crises" of the political system liberal

The authors took into account in the study discursive5 have a first common basis to criticize the representative system practice in democracies occidentales6. They focus their thoughts on the different aspects, causes and effects of what they call the crisis of representative democracy that we can study in four thematic clusters: the crisis of representation (2.1 ), that of the participation (2.2 ), the deconstruction of liberal notions of election and of competence (2.3 ) and transverse manner the crisis of legitimacy (2.4 ).

2.1" A crisis of representation that never ends not "7

2.1 .1a criticism on the form

All of the attacks of the authors studied here against the political systems Western liberals must not allow them to believe that it is the same principle of representation they implicate but well its current form. In fact, in the vast majority of texts, direct democracy is certainly presented as an ideal but is rejected for its impraticabilite8. The authors of the corpus consider the representation as necessary to the proper functioning policy (Mueller, Tollison & Willett 1972, 57) :

" It has been generally accepted in political science literature that no matter the priviledges of full participatory (town meeting) democracy, for a wide polity, such as almost any country, this form of government is not feasible. Hence, it is purely technical grounds the closest that a country like the United States could come to a pure democracy would be representative government of some form. ≪9

5We present here the arguments common to the vast majority of authors. The points on which they are divided as well as the diverging opinions isolated are presented infra (cf. p. 162 et seq. ).

6By linguistic facility we will employ interchangeably the terms liberal democracy, representative democracy, western political system liberal and their combinations and components because they are used by the authors to designate the political systems of most western countries, while remaining aware of the problem posed by these designations (Sen 2005). For an example of these designations, see Burnheim (1985, 188) : " Dahl has tea seems useful term "polyarchy" tb désigner tea regimes we usually call democratic in Western countries ".

7Sintomer (2007, 15).

8See for example Burnheim (1985, 91), Carson & Martin (1999, 28-30) or Horn (1980, 20 and 58).

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What then is the purpose of criticism, are the form and content of the representation politically involved.10. Most of the supporters of the draw deal with this problem based on the traditional division performed by Piktin (1967) between formal representation (standing for) and substantial (acting for) and adopt a broad approach to what should be the democratic representation.

2.1 .2a formal representation overdriven

The first catchment area of the representation concerned as well the " representation-figuration ≪ representatives, i.e. their ability to reflect in a passive way the society in the form of the Stellvertretung11. In this context, a " representation representative " should be a statistical reflection of the population as a whole. However, for the authors of the corpus, the western democracies are far from fulfilling this ideal. The first reason for the distortion comes to them the fact that the representation is constructed on a geographical basis - it is the principle of the constituencies - which encourages all kinds of manipulations, including the most well known is the gerrymandering (cutting of constituencies) and as a result high distortions in the representation of structural minorities. Added to this is the problem of localism which prevents the emergence of a general willingness at the national level or even international12.

Beyond the geographic component, the Stellvertretung also suffers from through socio-economic which font that the representatives are not a true reflection of the society. Figures has the support, the authors compare the profile sociological, economic, cultural and ethnic background of elected13 has that of the whole of the citizens, and arrive at the conclusion that representatives and re9See

Also the calculations presented by Dahl (1970, 144-145) or Carson & Martin (1999, 1). The formulation of Burnheim (1985, 91) applies also to be cited: " There is no possibility of reaching reasonable conclusions about matters in which a diversity of interests and opinions are involved by voting or by the direct involvement of all those affected by the decisions. Most decisions have to be left to negotiators (Stockholm who enjoy a very wide margin of discretion about what to concede and what tb refuses to other parties. Realistically, then, the problem of democracy is that of selecting and controlling the representative who are to negotiate the various decisions that have to be made about matters of public policy and administration. ≪

10In the same sense, the authors of the corpus do not criticize the principle of democracy, but its present form. Cf. for example Sutherland (2008, 32). See also the remarks of Barber (1984, XIX).

11Cf. Rosanvallon (2008, 140) for details on this concept.

12The first analysis of the phenomenon is located among Mueller & al. (1972, 59) : " Tying representation tb lease gives rise to the much discussed incentives to logroll for the home district, forcing the polity into negative-sum games. Purely national issues presumably have no representative except tea President and Vice-President ". For an analysis largely updated and thorough, cf. Refehld (2005, 13) or the discussion of the latter with other authors published in the magazine Polity (cf. chapter 2, note 60, p. 110). For an analysis regarding the European Union, see Buchstein & Hein (2009).

13In the texts studied, the term elected is understood in a very broad sense and often designated in a comprehensive manner the elected national and local, legislative, executive and judicial and sometimes even the elected direct and indirect. We will keep this broad meaning. 130

2. The "crises" of the political system liberal

Presented have not large thing in commun14. For some this state of fact is a given intrinsic regimes of representative, rooted in their past the more lointain15. For others, it is rather a drift of the ideal of representative democracy:

" Americans are worried about Congress, and they are right to worry. The founding fathers intended Congress to be representative of all Americans "a portrait of the people in miniature". Purpose today 95% of its members are still white male property-owners, almost half of them lawyers. ≪ (Callenbach & Phillips 1985, 1)16.

Such figures, taken up by each of the authors in its national context, emphasize the existing imbalance between " people " and " elite " on17, between circles popular and affluent minorities, between political class and citizens. This gap would, however, not an inevitability, say the authors, if the elect were at least the incarnation of the symbolic dimension of the representation, that is, if they were considered to be representative by their constituents, as is the case of charismatic leaders. Unfortunately, the texts of the corpus the stress polls has the appui18, the citizens do not feel represented by their political class and the conclusion is without appeal: the symbolic representation is in crisis and beyond the social and economic differences, it is the link between representatives and represented which is broken.

2.1.3 The limits of the substantial representation

" There are two fundamental problems in American politics. The first is that most Americans do not believe that elected officials represent their interests. The second is that they are correct. ≪ (Gastil 2000, 1).

In its analysis, Pitkin noted that the Stellvertretung, for central that it can be, is that a catchment area of representation since a representative ideal, in the liberal sense, must also be capable of acting on behalf of its constituents. The substantial representation or represented14See

Amar (1984, 1284) : " The plight of discrete and insular minorities - paradigmatically, the poor and the blacks - who are systematically denied free access to the bazaar of pluralist politics posed a vexing problem in American democratic and constitutional theory " on. See also Mulgan (1984, 555).

15See for example the analysis of Manin (1996) or that of Mc Cormick (2006, 1).

16A next on the texts activists is illuminating here. More than the writings are polemics, more than they focus on this aspect current socio-economic without genuine historical hindsight. Cf. Sizif (1998) or Weyh (2007). There are also analyzes which consider the non-representativity as sociological fact, without positive or negative value. Dienel (1971b, 155) offers a good example of this type of presentation: " Auf Verbandskongressen oder EIB Protestaktionen sind die Coming Up unter sich, im Supervisory die Fachleute, im Parlamentsausschuss die von den Karrieremechanismen der Parteien Selektierten. ≪

17Callenbach & Phillips (1985, 3): " About half of the electorate, which does not vote, cannot readily be considered to be represented at all, and this group, of course, includes a Ontatio mass of's periodical disadvantaged people (something like a sixth of our population) who bear the brunt of our poverty and unemployment " on. See also Sintomer (2007, 26).

18See for example Gastil (2000, 41-50), Manin (1996, 248-250) or Sintomer (2007, 16).

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TION-delegation (Reprasentation in german) will materialize according to Pitkin (1967, 124-127) on a scale ranging from the agent - an agent with little or no autonomy - the fake, that is to say on the person acting in complete autonomy in name and place of someone else in passing by the delegate, the commissionaire and the trustee. But regardless of its powers, the representative must act in the interest of his authorised representative19 which must have a power of control. If the authors of the corpus differ on the ideal form that should take the substantial representation, they are in contrast to agree to say that it cannot be found that very superficially performed in political reality.

First of all, concerning the defense of the interests of the agents, i.e. the voters, the authors argue the idea that the representatives have developed own interests who take their source in the professionalization of the policy and in its paradigmatic form, the system partisan20. Although any two are analyzed as deviations from the ideal representative, the political parties are the figure the more hated of authors of the corpus which characterized archaic, of oligarchic and inefficaces21. They are the channel quasi-monopoly of selection of candidates for elections. They decide who will be able to submit or. Given that the policy is professionalized, say the authors of the corpus, the selection of candidates is then for the party has choose internally the people who will serve the better its interests independently of those of citoyens22. The latter are reluctant to launch into the adventure, strewn with pitfalls: for count in politics, it is necessary to make a career in a party, fit the echelons of power, be capable of plotting and trahir23. All of these practices are in fact, noted most of the authors, a recurring event of the " iron law of oligarchy " on which is often mobilized as a category of analyse24. The combination of these factors - professionalization and monopoly party19See

For example the definition of Burnheim (1985, 107-108): " My representative should have at least as strong an interest in advancing my interests as I have, should be in a position to devote more time and effort to the task and bring to it superior knowledge and skill. ≪

20See Aguileo Cancio (2010, 12), Carson & Martin (1999, 3) or O'Leary (2006, 34-54).

21See for example Martin (1995, 20) or Sutherland (2008, 11 and 45) : " So political parties are not just useless, their role is actually counterproductive. ≪

22See Buchstein & Hein (2009, 365), Burnheim (1985, 103) or Snider (2006, 1).

23Burnheim (1985, 101) : " The reason many abler and better people give for not going into politics is that they are not well equipped to deal with the continual jockeying for influence and position in party life, the toadying to those already in positions of power, the necessity of discrediting others rather than co-operating with them, the subordination of issues to tactics and so on. ≪

24 See Barber (1984, 205 and 291), Sintomer (2007, 29) or Sutherland (2008, 33). The law in question has been formulated by Michels (1911, 38) : " Zwischen der Monarchy und der Demokratie, die beide ihre Wurzel im Vertretersystem haben, bestehe hochstens bedeutungsloser ein Unterschied im Tempo, against aber in der 132

2. The "crises" of the political system liberal

SAN on the nominations and the policy - fact that the representatives have developed a set of individual interests do not reflect those of the society in general. Three elements characterize these interests. In the first place, they take before any account of the desires own politicians as a social group - the famous political class - and those of the support their having helped to achieve their position, the not less famous vested interests:

" Congress members receive over $300,000,000 , or at in campaign contributions and their votes follow the demands of the popular form sources that provide thesis funds. As one observed in Washington puts it, we now live in has special interest state. ≪ (Callenbach & Phillips 1985, 94)25.

In the second place, the interests of the representatives are limited in temporal terms and geographical. In effect, the politicians are not doing that little - they have no interest in doing so in their electoral optical short-term - of problems that are beyond the horizon national or local generational and then even that a growing number of problems are resolvable difficulties that at the international level or even global and taking into account the generations futures26. Finally, in the third place, and paradoxically, the current representatives have the ability of being able to influence (and even legislate on) the whole of the policy under the fiction that gives them the sovereignty. Thus, they can formulate laws to which they are not submitted, and which they will not suffer the consequences or on the contrary to make laws for themselves, for example on their wages, without no controle27.

That is precisely the second problem that see the authors of the corpus in the representation-current delegation: the mechanism of surrenders of accounts supposed to allow the control of citizens on their representatives does not work or more. The realization the most significant of this deficit is the fact that the representatives can give themselves some rules for itself and thus have the impunity making them vulnerable to the corruption28. A second figure of the lack of control on the representatives is the possibility for the latter to be extended at the

Substanz. Das Volk souverane wahle sich statt eines Konigs met eine Kategorie von kleinen Konigen, und unfahig, seine Herrschaft uber das Staatswesen frei und selbstandig auszuuben, lasse es sich willig within Grundrecht konfiszieren. ≪

25Crosby (1976, 5) : " A selection between a representative democracy and a democracy by lot depends on two factors: how competent are the citizens and how likely are the representative to serve the people as a whole rather than special interests? There is now a fairly average emerge among both hidden faceâ and the general public about the ability or interest of elected representative to serve the interests of all. ≪

26See Dienel (1978), Schmitter & Trechsel (2004, 18-22) or Snider (2006, 3).

27For more details, cf. infra, p. 166.

28See for example Becker (1976b, 183) or Callenbach & Phillips (1985, 45): " Since Congress votes its own wages, establishes an its own budget, and has no known structural existance there have been no internal budgetary reforms in the course of its history, purpose public resentment of recent pay rasies has been intense. ≪ 133

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Power without the agreement, or in contradiction with the wishes of the citizens and to be able to carry out policies contrary to the promises made during campaigns electorales29. And the traditional tool, even unique, for the control of representatives provided by the liberal regimes - it is the elective vote - do filled more than its function, for little than it had ever done (cf infra, p. 137 et seq. ). Taken as a whole, the arguments of the authors of the corpus thus seeking has demonstrate that there is a significant distortion of the representation-delegation30.

2.2The (non) -participation

The second area of analysis of the authors of the corpus concerning the political participation which constitutes a basis for democratic regimes but is doubling in crisis: the traditional channels of participation are drying up while the emerging channels provide only short-term responses and/or insufficient has a substantial problem of distribution of powers within the representative regimes-liberals.

2.2 .1a crisis of traditional channels of participation without real alternatives

Beyond the crisis of representation, the proponents of the theory of democracy random therefore see to draw a crisis of participation: the citizens to withdraw from political life " classic " on31: the rate of participation in elections tend to fall on the long-term, the trade unions and parties are losing members, the citizens seem to become more and more apathetic. The authors of the corpus however, consider that the cause of this evolution is rather a look from the side of the operation of parties and elections that has a lack of intrinsic interest of citizens for the policy (cf. supra p. 127 and infra p. 137 et seq. ). Indeed, in the whole of the texts, the authors argue that citizens would be ready to participate if they had the means and if this was interesting in terms of calculation of costs-avan29See

Gastil (2000, 32 et seq. ), Aguileo Cancio (2010, 20) or Sintomer (2007, 27): " even more than the wine and cheese, the cumulation of mandates is the sector in which the France can claim the excellence. It is also located in the platoon of head for the longevity of political leaders, who, despite the electoral defeats, will represent again and again in the elections. ≪

30In substance (Burnheim 1985, 7), " The system is corrupt and corrupting. We do not realize how badly it functions only because the existing alternatives are worse. ≪

31On the notion of conventional channels, see Norris (2002, 3-19) or Barber (2003, XI). On the inadequacy of existing channels, cf. Dienel (1971a, 152), Carson & Martin (1999) or Schmitter et al. (2004, 23-44).

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Vantages, which is not the cas32. On the contrary, the policy area is reduced and the interest that the citizens there are decreases proportionally. A large part of the population tended to be apathetic, is no longer interested in politics except to criticize and the Politikverdrossenheit reign in maitre33.

This crisis could however be the sign of a renewal, a change of modes of participation, and, the weakness of the traditional channels could quite be alleviated by the emergence and the development of new forms, more adapted to the global transformations of the society. This is a problem that the proponents of democracy random deal in is interesting more particularly has three thematic: the democracy of opinion, the semi-direct democracy and the socialist alternative. The first, analyzed as the product of the development of a democracy of earth based on the polls and the media coverage of the policy, has deeply influenced the functioning, or even the nature of the schemes and representative has given birth of the major problems in making the system more direct, immediate and much less deliberatif34. The policy becomes a matter of opinion, it is conducted on a day by day, appreciate the results of polls, given the primacy to the emotions, to the short-term, the views not illuminated in a logic of speech and not of discussion35. Such a development does not therefore seem to be an adequate response to the crisis of the participation classic, it represents even an additional problem.

May be should we then turn to the semi-direct democracy? Not meet most of the authors. The referendums, legislative or popular initiative, are useful but not

32Sintomer (2007, 17), Burnheim (1985, 78): " There is a great interest in public affairs and, I believe, great 'willingness' to participate in them if only it were more possible to do so in some limited purpose effective way. ≪

33Barber (1984, 221) : " Constituents of thin democracies are normally stirred into action only by constitutional crises and governmental write-offs; otherwise, they are content to leave the governing to others and to reserve their energies for the boundless private sphere. Aside from the occasional election, tea were infrequent letter to a congressperson, gold the biennial media event of a political scandal, citizenship reduces tb sourt year exercise in customer relations gold has political insurance policy. ≪

34Fishkin (1995, 62): " Just as in ancient Athens, where the lottery was used so frequently that each citizen had a good chance of occupying a position of responsibility at some point in his lifetime, each American citizen now has a good chance of being consulted (people who provide input on several occasions by opinion polls. The difference, however, is that the Athenian lottery put citizens in councils, juries, and legislative committees, where they had to become immersed in the competing arguments before they where asked to make a decision. Phone sondages consult you in you living room, without warning or preparation, in order to find out your views - when you may well have had no reason to develop any opinions convention on the subject being asked. " See also the assumptions of Manin (1996, 279 et seq. ).

35Barber (1984, 175) : " The aim in adversarial proceedings is to prevail - tb verbal score points and to overcome one's interlocutors. In fact, speech in adversary systems is a form of aggression, simply one more variety of power. ≪ See also O'Leary (2006, 22-26) or Sintomer (2007, 32). 135

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Sufficient because they are based on the same assumptions that the traditional instruments of representation, and in particular on the vote, thus suffering the same missed36 :

" Social scientists and political elites have all too often indulged themselves in this form of hypocrisy" not "high-pocrisy. They throw referenda at the people without providing adequate information, full debate, however careful insulation from money and media pressures and then pillory them for their lack of judgment. They overwhelm the people with the least tractable problems of mass society - busing, inflation, tax structures, nuclear safety, right-to-work legislation, industrial waste disposal, environmental protection (all of which the representative elites themselves have utterly failed to deal with) - and then carp at their uncertainty or indecisiveness. ≪ (Barber 1984, 154).

The most ancient texts also address the issue of the alternative Socialist/Communist and of the revolution as a means of resolving the crisis the better to quickly reject as the setbacks of a same medal, the power of elites and non of the peuple37. And it is precisely this that take a stress the authors of the corpus: the low participation and the lack of real alternatives is that the visible part of a failure more deep of representative regimes.

2.2 .2An unequal distribution of powers

" Polyarchy has an irreparable flaw - the remoteness of the government (I have in mind chiefly the national government) from the citizen. For the ordinary citizen ed. by little or not at all in many decisions that have crucial import for his life. ≪ (Dahl 1970, 142).

As the emphasized Dahl, this structural lack is the following: in the liberal democracies, the citizens have in reality that a tiny real power of decision38. This fact is analyzed in part as a result of cyclical uptake of powers by the political parties, as we have seen. It is also the consequence of the vote elective: in a large electorate, each voting has only a tiny chance to find themselves in a position to be the decisive voter what fact of the vote - a point of view utilitarian - an act which will cost more than it reported. In reality, this tool which is virtually the only lever of influence of citizens on the policy, is barely more than an act symbolique39. A distribution so uneven of powers is also view by number of authors as a structural element of representative governments,

36See for example Callenbach & Phillips (1985, 41), Martin ( 1995,40 ) or Sutherland ( 2008,94 -100).

37See for example Burnheim (1985, 49) or Dienel (1969).

38Burnheim (1985, 48) : " The most common complaint against contemporary liberal democracies is the remoteness of the decision-makers from those affected by decisions. Those affected have little say in those decisions unless they happen to be in a position to bring organized pressure on the decision-makers, and the ability to bring such pressure is very unequally distributed, usually in favor of groups that are already highly advantaged in their socio-economic power. Purpose the present complaint is more fundamental. It concerns not only the existence of great inequalities in the distribution of power, aim the incapacity of most people to do anything toward righting them. ≪

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Designed as schemes requiring high passivity on the part of citoyens40. The presentation and the criticism of such a vision of Schumpeterian democracy represents in fact the entrance door of a remission in more fundamental issue of foundations even of liberal thought, that the authors will employ a deconstruct.

2.3Deconstruct the foundations of liberal regimes

In their search for the real causes of the crises of liberal democracies, the authors of the corpus are focusing their attention on what they identify as the two pillars of liberal regimes and shall endeavor to make a systematic critique.

2.3 .1a discount in question of the elective vote

" Our primary electoral act, voting, is rather like using a public toilet: we wait in line with a crowd in order to close ourselves up in a small compartment where we can relieve ourselves in solitude and in privacy of our burden, pull a-level, and then, yielding to the next in line, go silently home. ≪ (Barber 1984, 188).

The vote elective - analysis in its aspects cyclical but also structural41 - is the prime focal point identified by the set of authors as center around which revolve the crises of the regimes actuels42 representative. The current elections, note-they, are legacies of the past that no longer has a sens43. The vote is not profitable in terms cost-benefit, it is more a symbolic act fort (highlights) and " the outcome of general elections depends more on the weather on polling day however the fate of the national football team than it does on the coherence of the policies presented " on44. Beyond that, it is in reality the sys39See

Elster (1987, 149) : " Under a deterministic voting system there is little point in voting for a candidate whose victory is confidently expected in any box, whence the traditionally low participation rates in the American South. Similarly, there is no point in voting for a candidate who has virtually no chance of being elected, whence the difficulties of new parties in attracting votes " on. See also Mueller & al. (1972, 57): " Another problem with the present representative forms is that in a large number setting the individual voters may feel powerless to affect outcomes and may "rationally" decided to be translated locally using thesis grounds. ≪

40See Manin (1997), Mc Cormick (2006) or Barber (1984, 198) : " Indeed aggressively, the thin design of democracy depends so much it was passive and inarticulate citizenry that Bernard Berelson and his colleagues have asked, "How could a mass democracy work if all the people were deeply involved in politics?" ≪.

41On this distinction, see Horn (1980, 13).

42This is of course linked to the fact that the vote is regarded as a central element of this which defined the representative regime: " Of all the institutions that we associate with democratic government in the West, none msfss so central as voting. ≪ Barber (1984, 198).

43Cf. for example Sutherland (2008, 11) who spoke of " rusty Victorian ballot box " on.

44Sutherland (2008, 141). In the same direction see Carson & Martin (1999). 137

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Electoral system taken as a whole which is in crisis. Each election, support the perpetrators supporters of the drawing is a further evidence that the electoral process is monopolized by the political parties and dominated by money and private interests. The logic is simple: politicians live on the policy that is their business, their interest is therefore to maintain has their position, i.e. to be re-elected. To do this, it must meet a number of sufficient votes which cost a considerable sum of money. It must therefore be " sell his policy " to the highest bidder in order to recover the funds required for the re-election and has the maintenance of the machine partisane45. In this same logic of maximization of votes, the candidates would be pushed to make vague promises for little that they are broad, without worrying about their feasibility46 which would leave the voters that the choice of the least worst solution47 and would initiate a vicious circle of increasing incompetence:

" When one's personal choice (vote) has relatively small impact, then the principle of economy diktats that it is irrational to spend that much time on the choice. Candidates know this and realize that they are more likely to be elected if they can extend wave promised to all than if they adopted specific stands on issues. This makes it even harder for the idealistic vote who still persists in being well informed. The result is a system which reinforces citizen incompetence. ≪ (Crosby 1976, 5).

For most of the authors, these faults are however that the tip of the iceberg and the real problem is the voting procedure elective in itself which is attacked on at least four components: it is manipulatable and non-resistant to strategic calculations, it does not allow to reveal the preferences of voters, it does not allow the voters to really give a mandate and it is a procedure aristocratic by nature. The first criticism is that the vote is not a procedure strategy proof, that most of the authors of the corpus stress based on the work achieved in the years fifty and soixante48. A vote may be manipulated by the creation of temporary majorities and of strategic coalitions: it is to achieve the best deal  in a game of bargaining and static agregatif49.

45The politicians have as well an economic approach to democracy, in the direction of Downs (1957, 137) : " Year contractor selling policies for votes instead of products for money. ≪ On this point see Becker (1976b, 127-139), Callenbach & Phillips (1985, 35) or Aguileo Cancio (2010).

46See Burnheim (1985, 97) or Manin (1996, 248-249).

47Amar (1984, 1297) : " Individuals are often forced to vote for the lesser of two major-party evils' ,. ≪

48That is the reason why so many authors cite Arrow (cf. chapter 2, illustration 24, 120).

49Barber (1984, 136-137): " Where voting is a static act of expressing one's preference, participation is a dynamic act of imagination that requires participants to change how they see the world. Voting suggests a group of men in a cafeteria bargaining about what they can buy as a group that will follows their individual tastes. Strong democratic politics suggests a group of men in a cafeteria contriving new menus, inventing new recipes, and experimenting with new number in the effort to create a public taste that they can all share and that will supersede the conflicting private tastes about which they once tried to strike bargains. ≪

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The authors of the corpus also consider that the vote elective such as designed in the liberal democracies commits the mistake to confuse the voting procedure with the expression of a preference qualitative50. Added to this is the fact that a single vote is in the inability to reflect the whole spectrum of opinions put in debate during a vote, which becomes especially bothersome during general elections. In addition, it is often a impose to the electors to formulate a preference that they have perhaps not even:

" In practice people do not have definite preferences over the whole range of alternatives that affect them. They have neither the information nor the analytical skill nor the imagination to construct the sort of stable schedules that the economists' calculations require. They simply do not have the fate of preferences that economists want them to "reveal". ≪ (Burnheim 1985, 83-84)51.

The third criticism concerning the substantive vote elected is that it strengthens the imbalance of power between citizens and elus52. By putting their power in the hands of representatives, citizens are depriving themselves of their sovereignty and to enable the political class to monopolize the legitimate political action. By the game of a vicious circle, the citizens will eventually lose their competence to transform little has little in an earth apathique53. The last criticism against the vote concerns its supposed nature or even aristocratic oligarchy. The vote, even in its form the more egalitarian of universal suffrage, creates an equality which is fictitious and which largely ignored the socio-economic conditions of its realisation54. The principle of one man one vote does not take the test of reality. In reality, the vote favors the social strata that have the necessary resources, symbolic and economic, to participate in the competition. It is a procedure which asked the voters to choose non- " the first venus " but " the best " on55. Those end up elsewhere by believing that they

50Burnheim (1985, 83-84): " My voting for rather than against does not say how strongly I am in favor of a proposal. It cannot express anything like a price I am willing to pay. A majority with slight preferences one way may outvote almost as many strong preferences the other way. ≪

51Cf. also Barber (1984, 199; 203-205) which qualified the vote of " unresponsive to intensity and commitment " and deals with the problem or Gastil (2000, 32-67) which deals in detail with the problem of information.

52Martin (1995, 25): " It should be a truism that elections empower tea PWO's and not the voters. ≪

53This problem had been raised by Rousseau, but found an echo important among the authors of the corpus which often comment the negative logic of the monopolization of political power. See for example among Sutherland (2008, 35 et seq. ) or among Gastil (2000, 40 et seq. ).

54Barber (1984, 146) : " Equality, undertakings makes it exclusively in terms of abstract personhood gold of legal and electoral equity, omits the crucial economic and social determinants that shape its real-life incarnation. ≪ Amar (1984, 1291) : " Yet the reality of Reynolds is that when representative are selected by majority rule, the votes of those in the minority do not truly count ... In a real way, the current system has wasted their votes instead of counting them equally, and the "one person, one vote" promised ... passã breached image. ≪

55See Manin (1996) or McCormick (2006, 1) : " Put simply, election is a magistrate selection method that directly and meaning work- favors tea popular form and keeps political offices from being distributed widely among citizens of all socioeconomic backgrounds. ≪

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Are actually higher than the common mortal and the vote ends by convert into a procedure which enhances the reproduction of the elite56. The deconstruction theoretical carried out by the authors is double in the vast majority of texts in a historical context to understand how and why the vote was able supplant the draw as instrument of democracy has such a point to become the synonym then even that he had been chosen in knowledge of cause by the founders of liberal regimes to create elitaires57 regimes.

Despite this load very offensive against the principle of the election, the authors of the corpus him recognize two advantages. The first is without a doubt that the election " make it possible peacefully to eject a government and replace it with a government that is at least less disagreeable to the largest cohesive group of voters " on58. The second element which attracts the attention of the sponsors is the symbolic potential of the act of voting that they say they want to take into account at the time of rebuild of new institutions, including to compensate for its perte59.

2.3 .2against the Liberal definition of the jurisdiction

" The typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. Hey allegedly infringing and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infant within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes a primitive again. His thinking become associative and affective. ≪ (Schumpeter 1942, 262).

Parallel to the developments on the vote elective, the authors of the corpus have in common to be interested in the concept of political jurisdiction in a critical optical and are instead deconstructing in three steps the concept prevail in liberal democracies. They focus first of all to show that the staff policy elected is in reality not more competent than

56This is the idea of the distinction (Manin 1996, 125 et seq. ). See also Emerey (1976b, 200) : " The behavior of thesis token representative is likely to re-reinforce thesis trends. They will tend to regard themselves as cut above their electorate by the mother inv of being elected tb notamment auspicious bodies. ≪

57Callenbach & Phillips (1985, 2) : " When they thought of "the whole society" they tended to mean propertied dialog box white males, and much of Federalist doctrine speaks to the desirability of a government's reflecting the stabilizing role of "influential persons". ≪ Cf. also Dowlen (2008a) or Mulgan (1984, 540).

58However, even in these cases, most of the authors relativize their remarks. Thus Burnheim (1985, 85) he continues: " But this gain is a gain only when compared with other systems of tenure of office that rest on heredity gold co-option gold military force. It probably has few disadvantages that are not shared by those other systems, goal equally it shares most of their disadvantages " on. See also (Sutherland 2008, 23): " The best you can say is that a mechanism to "throw the rascals out" every few years is at least some form of protection against complacency, corruption or tyranny. ≪

59See Mulgan (1984) and more generally Schmitter & Trechsel (2004, 92-96).

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The average voter but yet that this last is - or could be - far more competent than his representative ; said out (Sutherland 2008, 84) : " Grandma, not the gentleman from Whitehall, knows best. ≪. By analyzing the concrete framework of contemporary elections, the authors note an interesting paradox:

" Election process hast practised in our media age rewards candidates who have congenial TV images, have a convincing verbal delivery, and are adept tools at sensing transient public emotional moods. Thesis quality do not necessarily correlate with either intelligence or responsible political leadership. ≪ (Callenbach & Phillips 1985, 22).

In such conditions - which are greatly due to the transformations of the liberal democracies in democracies of earth and of opinion - the elections are therefore not, or more than, a way to choose the candidates with the best skills policies. To the contrary, what is put in front and allows to triumph, this are of media skills and communicationnelles60. This ominous trend is exacerbated by the phenomenon supporter that fact that the candidacy has a political position is a function of the ability to impose inside his party and not that of defending the interests of constituants61.

The authors of the corpus does not stop yet not has these aspects cyclical; they are wondering about the notion of political jurisdiction and trying to identify the liberal concept. The latter - analyze-they - is characterized by a skeptical posture vis-a-vis the people and its ability to participate in power. It is a low concept of citizenship which is then drawn and which pushed the Liberals to justify the limitation on the participation of citizens in the election of the representatives, capable, them to carry out in agreement with the experts the politiques62 affairs. This is the same type of design that pushes a reject the most direct forms of democracy, even if the principle of participation is acquired in theorie63. This vision of the com60In

This meaning, Sutherland (2008, 19) notes that studies of anthropology seem to confirm that the victories in elections depend on more of the shape of the face that the political program (Little & al. 2007).

61See supra (p. 131), the critical toward the political parties. Barber (1984, 152) adds: " Liberal and representative modes of democracy make politics year activity of specialists and experts whose only distinctive qualification, however, turns out to be simply that they engaged in politics. ≪

62We find the opinion of Schumpeter or the oldest of Montesquieu (The Spirit of Laws, book XI, Chapter VI): " The great advantage of representatives, is that they are able to discuss business. The people there is point of any own ; which form one of the great disadvantages of democracy ... ] There had been a large vice in most of the former republics: it is that the people had a right to take the active resolutions, and which require some running, something which it is entirely incapable. It must enter in the government that to choose its representatives, which is very has its scope. Because, if there is little people who know the precise degree of the ability of men, each is yet capable of knowing, in general, if the person he chooses is more enlightened than most of the other. ≪

63Delannoi (2003, 12): " However, the reluctance to the procedures the more democratic has deeper roots, often close to the reluctance platoniciennes. The idea of Protagoras, according to which the political competence and the competence moral, unlike other skills, are also distributed 141

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Policy floundering, in general principle and limited in practice would represent as well the heart of the Liberal argument, but would not faithful to the reality of a jurisdiction much more multidimensional than the authors attach then was present. The starting point of this work is shown by querying the Dahl:

" Is the ordinary man incompetent? No judgment is more decisive for one's political philosophy. It was peut the single most important difference in judgment between Plato and Aristotle. If you believe, as I do, that on the whole the ordinary man is more qualified than anyone else to decide when and how hey alternaitve Agent will coax it decisions he feels are important to him, then you will surely opt for political equality and democracy. ≪ (Dahl 1970, 35)

If you look at the level of individuals and of the decisions that affect them directly, say the authors of the corpus, we can advance the idea that citizens are competent enough to know what draws and what the gene. They seem to be able to recognize the famous pragmatist definition of Dewey (1927, 207) : " The man who new added locations from the shoe knows best that it pinches HBTX and where it pinches HBTX, even if tea expert shoemaker is the best judge of how the disorder is to be remedied. ≪64 However, even this vision seems too reductive has most of the authors who consider that in reality it is the average citizen who could well find also be the best judge of how to solve the problem if it were put in a proper situation:

" Political scientists have shown beyond doubt that within the current political system the average citizen is not a very competent vote. Purpose no one has taken the time to see how competent citizens might be under circumstances designed to promote their competency. ≪ (Crosby 1976, 2)65

Such a vision puts forward a competence of use, special, in contrast with the supposed reflexive competence and general representatives of liberal thought which is for the authors of the corpus a fiction: there is no skill objective and complete but only skills subjective and partial. And this all the more, they point out, if we take into account that our societies have become complex societies and crossed by the idea of the risk66: an increasing number of areas are characterized pat the absence of solution " objectively better " on whether it is of biotechnology, the environment, or other areas yet and modern societies are at this point complex that it is impossible to be

Between all hits too many minds. This idea is both admitted and denied by the DOXA Documentary film contemporary democratic, therefore recognized in principle but watered down by the procedures. ≪

64 In the words of Becker (1976, 184): " We believe ... that you don't have to be an expert to know what you want. ≪

65The authors of the corpus often insist on this argument of non-jurisdiction of the voters, but interpret it as a sign of a problem in the voting procedure that would not allow the citizens to be competent. Cf. Gastil (2000, 30 et seq. ) or Sutherland (2008, 20 et seq. ).

66On the risk, see Sintomer (2007, 22-23). On the relativity see Barber (1984, 120).

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Perfectly competent, would that in one area only. The idea of a political jurisdiction objective and monolithic is then obsolete and there is jurisdiction that multidimensional and subjective. The consequence of such an assertion is that the concept must be understood in terms of mainly procedural: firstly, it is by participating as the one becomes competent and the more we participated the longer it will be competent67. Secondly, it is important not to try the " true " or the " best solution " but it must concentrate efforts on the design of procedures to formulate common compromise.

2.4A legitimacy crisis widespread

2.4 .1The liberal democracies contradictions between structural and cyclical transformations

" Most people attribute problems with representative government tb PWO's individual and specific policies. A standard assumption is that if only the right people could be elected and the correct policies implemented, then everything would be okay. Purpose the problems go much deeper. ≪ (Carson & Martin 1999, 1)

All the analyzes concerning the representation and participation, coupled with the deconstruction of the founding concepts of the liberal democracies prompted the authors of the corpus has portray a situation of generalized crisis of their legitimacy, which does not seem at first sight find no viable alternative. The phenomena as the professionalization of the political, partisan politics, society from the risk and other factors, such as globalization are today highlighted the deep contradictions of representative regimes. The initial tension between people and elite, who had been able be a time exceeded by the democratic potential of the elective vote spring with more force still as before and the liberal democracies have become - or reverted - of " oligarchies has democratic legitimacy " on68. The same forces of these regimes - the distance between reflection and action, between agents and

67Dienel (1971b, 155) : " Informierheit lasst sich wie eine Funktion von Teilnahme behandeln. " On This idea is that of empowerment that we'll go into later (cf. p. 152 et seq. ).

68Delannoi (2003, 9). See also for example the qualification given by Burnheim (1985, 1) of the first sentence of his book: " Democracy does not exist in practice. At best we have what the ancients would have called elective oligarchies with strong monarchical elements. ≪

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Constituents, the media coverage - have become its weaknesses. And the transformations added that made the regimes of the earth have yet more fragilises69.

2.4 .2of the reform proposals insufficient

Taken together, the crises of the representative regime constitute liberal as well for the authors supporters of drawing a particularly worrying situation to which he must respond by a structural solution and not by the cyclical adjustments. In fact, most of the authors do not ignore that many proposals for reform are regularly made to improve the representation and/or participation in liberal democracies, but they consider the latter inadequate. The reforms concerning the vote elected their seem thus be at the level of the fight against the symptoms and not against the cause of the evil: to limit the expenditure of campaigns, fund the elections by public money, change the mode of voting, are as much of noble ideas but inutiles70. The same goes for the proposals concerning new forms of participation and, in particular, the semi-direct democracy, as we have seen precedemment71. What is needed is a more radical solution, but however realistic, that most of the perpetrators are working to seek in the history of political practices.

2.5The best practices, from Athens to the mini-public

Throughout their attacks in rule against the regimes contemporary representative, or on the contrary before turning to the issue of the relevance of the topic, the authors of the corpus slurp in the history and the political practice of many examples that provide according to them tracks allowing to formulate solutions to the current crises. This pool of practice constitutes a real anchor point common. The historical reference most cited, commented on and analyzed is without no doubt the ancient Athens. Of the 67 texts present in the corpus,

69Fishkin (1995, 62) : " The most striking vulnerability of mass democracy is that it neglects one of the values emphasized by the founders - deliberation " on.

70See for example Barber (1984, 206), Callenbach & Phillips (1985, 39) or Dienel (1971b, 152-154). See also the critical scope by Martin (1995, 22) has the idea that the development of new radical political parties could be a solution to the crisis of the parties of the masses.

71See Martin (1995, 30 et seq. ), O'Leary (2006, 28) who spoke of " trap of direct democracy " or Sutherland (2008, 56). It should be noted that the authors supporters of the draw offer them-even a new form of participation and that they often criticize the semi-direct democracy for better put in before the supposed advantages of their models. 144

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47 OR 71% also refer to it, in particular in detailing its two major institutions, the ball and  the dicastes72. For most authors, Florence and Venice are also exciting examples of republican systems which we could learn a lot.

These historical references are not, however the only horizon practice theorists of the prize draw which, for some twenty years, can refer to a growing number of jobs of the pull and policy in the framework of participatory democracy. The practice the most analyzed is that of mini-public that we will be considering later and which we will see the importance for the interaction between theory and practice later. The third exemplary practice mobilized by the authors of the corpus is located in the judicial sphere ; this are well on juries. These latter are often taken as a point of departure for reflections on the competence of the citoyens73. Beyond these examples, the authors cite and are interested has an infinite number of examples in order to base their demonstrations and to formulate expectations face has the use of the draw in policy but that it would be too long to detail here.