Assessing ISS vs. al-Shabaab on Governance When it comes to governance, ISS appears to have relatively lit-
tle capability. Reports of ISS governance are virtually nonexistent.
Even when ISS held the town of Qandala in October 2016, there
was no evidence ISS made a real attempt at governing.
i
Especially
given that civilians of Qandala fled during the fighting, this removed
the chance of ISS engaging in any form of governance. Its current
territorial holdings, thought to be small swaths in the mountainous
areas of the Bari region,
j
contain few to no civilians, and the land
that the group is assumed to hold is not believed to be very ex-
pansive. The nearest suggestion of possible ISS governance comes
from an ISS defector, Abdulahi Mohamed Saed, who told Puntland
authorities of ISS members engaging in extortion.
48
However, this is
likely in reference to extortion of civilian populations in ISS’ area of
operations generally and not in any direct way in reference to those
that it “governs” per se. For its part, al-Shabaab acts, in many parts of the country, as a
full-on stand-in for the state. Among other governance capabilities,
in varying locales it provides food, water, and education; runs an ef-
fective judiciary; provides security; has an effective tax system; and
maintains roads.
49
To that end, as of mid-2017, the researcher Tricia
Bacon found that “
al-Shabab is thriving because it’s still offering a
comparatively attractive alternative to the Somali government. It
capitalizes on grievances, keeps areas secure and settles disputes,
with relatively little corruption.”
50
Indeed, whereas ISS’ potential for governance is inherent-
ly stunted because of its limited territorial claims, in the case of
al-Shabaab, it is precisely because of the wide-ranging territorial
presence of the group that capacity for governance is imperative.
Primarily situated in the Hiran, Middle Shebelle, Lower Shebelle,
Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Lower Juba, and Middle Juba regions in south-
ern Somalia,
al-Shabaab maintains a significant presence in central
and northern Somalia as well.
51
While the group has been forced
out of many of its urban strongholds by African Union and Somali
i
The authors have not been able to find any evidence of this taking place.
j
To date, ISS appears to be almost exclusively centered in the mountainous
Bari region of northern Somalia. This concentration in Puntland has been
confirmed by the aforementioned June 2017 ISS defector, as well as by
release of photos from the Islamic State’s central media office on October
11, 2017, showing Mumin’s ISS troops in terrain that appeared to be the Bari
mountains. Giving further credence to the fact that the group is primarily
based in Bari, many of the operations of the group take place in Bosaso, the
capital of the Bari region.